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Adult Mental Health Essay
Both behaviour therapists and cognitive therapists may use 
behavioural techniques in the treatment of anxiety disorder and 
depression. However, the underlying theoretical rationales for the 
use of these behavioural techniques differs. Critically evaluate 
these different theoretical rationales by drawing on the literature
from anxiety and depression
Introduction
This essay will describe the theories underlying the practice of behaviour and 
cognitive therapy. Behavioural techniques common to both behaviour and 
cognitive therapy will be outlined. The rationale for the use of these behavioural 
techniques in both behaviour and cognitive therapy will be described. Finally 
literature from anxiety and depression will be used to evaluate the two different 
theoretical rationales. Due to the large body of literature on anxiety and 
depression the evaluation will concentrate on evidence which differentiates the 
two theoretical approaches.
Due to the large number of anxiety disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) this essay 
will only focus on literature relevant to panic disorder, on which there is a 
relatively large body of research (Clark, 1997). To do justice to all behavioural 
and cognitive theories would be beyond the scope of this essay. Therefore 
principles underlying behaviour theory, classical and operant conditioning, will 
be briefly described and then disorder-specific models will be explained in more 
detail. For panic disorder the essay will concentrate on the recent classical 
conditioning model (Wolpe & Rowan, 1988) and the cognitive model proposed 
by Clark (1986). When evaluating the theories of depression the most influential 
behavioural theory of depression (Williams, 1997), the operant theory of lack of 
or reduced level of reinforcement hypothesis (Costello, 1972; Lewinsohn et al., 
1970; cited in Williams, 1997) and Beck’s (Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1979) 
cognitive model of depression will be described.
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Early behavioural theory: classical and operant conditioning
Behaviour therapy has its foundations in animal research performed earlier in this 
century. There are two main components of behaviour theory; classical and 
operant conditioning. Pavlov (cited in Hawton, Salkovskis, Kirk and Clark, 1989) 
showed that when an unconditioned stimulus (e.g. a bell ring) was paired with a 
conditioned stimulus (e.g. food) dogs produced an unconditioned response (e.g. 
salivating). Furthermore, Pavlov also showed that when the dogs were presented 
only with the bell ring, without the presence of food, they still salivated 
(conditioned response). Thus, the dogs learned the association between the bell 
(conditioned stimulus) and the arrival of food (conditioned response). This 
procedure, termed classical conditioning, has implications for human learning 
and has been applied to the understanding of human psychological disorders 
(Hawton et al., 1989). Anxiety according to the classical conditioning perspective 
occurs as a result of learned associations between otherwise neutral stimuli 
(conditioned stimulus) and psychological discomfort (anxiety as a conditioned 
response).
Behaviour theory draws on operant conditioning principles to explain why the 
psychological disorder is maintained. Operant conditioning, highlighted by 
Skinner (cited in Hawton et al., 1989), specifies that behaviour is maintained by 
reinforcement. That is, the individual learns that if in the context of a particular 
stimulus (antecedent), he/she performs a behaviour (behaviour), that behaviour is 
subsequently reinforced (consequence), the individual is likely to perform the 
behaviour again, having learnt the association between behaviour in the context 
and reinforcement. For example in the presence of anxiety-inducing stimuli 
(antecedent) an individual often displays avoidance (behaviour) of the stimuli to 
reduce fear (consequence), thus the avoidance is reinforced by the reduction of 
anxiety (Hawton et al., 1989). Behaviour theory states that this process maintains 
behaviour. Mowrer (1947, 1960; cited in Hawton et al., 1989) proposed a two- 
factor model of anxiety. According to this theory fear is developed through 
classical conditioning and maintained through operant conditioning.
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Behavioural and cognitive approaches to anxiety: panic disorder
Definition o f panic disorder
A panic attack is defined as a discrete period of intense fear or discomfort during 
which at least 4 of 13 somatic or cognitive symptoms are present. Panic disorder 
is characterised by recurrent panic attacks with the requirement following at least 
one panic attack there is a period of a month during which the individual worries 
about having another attack, worries about the implications of the attack (e.g. 
dying) and during which there is a significant change in behaviour (DSM-IV; 
APA, 1994).
Classical conditioning model
Wolpe & Rowan (1988) advanced a classical conditioning model of panic 
disorder. They suggest that the first panic attack is a response to the bodily 
symptoms or physiological sequelae to hyperventiliation (e.g. feelings of 
depersonalisation, increased heart beat). Wolpe and Rowan state that following 
the experience of the first panic, the individual learns the association between 
surrounding stimuli at the time (e.g. the environment), accompanying 
physiological symptoms and panic. Resulting panic attacks are conditioned 
responses to the conditioned internal or external stimuli (physiological symptoms 
produced by hyperventilation or environmental contextual cues respectively). 
Thus, Wolpe & Rowan’s model proposes panic to be a conditioned response to 
stimuli associated with the first panic attack.
Cognitive theory
Clark (1986) applied the Beckian cognitive model (first developed to explain 
depression as described later) to the explanation of panic. Clark’s theory specifies 
that it is not the experience itself but the individual’s interpretations of 
physiological sensations that produce panic. This model, like Wolpe & Rowan’s,
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proposes that the trigger for the panic can be internal or external. Attribution of 
threat to stimuli would then result in increased body sensations as an autonomic 
nervous system reaction. Clark describes how individuals with panic disorder 
then misinterpret bodily sensations in a catastrophic manner, for example 
believing that a rapid heart beat is a sign of impending heart attack and death. 
Clark’s model specifies how these misinterpretations can further increase focus 
on and exacerbate bodily symptoms (for example the belief that one is about to 
have a heart attack is likely to induce intense fear and thus the body’s autonomic 
nervous system will react to fear by further increasing heart rate!). A circular and 
causal relationship is formed between interpretation and aggravation of 
symptoms, such that sensations will increase to such an unbearable level that the 
individual is convinced of impending catastrophe. Thus, central to Clark’s theory 
is the notion that panic attacks are mediated by cognitive interpretations of bodily 
symptoms.
Behavioural techniques: exposure and relaxation
The behavioural technique of exposure to symptoms eliciting a panic attack is 
advocated in both theoretical frameworks. Exposure is either gradual, involving 
small increments in intensity of symptoms or fear, or is very intense, during 
which an individual might be exposed to a full panic attack. Exposure to 
symptoms of a panic attack may be to internal stimuli (induced through 
hyperventilation, either self-induced, or produced by inhalation of high oxygen to 
carbon dioxide ratio) or may be to external stimuli (involving an individual 
placing themselves in a situation known to bring on a panic attack). At time of 
exposure relaxation may also be used in which the individual is encouraged to 
learn the difference between tense and relaxed muscles. This behavioural 
technique is more controversial as will be discussed.
Rationale for use o f behavioural techniques in classical conditioning model
The classical conditioning model of panic proposed by Wolpe & Rowan (1988) 
suggests that in order for the individual to break the conditioned response of 
panic to physiological symptoms induced by hyperventilation it is necessary for
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the individual to gradually be exposed to increasing intensity of hyperventilation 
(systematic desensitization [Wolpe, 1958; cited in Hawton et al., 1989]), at which 
each increase is undertaken only after a reduction in fear response to the current 
level is achieved. During exposure a reciprocally inhibiting response to fear 
(Wolpe, 1958; cited in Hawton et al., 1989), relaxation, may be employed. A 
reciprocal inhibitor is a physiologically incompatible response; relaxation would 
be a reciprocal inhibitor of fear as the two physiological states cannot exist 
simultaneously; the introduction of one (relaxation) will inhibit the other (fear). 
Thus, the individual unlearns the association between physiological sequelae of 
hyperventilation and panic. This technique can also be applied to other 
conditioned stimuli which elicit panic.
Rationale for behavioural techniques in cognitive model
According to Clark’s (1986) cognitive model, exposure would be viewed as a 
behavioural experiment, in which catastrophic beliefs regarding consequences of 
panic attacks can be tested by the individual. For example if a patient experiences 
the fear that he will faint in a panic attack he/she is encouraged to expose 
him/herself to internal and external stimuli that elicit panic attacks in order to test 
the validity of this belief. The use of relaxation in cognitive therapy is not 
considered to be of optimal benefit. Wells (1997) stresses the importance of the 
way in which behavioural techniques are used: “Teaching panic patients 
relaxation...techniques are unlikely to produce optimal changes in belief in 
misinterpretations since patients could attribute the non-occurrence of catastrophe 
to use of their relaxation strategy. Behavioural attempts to discover that 
misinterpretations are false is likely to be a better strategy.” The individual will 
be encouraged to eliminate any behaviours (termed “safety behaviours”; 
Salkovskis, 1995; cited in Clark 1996) which he/she believes prevent the 
catastrophic consequence from occurring, and if allowed to remain will prevent 
discontinuation of the belief. Thus a patient who believes they will faint unless 
they hold onto something during a panic attack is encouraged to experience the 
panic attack without holding onto anything, thereby fully discontinuing the belief 
in fainting.
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Thus, behavioural and cognitive models are agreed that exposure is beneficial, 
but for different reasons. The behavioural perspective proposes that exposure 
modifies the learned associations and seeks to break the cycle between 
hyperventilation and panic. In aiding this process, relaxation is advocated to 
introduce a physiologically incompatible response to fear during exposure and 
thus the individual unlearns the conditioned associations between stimuli 
(conditioned stimuli) and fear (conditioned response). The cognitive model also 
agrees that exposure is beneficial, but for different reasons: exposure serves to 
disconfirm catastrophic beliefs which maintain panic attacks. In this approach 
relaxation may be viewed as a safety behaviour, which would prevent the belief 
from being challenged properly.
Critical evaluation o f evidence
A crucial argument differentiating the behavioural and cognitive theories is the 
rate of occurrence and temporal order of the fearful cognitions in panic attacks. 
Firstly it has been suggested that negative cognitions are not even present in all 
panic attacks (Rachman, Levitt & Lopatka, 1987; cited in Rachman, 1993). 
However, Clark (1997) criticised the validity of these findings due to the fact that 
some catastrophic cognitions were not enquired after by the authors in the study. 
Thus the evidence that cognitions are not present in panic disorder is 
questionable. There is evidence however in support of catastrophic cognitions in 
panic; Hibbert (1984; cited in Clark, 1986) found that patients with panic disorder 
were significantly more likely to experience cognitions concerned with illness or 
death than individuals without panic disorder.
A critical difference between the theories and the rationale for the use of 
behavioural techniques is the role of cognitions in the cause of panic. Central to 
Wolpe and Rowan’s classical conditioning theory is the notion that panic is not 
invariably accompanied by fearful cognitions and, although they note that the 
first panic is a very unpleasant experience, such cognitions do not play a causal 
role. The evidence for this comes from Wolpe & Rowan (1988) who found that 
fearful cognitions were not present until after the panic attack had reached its 
height. At first glance this might seem to contradict the cognitive model of panic,
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which proposes that cognitions are instrumental in producing panic. However, 
individuals were required to retrospectively recall their first panic attack, which 
in some cases occurred many years ago and to differentiate this from all 
subsequent panic attacks. Furthermore individuals were required to describe the 
exact sequence of events in a very fine time frame. The reliability of accounts 
under these conditions is likely to be questionable. Automatic thoughts are 
considered only just accessible to conscious awareness (Beck, 1988; cited in 
Clark & Fairbum, 1997) and given the detailed advice for clinicans on eliciting 
thoughts from individuals (e.g. in Wells, 1997) their accessibility after a long 
period of time has elapsed, and since which other episodes have occurred, is 
likely to be difficult. Even supposing evidence was reliable, Clark (1997) notes 
that the cognitive model does not specify cognitions to be the first indication of 
an impending panic attack. More convincing evidence to resolve the debate 
regarding the presence of negative cognitions in panic is provided by Khawaja & 
Oei (1999) who studied cognitions prospectively and in vivo (at the time of a 
panic attack). They found that catastrophic cognitions were the prominent feature 
during a panic attack, which is in support of Clark’s model.
Further evidence that differentiates the two theories comes from prevalence rates 
of panic. Critically, not all individuals who panic once go on to develop panic 
disorder (many studies cited in Clark & Fairbum, 1997). Thus the critical 
question to be addressed by theories of panic is why does panic attack not 
invariably lead to panic disorder? If panic is a classically conditioned response to 
hyperventilation one might expect every subsequent hyperventilation episode to 
lead to panic (Wolpe & Rowan, 1988). This is not the case: Gorman et al. (1988; 
cited in Sanderson & Beck, 1989) found that hyperventilation only leads to a 
panic attack in 23% of patients with panic disorder. Thus, there appears to be 
another factor in mediating individuals’ responses to hyperventilation and the 
bodily symptoms it produces; a factor which according to the cognitive model is 
the individual’s interpretations of the experience. There is evidence to support 
this suggestion: Sanderson, Rapee & Barlow (1989; cited in Sanderson & Beck, 
1989) demonstrated that perceived (not actual) degree of control over 
hyperventilation was an important factor influencing resultant panic and anxiety 
in individuals with panic disorder. Studies have also shown that individuals with
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panic disorder do misinterpret bodily sensations more than people without panic 
disorder (McNally & Foa, 1987; cited in Clark & Fairbum, 1997) and more than 
other patients with non-panic anxiety disorders such as social phobia and 
generalised anxiety disorder (Clarke et al., submitted; cited in Clark & Fairbum, 
1997). Thus there does seem to be something specific about panic disordered 
patients in their interpretations of bodily symptoms.
There is also evidence supportive of the role of cognitions in mediating 
experience in individuals without panic disorder: Van den Hout & Griez (1982; 
cited in Clark, 1986) and Clark & Hemsley, (1982; cited in Clark, 1986) showed 
that normal individuals’ response to hyperventilation is mediated by cognitions or 
interpretations of the experience. This observation is further support of the 
cognitive model of panic.
Wolpe & Rowan (1988) refute the role of cognition in panic by stating that 
cognitive correction by physician is not effective in reducing panic attacks, 
however Sanderson & Beck (1989) believe such correction is effective. Wells 
(1997) considers behavioural experiments to be the most powerful way of testing 
beliefs. Thus just because cognitive correction is ineffective this does not mean 
that cognitions are not the maintaining factor: this evidence might simply suggest 
that providing the patient with factual information may not be powerful enough to 
change beliefs: the individual may need to discover this for themselves through 
exposure.
Despite the different rationales, and the predominance of evidence for the 
cognitive model and against the classical conditioning model, therapy which uses 
behavioural techniques in a behavioural or cognitive theoretical framework can 
be equally as effective (Lloyd-Williams & Falbo, 1996; Burke et al., 1997; cited 
in Hughes, 1998). It may be unhelpful to compare the two techniques’ 
effectiveness and more useful to elucidate the finer mechanisms of action. There 
is evidence to suggest both techniques can have an equal effect on cognitions 
regarding panic attacks (Lloyd-Williams & Falbo, 1996) despite this change 
being the aim of only one (cognitive) theoretical framework. The most 
convincing evidence for cognitions as having a strong mediating role is from
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Clark, Salkovskis, Hackmann, Middleton, Anastasiades & Gelder (1994) and 
Clark, Salkovskis, Hackmann, Wells, Ludgate & Gelder (1999) who 
demonstrated that catastrophic cognitions reported by people with panic disorder 
at the end of treatment predicted outcome at follow-up.
The evidence suggests that panic disorder is mediated by the interpretation which 
an individual attaches to the experience. Furthermore, the research suggests that 
the therapeutic change of such cognitions is an effective treatment for panic 
disorder and moreover that status of cognitions at end of treatment is predictive 
of outcome at follow-up.
Behavioural and cognitive approaches to depression
Definition o f depression
DSM-IV criteria for a major depressive episode are for the individual to 
experience any five of the following symptoms; negative affect, reduced pleasure 
from activities, weight change, sleep disturbance, psychomotor agitation or 
retardation, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness, concentrational difficulties or 
recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation (DSM-IV; APA, 1994).
Behaviour theory
Williams (1997) stated that the most influential behavioural theories are those 
employing operant conditioning principles to explain depression. Reinforcement 
is the factor influencing behaviour in operant conditioning terms. Costello (1972; 
cited in Williams, 1997) suggested that depression is a result of a “loss of 
reinforcer effectiveness”. Lewinsohn et al. (1970; cited in Williams, 1997) 
proposed a similar hypothesis: depression is a “low rate of response-contingent 
positive reinforcement”. In initial stages of depression the individual may receive 
increased attention from the environment in response to their reduced behavioural 
output, termed “secondary gain phenomenon” (Williams, 1992), but central to 
both theories is the notion that ultimately the depressed person experiences a loss 
or reduced level of reinforcement for their behaviour as individuals stop paying
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attention to the depressive behaviour. As a result the individual experiences 
negative affect and low motivation to perform usual behaviours (due to low or 
non-existent reinforcement).
Cognitive theory
Beck’s cognitive model of depression (Beck et al., 1979; cited in Fennell, 1989) 
proposes that depression results when critical life events activate underlying 
assumptions a person may believe about themselves and how they should behave. 
The critical incident may be interpreted in the light of these underlying 
assumptions. For a person who has underlying beliefs “I must always be perfect” 
and “If I am not perfect I am a failure”, the failure of an important exam might 
activate these underlying negative assumptions about themselves. Beck et al. 
(1979; cited in Fennell, 1989) suggest the activation of negative assumptions then 
give rise to a number of cognitions, characterised by negative thinking about the 
self, the world and the future, termed the “cognitive triad”. These negative 
cognitions are said to mediate and maintain the depressive process and symptoms 
in a circular relationship in that the more negative the thoughts, the worse the 
depressive affect (Beck, 1991; cited in Clark & Steer, 1996). The theory states 
that cognitions in depressed people are subject to bias, both in recall of past 
events, and interpretation of new events and information, towards the negative. 
Beck (1991; cited in Clark & Steer, 1996) suggested that events are interpreted in 
the light of activated dysfunctional beliefs. In the example above any events in 
which the individual deems him/herself to be less than perfect will be interpreted 
as an example of “I am a failure”.
Behavioural techniques: activity scheduling and graded task assignment
In depression the techniques of graded task assignment and activity scheduling 
are employed. Both involve arranging to perform behaviours previously not 
exhibited or performed at a reduced rate during the depression. Activity 
scheduling would simply involve arranging to perform particular behaviours at 
particular times. Graded task assignment is used for more complex behaviours or 
tasks, which may need to be broken down into individual components; the
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rationale for this being that the task itself is too large for the individual in their 
present depressed state to be able to manage.
Rationale for use o f behavioural techniques in operant conditioning model
Operant behaviour theory states that increased reinforcement from the 
environment is instrumental in improving mood (Schwartz & Schwartz, 1993). 
Thus, behaviour therapy aims to increase reinforcement to break the cycle of 
reduced reinforcement leading to lower behavioural output, leading in turn to 
further reduced reinforcement. Activity logs are useful in determining 
contingencies for reinforcement and are subject to behavioural analysis (i.e. 
antecedent, behaviour, consequence, outlined above), which then enables the 
therapist to see where there are potentials for increasing reinforcement via 
activity scheduling or graded task assignment. In operant behaviour theory 
activity scheduling serves to increase potential for reinforcement from the 
environment (Schwartz & Schwartz, 1993). Graded task assignment would be 
used in behaviour therapy to gradually enable the individual to become more 
active, reinforcing behaviour at each stage, such that the individual is inclined to 
perform more of the same behaviour. Through activity scheduling and graded 
task assignment the cycle of low reinforcement resulting in reduced behavioural 
output is broken.
Rationale for use o f behavioural techniques in cognitive model
Central to cognitive theory is the notion that it is the individual’s negative 
interpretation of events that maintains depressed mood. The rationale of therapy 
according to cognitive theory is to compensate for the bias in negative 
interpretation (Williams, 1997) to promote more rational or objective 
interpretations by examining the evidence for negative cognitions. As negative 
thinking is thought to maintain depression, targeting these cognitions is 
considered to be the optimal strategy in alleviating depression (Fennell, 1989). 
Thus, behavioural techniques employed in cognitive therapy aim to test out 
negative cognitions. Activity scheduling may be used to plan a test of a negative 
cognition. For example the cognition might be “no one will talk to me at the
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party” and may discourage the individual from going. Activity scheduling, set up 
as a behavioural experiment to test out this hypothesis might involve arranging to 
go to a party to see if the negative cognition is true. Behavioural experiments 
such as this are employed in the likelihood that the individuals interpretations or 
predictions about events are likely to be subject to information processing bias or 
recall bias (Beck, 1967, 1976, 1987; cited in Clark and Steer, 1997). Such biases 
would tend to focus on the negative and the activity scheduling would serve to 
correct the biases. Graded task assignment would be used, as in activity 
scheduling, to test out negative cognitions regarding a particular activity 
(Williams, 1997). For example, a negative cognition “I won’t be able to do it”, 
would be subject to evaluation. Graded task assignment is likely to be used in 
preference to activity scheduling if the task is considered to involve separable 
stages, after which the individual can make a negative hypothesis regarding each 
stage, but then have this disconfirmed by the fact that he/she is able to perform 
the task. It should also be noted that in some cases individuals may be correct in 
their cognitions, in which case the activity scheduling as a behavioural 
experiment would provide valuable information to aid problem solving (i.e. what 
can the individual do to improve the situation?).
In summary, according to behaviour theory, behavioural techniques increase 
opportunity for reinforcement, the lack of which is proposed to maintain 
depression. However, in cognitive theory of depression, behavioural techniques 
such as scheduling activities and graded task assignment serve to evaluate 
validity of cognitions (Fennell, 1989).
Critical evaluation o f evidence
There is some evidence that depression is associated with reduced reinforcement 
in that they showed a tendency to alienate people and thus reduce opportunity for 
reinforcement (Coyne, 1976). There is also some evidence that depressive 
behaviour is reinforced by surrounding individuals (Sheeber, Hops, Andrew, 
Alpert & Davis, 1998). Lewinsohn (1975; cited in Williams, 1992) showed an 
association between activities which are reinforced and mood, however Williams 
(1992) criticises the methodology used, which required individuals to only rate an
15
Adult Mental Health Essay
activity if they found it enjoyable and therefore individuals experiencing 
improved mood would be bound to rate more pleasurable activities for that day. 
Thus, the above is not evidence to suggest that altering reinforcement schedules 
will alter the depression. Williams (1992; cited in Williams, 1997) has argued 
that low reinforcement could be a consequence and not a cause of depression.
A problem for the behavioural model of depression is that clients may increase 
behavioural output and elicit more reinforcements, but still be depressed 
(Schwartz & Schwartz, 1993). This observation echoes my clinical experience 
that clients can receive reinforcement and have reasonable behavioural output, 
pursuing normal activities, yet still be depressed. Thus, reinforcement may not be 
sufficient to alleviate depression: the underlying cognitions that the individual has 
in relation to the experience may also need to be examined.
A fundamental prediction of the cognitive model of depression is that negative 
cognitions will be present in depression. Clark & Steer (1996) and Williams 
(1992) note that negative cognitions are consistently found in depression. There is 
also evidence for the existence of an information processing bias in depression. 
Haaga, Dyck & Ernst (1991) note that evidence consistently suggests that 
individuals with depression show biased negative interpretation of hypothetical 
scenarios. Such a bias also applies to the recall of past events. Clark & Teasdale 
(1982; cited in Haaga et al., 1991) showed that depression levels within 
individuals affected the number of negative autobiographical memories recalled.
Evidence converges to suggest a relationship between negative cognitions and 
other symptoms of depression (Haaga et al., 1991). In addition, Clark & 
Teasdale’s study (cited above) showed that the negative recall bias was related to 
severity of depression. Such evidence is obviously in support of the cognitive 
model, but not contrary to the behavioural model as it is the critical role of 
cognitions, and not their presence which differentiates the two theories.
As noted in the discussion of panic disorder, the presence of cognitions does not 
necessarily imply their role in maintenance of the depression, as proposed in the 
cognitive model (Beck et al., 1979; cited in Fennell, 1989). More convincing
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evidence for the critical role of cognitions comes from mood induction 
procedures, in which negative depressive affect is demonstrated to follow 
induction of negative cognitions through the use of depressive stimuli, for 
example, asking for recall of negative autobiographical memories or reading 
aloud negative statements about the self (Williams, 1992). Williams (1992) notes 
that such evidence provides strong support for the maintenance role of cognitions 
in depression, and there is some evidence that a reduction in negative cognitions 
in depressed individuals accompanies alleviation of depressed mood (Williams et 
al., 1990; cited in Williams, 1992). However, there have not been prospective 
studies to investigate temporal order of cognitions and depressed affect 
specifically in depressed individuals (Clark & Steer, 1996). Thus, it could still be 
argued that cognitions do not play a maintaining role in depression.
As in panic disorder, the most convincing evidence for the role of cognitions in 
depression comes from studies which demonstrate the predictive value of 
cognitions for subsequent depression. Hollon et al. (1990; cited in Williams, 
1997) showed that degree of dysfunctional attitudes was directly related to 
likelihood of relapse following treatment for depression.
The evidence is consistent with the presence of negative cognitions and 
interpretative biases in depression, which is consistent with the cognitive model, 
but not inconsistent with the behavioural models discussed. The relationship 
between cognitive status and depressive affect is stronger evidence for the 
cognitive model, but still does not imply causality. However the predictive value 
of cognitive status for outcome of depression adds further weight to the notion of 
a critical role for cognitions in depression. In the light of the accumulating 
evidence for the importance of cognitive change in depression, behavioural 
theories which specify lack of reinforcement to be the maintaining factor in 
depression are not likely to provide a complete account for depression.
Conclusion
Beck (1991; cited in Clark & Steer, 1996) stated,
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“the distinctiveness of cognitive therapy as a system of psychotherapy does not 
depend on the particular therapeutic techniques employed by cognitive therapists 
(many of these are borrowed from other therapy schools), but upon the 
fundamental cognitive constructs and propositions that guide the implementation 
of therapy.”
Thus, actual behavioural techniques can be indistinguishable in behaviour and 
cognitive therapy, however the rationale for using the techniques differs on 
critical points: their mechanism of action and the role of cognitions. Behaviour 
theorists would suggest behavioural techniques act to allow the individual to 
unlearn conditioned associations. Cognitive theorists would argue that 
behavioural experiments allow objective evaluation of evidence for the 
individual’s negative cognitions.
The majority of the evidence from panic and depressive disorder discussed in this 
essay is in support of the cognitive rationale: cognitions of the type specified by 
cognitive theory do appear to be present in panic disorder and depression. There 
is also evidence to suggest that misinterpretative and negative cognitions may 
play an important mediating role in other anxiety disorders, for example 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Salkovskis, 1985) and social phobia (Clark & 
Stopa, in preparation; cited in Clark, 1997). However their presence in the 
conditions does not imply their causal role.
The difficulty researchers currently face is one of establishing unequivocal 
evidence for the maintenance role of cognitions in anxiety and depression, a 
crucial point on which behaviour and cognitive theorists differ. It is not helpful to 
examine the efficacy of different therapeutic approaches (Robinson, Berman & 
Neimeyer, 1990) as this essay has shown, for example in the case of panic 
disorder, that behaviour therapy and cognitive therapy can yield similar results. 
Wells (1997) notes that behavioural techniques applied in the rationale of 
behavioural theory can be useful in alteration of cognitions, although this is not 
specified in the underlying theoretical rationale regarding the mechanisms of 
action.
18
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Evidence that change in cognitions accompanies therapeutic change is not 
decisive as change of cognitions may be an accompanying, rather than a causal 
factor (Marks, Basoglu & Noshirvani, 1995) in alleviation of anxiety or 
depression. Added to this is the inherent difficulty in measuring cognitions 
(Gelder, 1997). More convincing evidence for the critical role of cognitions in the 
maintenance of anxiety and depression is in their ability to predict outcome, as 
has been shown to be the case (Clark et al., 1994, 1999 and Hollon et al., 1990; 
cited in Williams, 1997) in anxiety and depression respectively.
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What is the impact of others’ expectations on the communicative
abilities of people with learning disabilities and how might a 
clinical psychologist work with these issues?
Introduction
Communication can be defined as
“The exchange of messages between two or more individuals in direct 
relationship through the use of oral language, symbols, signs and behaviour, 
when the meaning of these symbols is understood by all participants in this 
exchange”, Kenefick (1988) 
or
“A communication partnership involves two or more people who exchange ideas 
and interpret meanings”, (Bartlett & Bunning (1997).
Communication is essential to experience relationships, assert needs, make 
choices and establish an identity, both for the self, and in the eyes of others 
(Thurman, 1997). Therefore communication is a fundamental aspect of life. 
Understanding of others’ communicative intentions is also crucial to make sense 
of the environment.
Difficulties in communication are common in people with learning disabilities. 
Estimates differ, probably due to methodological differences (Bartlett, 1997), but 
range from 62% (Blackwell et al., 1989; cited in Bartlett, 1997) to 81% (Law and 
Lester, 1991; cited in Bartlett, 1997). Keman & Sabsay (1997) note that people 
with learning disabilities’ communicative style characterises them as different to 
people with whom they interact. For example Sabsay & Keman (1983; cited in 
Leudar, 1997) found that people with learning disabilities did not conform to the 
quantity and relevance maxims of conversation outlined by Grice (1975; cited in 
Leudar, 1997). Leudar (1997) also found that people with learning disabilities 
were rated as less coherent and relevant. On the basis of research following the 
communicative interactions of people with learning disabilities in everyday
24
Learning disabilities essay
settings, Sabsay & Keman (1997) divide communication problems into two 
categories: that of conveyance of meaning and that of appropriateness in 
interaction. Participants in their study could not always convey their meaning to 
others with whom they interacted and they cite examples of inappropriateness 
such as talking excessively about the same topic. Of course there are also specific 
syndromes that are associated with communication difficulties, for example 
autism, however, it is beyond the scope of this essay to consider the different 
communicative characteristics of people with these syndromes.
Historically, theories of language development have influenced ideas about 
communication intervention. The ‘nativist’ account (Chomsky, 1965, cited in 
Remington, 1997) states that our brains are innately pre-disposed to leam 
language, which implies that attempts to intervene in language development 
would be of minimal use. There is also a behaviourist account (Skinner, 1957; 
cited in Price, 1997) which states that language is learned through manipulation 
of traditionally defined antecedent stimuli and reinforcement contingencies. 
Attempts to enhance language development were applied within a behavioural 
framework to individuals with communication difficulties, thus, historically the 
focus has been on the individual (Leudar, 1981; cited in Leudar, 1997), but with 
only limited success (Price, 1997).
Kenefick’s (1988) and Bartlett & Bunning’s (1997) definitions of communication 
highlight its reciprocal nature. Therefore to say that people with learning 
disabilities have problems with communication is not to say that they are solely 
responsible for the difficulty. This has been recognised in an increasingly popular 
alternative to the above two accounts, the social-interactionist theory (e.g. Bates 
et al., 1987; cited in Remington, 1997). This approach states that language is 
learnt through the interaction between an individual and their social environment 
and cognitive-developmental status. It also emphasises the functional use of 
communication (a point neglected by early behaviourist interventions (Price, 
1997), and the notion that children will not leam to communicate if  they do not 
have a reason or a communicative partner (Price, 1997). Therefore, this approach 
advocates consideration of all partners in a communicative exchange if 
intervention is to be successful. Despite theoretical advances in knowledge, the
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interactive nature of communication (Yoder, Davies & Bishop, 1994; cited in 
Purcell, Morris & McConkey, 1999) is not always recognised by people working 
directly with people with learning disabilities. For example care staff have been 
shown to perceive that the focus of communication intervention should be on the 
client, rather than themselves or others (Purcell et ah, 1999).
In research literature, the interactive nature is becoming recognised, as shown in a 
statement by Leudar (1997):
“Communicative problems are frequent in interactions where at least one 
participant is mentally handicapped”,
which locates the problem within the communicative exchange itself. 
Increasingly the emphasis is placed on intervening in the ‘communication 
environment’ (Van der Gaag, 1993). It is therefore important to consider factors 
extrinsic to people with learning disabilities, one of which is their communicative 
partner, and their expectations they bring to the interchange.
The role of others who interact with people with learning disabilities is one that 
attracts increasing attention in the literature. The expectations are likely to 
influence behaviour towards people (Jussim, 1986) therefore, one might predict 
that expectations could have an influence on the communicative exchange. This 
essay will discuss the expectations that others hold, and will consider their role in 
interaction with people with learning disabilities. ‘Others’ considered are 
families, care staff, clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, police and the general 
public. Current theory of language development and the psychological concept of 
‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Jussim, 1986) predict that others expectations and their 
consequent behaviour is likely to influence the way a person with learning 
disabilities communicates. The psychological impacts of expectations as 
mediators of the impact of expectations on communicative ability will be 
discussed and the clinical psychologist’s role will be considered.
Expectations
Van der Gaag & Dormandy (1993; cited in McConkey, Purcell and Morris, 1999) 
have noted that judgement and adjustment by staff of their communication level
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to that of the client results in more effective partnerships. Therefore one might 
expect difficulties where others under- or over-estimate the communicative 
ability of a person with a learning disability.
Over-expectation
In clinical experience others often overestimate comprehension abilities of 
clients. For example, the author has often heard staff say “He/she understands 
everything I say to them”, of a client with a learning disability. In practice 
understanding is often based upon non-verbal and contextual communicative 
cues, which is illustrated in a case study cited by Thomas-Bawa & Henecker 
(Unpublished lecture, 2000). A request to a client with a learning disability to 
pick up leaves was communicated in two different situations; once through verbal 
instructions combined with demonstration of the activity, non-verbal and 
contextual cues, and the second time through demonstration, non-verbal and 
contextual cues alone while the demonstrator used non-sensical language. The 
effect was the same: the client picked up the leaves. Therefore, clients can give 
the impression of proficiency in comprehension of language when the reality is 
actually comprehension of a communication through non-verbal and/or 
contextual cues alone. This example can give some clues as to why individuals 
who interact with people with learning disabilities may overestimate their 
communicative abilities and may lead to client’s communication partner’s 
assuming a higher level of language comprehension in other situations when 
accompanying non-verbal or contextual communication cues are absent.
Evidence shows that employed carers of people with learning disabilities do not 
tailor their verbal communication skills to match those of the client, (Bartlett & 
Bunning, 1997) and use language that is beyond their comprehension abilities 
(McConkey, Morris & Purcell, 1999). While the mismatch may be due to staff 
difficulty in matching their language to that of the clients, the findings do suggest 
that clients may be subject to overestimation of their communicative abilities 
(Bartlett & Bunning, 1997). Purcell et al., (1999) also found that staff tended to 
overestimate clients’ verbal communication skills and that they also experienced 
difficulty in identification of non-verbal communication. McConkey et al., (1999)
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suggested that staffs perception of people’s communicative abilities may be an 
explanation for their findings. However, both studies focused only on verbal 
communication skills without consideration of other modes of communication, 
which may facilitate a client’s participation in the exchange.
The author was witness to a conversation between a client with Down’s 
Syndrome, his carer and a psychiatrist, which highlights another example of over­
estimation of communicative abilities. The carer and psychiatrist asked the client 
numerous questions to which an appropriate answer would have been yes or no. 
The client replied in the appropriate way, thus giving the impression to others 
involved in the interaction that he had understood the questions. However, when 
the client was asked a question to which yes or no was not the appropriate 
answer, he answered “yes”, then in response to frowns from his carer, “no”, then 
in response to further frowns, he looked confused as the others looked on in 
expectation. There then followed an awkward silence. Therefore, the likely 
interpretation, and the impression of the author, was that the client had not 
understood any of the conversation, but somehow (perhaps through prosodic 
clues in the speakers’ voices) was able to produce the ‘right’ yes/no answer. 
Therefore, like the previous example, clients can often feign understanding when 
their communicative abilities are over-estimated, possibly to preserve self-esteem 
(Keman & Sabsay, 1997). However, the opportunity for people with learning 
disabilities to express themselves in such interactions is limited.
This phenomenon, acquiescence, was demonstrated by Siegelman et al. (1981; 
cited in Prosser & Bromley, 1998) in people with learning disabilities, 
particularly in response to questions requiring a yes/no response. This can occur 
when the person does not comprehend the question, likely in the above example. 
Therefore, over-estimation of communicative ability can actually impair people 
with learning disabilities’ communicative ability in the sense that when they do 
not understand questions they show a tendency to acquiesce. As a result their 
answers may not be consistent with their tme needs. This could have drastic 
consequences, for example if being asked about major choices in their lives. One 
such example, is in the legal justice setting. It has been shown that people with 
learning disabilities demonstrated difficulty in understanding their legal rights
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(Gudjonsson, Clare & Cross, 1992; cited in Clare & Gudjonsson, 1995). This 
difficulty of understanding, coupled with the reduced tendency to seek 
clarification (Donahue, Pear & Bryan, 1980; cited in Donahue, 1997) may result 
at worst in people with learning difficulties making false confessions.
Even if communication is tailored to the individual, acquiescence can still occur. 
Historically people with learning disabilities have often been subject to general 
treatment which intellectually average individuals do not usually experience, for 
example ill-treatment by hospital staff (Caine, Hatton & Emerson, 1998). 
Because of their disability a power differential often exists between people with 
learning disabilities and their carers, other professionals, or even family and 
friends. For example, McConkey et al. (1999) found that clients were not given 
the opportunity to be equal communicative partners by staff. This may lead to the 
individual tending to be influenced by what their communicators say. 
Acquiescence can occur due to a desire to give the “correct” answer to the 
communication partner (Siegelman, 1981; cited in Prosser & Bromley, 1998), 
which fits in with a socially desired role (Shaw & Budd, cited in Prosser & 
Bromley, 1998). People with learning disabilities are also particularly vulnerable 
to leading questions (Clare & Gudjonsson, 1993; cited in Clare & Gudjonsson, 
1995), which again suggests a desire to conform to the wishes of the interviewer 
(Perlman et al., 1984; cited in Bull & Carson, 1995). This is particularly the case 
if self-competence is perceived as low (Gudjonsson & Lister, 1984; cited in Bull 
& Carson, 1995). Indeed, people with learning disabilities may not even assert 
their needs in the face of a decision made for them: there is a tendency to comply 
(Flynn, 1989; cited in van der Gaag, 1993). Therefore it cannot always be 
assumed that people with learning disabilities will assert their choices.
There might also be expectations that communicative abilities in one situation 
will generalise to another, which is not necessarily the case. Bull & Carson 
(1995) noted that familiar contexts are often needed for people with learning 
disabilities to maximise their communicative abilities. This creates issues when 
people with learning disabilities have to give evidence in a court. Their ability to 
give evidence is likely to be compromised by style of questioning, which can be 
confusing and is likely to be unfamiliar to a person with a learning disability.
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This also relates to an interview setting, for example with a clinical psychologist 
in which regular stimuli for communication are not present. Thus, an interview 
setting is likely to be unfamiliar and therefore an individual’s communicative 
abilities may be under-estimated in this situation.
Under-expectations
The expectations of over-estimation of communicative ability and expectations 
regarding validity of communication regardless of the communication partner’s 
style can both lead to people with learning disabilities’ communicative abilities 
being compromised. However, there may also be under-expectation, or 
assumptions of invalidity.
Leudar (1997) found that communications made by people with learning 
disabilities were rated as significantly less valid than non-disabled controls by 
carers and instructors. This suggests that people with learning disabilities are not 
expected to be truthful as often as people without a disability. Evidence to 
support this assumption has been discussed in instances when certain questioning 
techniques are employed (e.g. Siegelman, 1981; cited in Prosser & Bromley, 
1998). However such an expectation is likely to further compromise the person as 
the assumption may give rise to their partner seeking clarification of meaning, 
which is suggested to adversely affect self-esteem (Sabsay & Keman, 1993; cited 
in Leudar, 1997). Furthermore, experience of expectations of invalidity may 
actually lead to a Teamed helplessness’ (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; 
cited in Clare & Gudjonsson, 1995), which may lead to people with learning 
disabilities actually making factually inaccurate statements. It is this mechanism 
that Clare & Gudjonsson (1995) suggest may be behind false confessions, in that 
people with learning disabilities place more weight behind the actual tmth than 
their statements, therefore, they might rely on non-disabled others to ‘know’ the 
tmth.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that low expectations of communicative abilities is 
associated with staff use of directives in communication (Bradshaw, 1998). 
Certainly, proportion of directives used by staff in communication with people
30
Learning disabilities essay
with learning disabilities is high at 70% (Kenefick, 1986, cited in Kenefick, 
1988). Kenefick also showed that a similar amount of communication between 
people with learning disabilities is directive. Research has shown that a decrease 
in the use of directive communication leads to increased client involvement in the 
communicative exchange (Money, 1997; cited in Purcell et al., 1999). Use of 
directive language by staff the majority of the time, coupled with evidence that 
staff only interact with people with learning disabilities in residential settings 10 
to 15% of the time (Landesman, 1988), suggests that opportunities for 
involvement in communication are very low.
Use of directives by staff is also associated with the production of challenging 
behaviour (Hastings & Remington, 1994; cited in McConkey et al., 1999). This 
may arise out of being unable to communicate needs (Chamberlain, Chung & 
Jenner, 1993), which is in keeping with the suggestion that directives hamper 
clients’ communicative opportunities, as challenging behaviour is a recognised 
form of communication (Thurman, 1997). Chamberlain et al. (1993) suggested 
that in the absence of appropriate forms of communication, individuals may 
resort to socially unacceptable modes. Research suggests that staff pay more 
attention to clients who exhibit seriously challenging behaviour (Emerson et al., 
1992; cited in Chamberlain et al., 1993), therefore through reinforcement clients 
may leam the functional use of their behaviour and adopt it to communicate their 
intentions (Chamberlain et al., 1993). Unfortunately the more intense the 
challenging behaviour, the less likely an individual will desire to communicate 
with people.
There is evidence from a case study that through education of staff to heighten 
awareness about a client’s modes of communication, it is possible to reduce 
challenging behaviour and increase appropriate communication (Bradshaw,
1998). Bradshaw reported that anecdotal evidence suggested that this change was 
mediated through a alteration in staff perceptions and enhancement of 
expectations of the client’s communicative abilities. Therefore, correction of 
under-expectation can enhance communicative abilities.
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As has been discussed, both under- and over-expectations can compromise 
people with learning disabilities’ communicative abilities. There is some 
suggestion that the communication problems such a mis-match can produce are 
contributed to by people’s reactions. Keman & Sabsay (1997) noted that due to 
potential communication partners do not always invest the effort to overcome 
difficulties and others may, out of impatience, embarrassment or discomfort for 
the communicator, step in as advocate. The theory of learned helplessness 
(Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; cited in Clare & Gudjonsson, 1995) is 
likely to be relevant in such situations and would predict that a person who is 
consistently spoken for in interactions may diminish his/her communicative 
output. Further consequences of social withdrawal would be reduced 
opportunities to enhance their communicative abilities.
Having discussed some of the consequences of a mismatch between others’ 
expectations of communicative ability, and the impact on communicative abilities 
' and opportunities for people with learning disabilities, expectations in general of 
people with learning disabilities should also be considered, as these are likely to 
impact on their communicative opportunities.
General expectations o f others
General attitudes towards people living in the community can vary and can be 
positive (Hudson-Allez & Barrett, 1996) or negative (e.g. Leighton, 1989; cited 
in Hudson-Allez & Barret, 1996), possibly depending on individual trust policy 
regarding the resettlement process (Hudson-Allez & Barrett, 1996). Szivos-Bach 
(1993) discovered a tendency for students with a learning disability to also hold 
negative views of their peer group. Thus, if people with a learning disability are 
perceived negatively by both other learning-disabled and intellectually-average 
peers, their opportunities for communication are likely to be minimal. In turn, 
lack of environmental opportunities for communication leads to less than optimal 
communciative abilities in people with learning disabilities (van der Gaag, 1989, 
cited in van der Gaag, 1998). Also of relevance is the suggestion that degree of 
success an individual experiences is likely to influence the likelihood of that 
behaviour occurring again (Butterfield & Arthur, 1995). People with learning
32
Learning disabilities essay
disabilities often experience rejection (van der Gaag, 1993), which will not only 
decrease the likelihood of aiming to communicate again (Butterfield & Arthur, 
1995), but the possible resultant social isolation means that the individual will not 
have the opportunity to develop social skills (van der Gaag, 1993).
Psychological impact and consequences for communicative behaviour
The impact of the expectancies discussed on an individual’s self-esteem and 
schema will now be considered. Unfortunately to the author’s knowledge, there is 
only sparse research that links expectations of communication directly with 
psychological impact and furthermore the psychological impact on 
communicative abilities. The research that is available is to some extent anecdotal 
and subject to interpretations of authors, and is often not the research question 
originally addressed by the studies, so may be of limited validity. Therefore it is 
also necessary to draw on broader psychological theory to hypothesise about 
links, although this should also be subject to further validation.
In considering the impact of under-and over-expectations of the communication 
abilities of people with learning disabilities the psychological concept of the 
‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (review by Jussim, 1986) is likely to be useful. As was 
discussed, when others over-estimate communication ability, people with 
learning disabilities are subject to failure. Should failure repeatedly occur, people 
are likely to develop self-schemas of failure comparable to those observed in, for 
example, depression (e.g. Beck, 1995), except that they may not be as easily 
amenable to correction, because as has been shown, the reality is that other’s 
sometimes communicate inappropriately with people with learning disabilities. 
Cognitive theory states, information is interpreted through activated schemas or 
assumptions, therefore, one might expect that any further experiences of failure 
would be integrated into such schema, leading it to be even more resistant to 
change. Furthermore, if an individual expects to fail, the probability of attempting 
to communicate is likely to be reduced and if individuals do not adjust their 
communication styles to enable success in a communicative interaction, 
expectations of failure are likely to increase and attempts to communicate are 
likely to reduce further.
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Self-schema as being an influence on an individuals motivation for social 
interaction can be understood by also considering the discoveries regarding 
cognitions thought to mediate social phobia. As Wells (1997) notes, the common 
cognition in social phobia is that of negative evaluation. There is anecdotal 
suggestion by Keman & Sabsay (1997) that this is a fear of many people with 
learning disabilities in their interactions, and indeed it does lead to social 
withdrawal by some individuals with a learning disability (Keman & Sabsay,
1997). However evidence also suggests that this fear might lead to compensatory 
strategies in at least some people, rather than social avoidance. Keman & Sabsay
(1997) describe a man who, when not able to convey his meaning to the 
shopkeeper, became frustrated and started to accuse the shopkeeper of cheating 
him. Another example is of a client who when anxious not to appear incompetent 
when trying to communicate, became aggressive, which had the opposite of the 
desired effect by alienating his communicator (Keman & Sabsay, 1997). This is 
captured by Goffman (1986; cited in Leudar, 1997):
“We may perceive his defensive response to his situation as a direct expression of 
his defect, and then see both defect and response as a just retribution.. .and hence 
a justification of the way we treat him”.
Under-expectations are also likely to have psychological impact. As has been 
noted, under-expectations are likely to lead to Teamed helplessness’ (Abramson, 
Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; cited in Clare & Gudjonsson, 1995), for example in 
the case of people whose statements are not believed, or whose communicative 
abilities are underestimated. Jussim (1986) notes the importance of 
“performance-contingent feedback” for people to develop a sense of control. If 
potential communication partners hold low expectations of a person with a 
learning disability, they may too have an information processing bias, through 
which only examples of poor communication pass, and which may lead to 
examples of success being ignored. If a person does not receive appropriate 
feedback, as found by Cullen et al. (1983) who showed that residents with a 
learning disability’s interactions often received no response, or even receipt of a 
negative response (found by Kistner & Torgesen, 1987; cited in Poikkeus et al.,
1999) it is possible that they might develop a low sense of self-efficacy (Bandura,
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1977; cited in Jussim, 1986) in ability to communicate. O’Brien (1981; cited in 
Bartlett, 1997) described the ‘vicious cycle’ which can lead people with learning 
disabilities to react to low expectations and opportunities to interact by becoming 
more severely delayed in communication abilities.
Therefore, the psychological impact of a mis-match between others expectations 
and people with learning disabilities’ communicative abilities is likely to have 
consequences for opportunities and development of communication. There are 
also likely to be wider impacts in terms of an individual’s self-esteem, which in 
turn may influence the likelihood or nature of future attempts to communicate.
There is also the historical expectation that people with learning disabilities are 
the sole cause of communicative difficulty, in addition to a more general history 
of ill-treatment (Caine, Hatton & Emerson, 1998). This is likely to have fostered 
a culture in which people with learning disabilities have poor self-esteem, 
shoulder the blame, as might be predicted within a cognitive framework (e.g. 
Beck, 1995) when early experiences lead to development of negative self­
schemas. The tendency to self-blame is evident in the work by Donahue that 
students attributed failure to understand internally in the context of ambiguous 
messages. Although unsubstantiated by evidence, it is possible that historical 
expectations still prevail to some extent today and have influence on people with 
learning disabilities’ communication partners. There is some evidence that 
negative attitudes to people with learning disabilities still prevail (e.g. Leighton, 
1989; cited in Hudson-Allez & Barrett, 1996) which are likely to lead to reduced 
opportunities for interaction. Therefore attempts at interaction may be rebuffed 
by a few individuals due to negative expectations. These are likely to have similar 
consequences for self-esteem as discussed above.
Finally the impact of expectations on service achievement will be considered. 
O’Brien (1987; cited in Emerson, Caine, Bromley & Hatton, 1998) defined five 
indicators by which a service should be judged: physical community presence, 
support for an individual to make life choices, development of competence, 
enhancement of respect and participation in the community and social networks. 
As Remington (1997) notes effective communication skills are crucial to their
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achievement. For example if an individual is asked questions or has low levels of 
self-competence, the likelihood of acquiescence will be increased and the realistic 
opportunity for choice is likely to be reduced. Others’ expectations and 
perceptions of self-competence are also likely to influence opportunity to 
participate in the community and social networks. Thurman (1997) has suggested 
that self-esteem is partially constructed in communication. Therefore 
communicative ability and others’ perception of this are likely to influence 
whether the individual obtains respect, both for the self and from others.
How can clinical psychologists deal with these issues?
Communication issues
The evidence suggests that one of the most obvious responsibilities of the clinical 
psychologist is to aim to tailor their communicative style to that of the person 
with a learning disability. Where communicative difficulties are anticipated, 
involvement of a speech and language therapist for an assessment is likely to be 
useful.
The clinical psychologist must also be aware of the possibility of acquiescence 
and should aim to phrase questions in such a way to minimise this, for example 
by asking open questions (Prosser & Bromley, 1998) and choosing either/ or 
questions in preference to yes/ no questions (Siegelman, 1981; cited in Prosser & 
Bromley, 1998). Additionally, clinical psychologists should be cautious of 
information obtained by others who may not have used recommended 
interviewing techniques.
The clinical psychologist should also be aware of the potential for influencing 
people with learning disabilities (Clare & Gudjonsson, 1993; cited in Clare & 
Gudjonsson, 1995), particularly those with low perceived self-competence 
(Gudjonsson & Lister, 1984; cited in Bull & Carson, 1995). Therefore, leading 
questions may be particularly hazardous when used with people with learning 
disabilities. Such influence would have consequences, for assessment/therapy, in 
that conclusions might be invalid.
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Remington (1997) notes that is it the responsibility of the clinical psychologist to 
maintain positive interactions with persons with learning disabilities to facilitate 
development of communication, as behavioural theory would predict that positive 
reinforcement of communication will influence likelihood of the communicative 
behaviour being repeated. As discussed above, positive experiences of 
communication are also likely to impact on self-esteem for people with learning 
disabilities, particularly those who have experience of difficulty in their 
communications. Functional analysis of stimuli and reinforcers in the 
communciation environment that influence individuals’ communication can also 
be undertaken by clinical psychologists. They can educate staff in behavioural 
principles that govern the likelihood of challenging behaviour as a form of 
communication.
Remington (1998) notes that clinical psychologists are concerned with the 
pragmatics of language, i.e. the interactions of an individual within his/her 
environment. Clinical psychologists are often involve in writing individual 
program plans (IPPs) for clients. This is an opportunity to take into account the 
communication needs of an individual in terms of opportunities to interact.
Psychological issues
Clinical psychologists are an expert source of information regarding the 
psychological impact of other’s expectations. The psychological analysis above 
of possible impacts of others expectations also highlights a number of issues 
about which the clinical psychologist has specialist knowledge. Education of 
other professionals, care staff and families may heighten awareness of impacts 
and through this, facilitate change in the communication environment. Clinical 
psychologists, with their teaching and consultative skills, may be well placed to 
address these issues with others.
McConkey et al. (1999) note that often, communicative difficulties are localized 
within an individual, rather than within the system. Systemic formulations of 
problems are an area of expertise of the clinical psychologist. Therefore they may
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be well placed to address the expectations of others in the system and the impacts 
on individual’s self-esteem in order to optimise communication, using both 
research evidence available as discussed above, and information particular to the 
individual.
c
Further research
In the course of researching for this essay it has become apparent to the author 
that causal research in this area is sparse. Jussim (1986) notes the difficulty in 
delineating causal factors, however, clinical psychologists with their expertise in 
research skills, might be in a position to address this gap in knowledge.
Conclusion
This essay has attempted to explore the impact of a variety of expectancy factors 
on people with learning disabilities’ ability to communicate. This essay firstly 
involved examining how others’ expectations might influence their 
communicative behaviour towards people with learning disabilities, and secondly 
how this behaviour will impact on psychological well-being and communicative 
abilities. Links between research are tenuous due to the lack of longitudinal 
research, which may imply causal links and at times it has been necessary either 
to rely on anecdotal evidence, or hypothesise about links from other 
psychological knowledge.
Expectations are likely to have been founded either historically, or through 
experience of the communicative behaviour of people with learning disabilities. 
The way in which expectations interact with individuals with learning 
disabilities’ communication abilities is complex and this essay has only been able 
to postulate at causal factors. Historically the concept of others as contributing 
expectations and holding influence over a communicative exchange with a person 
with a learning disability has been a neglected topic. As has been shown, through 
realisation of factors that are external to people with learning disabilities it may 
be possible to optimise individual’s communicative abilities.
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Both philosophy and research would advocate a systemic approach to 
communicative difficulties. That is, it is important to recognise the role each 
communicator has to play in making a communicative exchange a success. This 
shift in focus in intervention away from ‘pathologising’ the individual with 
learning disabilities is likely to produce better outcomes. Through a move 
towards locating the problem within the communication environment, greater 
awareness of the role others have in enhancing and optimising the communicative 
abilities of people with learning disabilities can be realised. This shift may also 
have an effect on people with learning disabilities’ self-esteem and lead them to 
challenge the power imbalance which sometimes exists, which may lead them to 
acquiesce or comply with choices.
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Psychiatric classification is irrelevant to the understanding and 
treatment of mental health problems in childhood and 
adolescence. Discuss.
Introduction
Psychiatric classification is widely used in psychiatry. Its relevance to clinical 
psychologists’ work with children and adolescents will be considered. Firstly, the 
history and description of the use of psychiatric classification is outlined in order 
to provide background information regarding intentional rationale of its use. The 
relevance and usefulness of the present system to the understanding, on the part 
of both psychologists and clients, and treatment of mental health problems in 
children and adolescents is discussed. Aside from whether a system is 
scientifically relevant, there is also the consideration of whether it is 
philosophically acceptable (Howard, 1985; cited in Sonuga-Barke, 1998). 
Therefore, both scientific evidence and ethical/philosophical points of view are 
considered. The impact of psychiatric classification on research and its 
interpretation are also considered, as research is fundamental to the. understanding 
and appropriate application of treatment within the scientist-practitioner model 
and according to the maxim of evidence-based practice.
A history and description of psychiatric classification
History
Frances, Hirst & Pincus (1995) noted that historically people have naturally 
categorised mental illness. The discipline of psychiatry developed informal 
psychiatric classification in order to distinguish between different types of 
mentally ill and the healthy (Mack, Forman, Brown & Frances, 1994; cited in 
Sonuga-Barke, 1998). However, there was a need for development of formal 
classification systems to make diagnoses uniform, improve reliability (Sonuga-
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Barke, 1998) and improve communication between professionals (Clark, Watson 
& Reynolds, 1995).
Current systems in use
There are currently two main systems of psychiatric classification; The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) and the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10: World Health Organisation, 1992). Categories in the two systems are 
similar (Cantwell & Rutter, 1994) and statements made about one often apply 
equally to the other (Sonuga-Barke, 1998), although their course of development 
differs (Shepherd, 1994; cited in Sonuga-Barke, 1998). The classification system 
of the American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994) is chosen for primary 
consideration in this essay as it is the most commonly studied (Sonuga-Barke,
1998).
American Psychiatric Association’s system (DSM)
The DSM-IV system of psychiatric classification (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) largely adopts a categorical approach to classification in that 
disorders are considered to be discrete entities, although it also includes a 
dimensional axis to code global assessment of functioning (Frances et al., 1995). 
A disorder is assumed to be characterised by clusters of symptoms. An individual 
must display some or all of the symptoms in order to meet the criteria for that 
disorder. As often individuals are not required to experience all symptoms to 
reach the threshold for categorisation within the disorder, there is variation in 
presentation of symptomatology within a category of disorder (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). Although the DSM-IV contains a separate section 
for disorders usually first diagnosed in infancy, childhood or adolescence, it notes 
that clinicians should also consider classifying individuals according to the 
categories in the adult sections.
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Theory underlying DSM
Due to disagreement regarding aetiology, psychiatric classification is intended to 
be atheoretical (Rutter et al., 1969; cited in Cantwell & Rutter, 1994) and 
disorders are not classified according to cause (Clark, Watson & Reynolds,
1995), but instead are based on observable symptoms. However, Sonuga-Barke
(1998) argues that the meta-theory of mental health problems implied by current 
psychiatric classification systems (DSM and ICD) is of a “traditional medical 
approach” (p. 120). Sonuga-Barke (1998) suggests that this “medical” model of 
mental illness carries assumptions; that mental illnesses are separate entities, that 
disorder is equivalent to dysfunction and that disorders apply to individuals rather 
than systems. Therefore, the pathology is thought to be located in an individual 
rather than his or her environment. The assumption of mental illness as a discrete 
entity that is dysfunctional will be examined in more detail in sections on validity 
and alternative approaches to classification. The impact of the assumption of a 
pathological individual is also considered later.
Relevance of psychiatric classification for understanding and treatment of 
mental health problems in childhood and adolescence
For psychiatric classification to be relevant for understanding it first needs to be 
reliable and valid. Reliability and validity will be considered before addressing 
the advantages and disadvantages of psychiatric classification for clients, clinical 
psychologists and research.
Reliability
The reliability of psychiatric classification systems refers to the extent to which 
two professionals agree in assigning an individual to a category, or test-retest 
reliability over time. Reliability is necessary if  a classification system is to be a 
language between professionals: they must know that they are talking about the 
same thing.
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Inter-professional reliability or test-retest reliability
There is some suggestion that inter-professional reliability in relation to 
childhood mental health disorders is problematic (Canter & Rutter, 1994). A 
reason for this might be that although there has been considerable effort to reduce 
inter-professional differences by specification of diagnostic criteria, which were 
not present in DSM until the third edition (Reid & Wise, 1995), the criteria 
specified in DSM-IV are not necessarily objective. For example, Frances et al., 
(1995) acknowledge that the concept of “clinically significant impairment or 
distress”, used to allow division from the normal and pathological (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1991) will be interpreted subjectively. Diagnostic 
reliability can be improved by standardised interview procedures; superior 
reliability was obtained from lay interviewers using the Diagnostic Interview 
Schedule for Children (DISC) than clinician’s diagnosis (Piacentini et al., 1993; 
cited in Jensen, Roper, Fisher, Piacentini, Canino, Richters et al., 1995). This 
suggests that formal assessment methods should be used to improve reliability. 
Reliability may also vary with disorder category. Jensen et al. (1995) found 
relatively higher reliability for depression (0.7), conduct disorder (0.71) and 
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (0.68) than oppositional defiant disorder 
(0.61) or anxiety disorder (0.50) when combined parent and child reports were 
used. It should be noted that Jensen et al.’s (1995) studies relate to DSM-IH-R 
diagnostic categories, and may not be generalisable to DSM-IV, the version 
currently in use, as diagnostic criteria have altered (Reid & Wise, 1995).
Inter-rater reliability of the “behavioural and emotional disorders with onset 
usually in childhood and adolescence” category in the research version of ICD-10 
was 0.94 (Sartorius, Ustun, Korten, Cooper & van Drimmelen, 1995), 
substantially higher than reliabilities reported by Jensen et al. (1995) on the 
DSM-III-R. This suggests that psychiatric classification systems can be reliable. 
The findings may reflect either an actual difference in reliability between the two 
classification systems, or methodological factors. For example, in making a 
diagnosis, Sartorius et al.’s (1995) clinicians used information obtained from a 
variety of sources, whereas Jensen et al. (1995) used only the DISC. Also, in 
Sartorius et al.’s (1995) study, assessments were either conducted jointly, or
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presented as a case conference, whereas in Jensen et al.’s (1995) study, 
assessments were conducted independently and over two to three week test-retest 
intervals. Therefore, reliability of a diagnostic category is inextricably linked to 
methods used in assessment.
Reliability o f informants
Even assuming that good inter-professional reliability exists, there are differences 
in the process of obtaining information used to classify an individual (Cantwell,
1996). In work with children and adolescents, it may be necessary to obtain 
assessment information from a number of individuals, including members of the 
family, teachers and the child him/herself. This leads to differences in 
perspectives. Reliability between different informants is often low, for example, 
Kolko & Kazdin (1993; cited in Target & Fonagy, 1996) found correlations of 
only between 0.27 between parent and child report and only 0.41 between parent 
and teacher. Cultural norms may also affect inter-rater reliability where raters are 
from different cultures (Sonuga-Barke, Minchoa, Taylor & Sandberg, 1993); 
however this research did not examine reliability of psychiatric classification 
criteria.
Reliability for time of symptom onset may be particularly problematic. For 
example, Angold, Erkanli, Costello & Rutter (1996) found that both children and 
parents reliability in dating onsets of symptoms were poor over periods of more 
than a few months, which will affect reliability of psychiatric classification when 
criteria specify a duration of symptoms.
Validity
In order for psychologists to use an instrument in clinical practice, the validity of 
that instrument should have been demonstrated. A classification that is not valid 
may lead to misunderstanding of mental health problems in childhood and 
adolescence.
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Carr (1999) notes that validity of categories depends on the degree to which they 
share common risk, precipitating, maintaining and ameliorating factors and the 
stability of the disorder over time.
There is very little evidence that mental health disorder categories in children and 
adolescents share common aetiology (Carr, 1999). Symptoms shown by a child 
that meet the criteria for a single psychiatric category may have differing 
precipitating factors. For example, enuresis or encopresis may be due to a range 
of factors that might include infection, which requires medication, or child sexual 
abuse, which would require initiation of child protection procedures. Research 
has also revealed that similar causal factors can manifest itself in different 
psychiatric categories. For example, children with depressed parents are at risk 
for differing psychiatric problems (Rutter, 1989, 1990; cited in Cantwell & 
Rutter, 1994), although it could be argued that depression in parents may 
manifest differently in parenting styles and may have different impacts on a 
child’s environment, thus representing different precipitating factors. Child 
sexual abuse can also lead to a variety of, or no negative psychological reactions 
(Rind, Tromovitch & Bauserman, 1998), although this study did not examine 
psychiatric disorder classifications.
It has been suggested that symptomatology can also change with the age of a 
child, in that as he or she grows older, they may meet different diagnostic criteria. 
For example, Cantwell & Baker (1989; cited in Target & Roth, 1996) found that 
out of nine children with separation anxiety disorder, four years later only one 
still met criteria for diagnosis, but four children met criteria for other diagnoses. 
However, Canter & Rutter (1994) stated that several disorders are consistent over 
time; they cited Harrington et al.’s (1990) research that found depressive 
disorders in childhood predicted risk of depressive disorder in adulthood. 
Stability over time appears to vary between disorders (Target & Fonagy, 1996), 
but also may be affected by methodology used. Therefore, some disorder 
categories may demonstrate validity in the sense that they show relative stability 
over time, while others may be relatively unstable.
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Validation of diagnostic criteria for DSM-IV (a field trial) categories of 
oppositional defiant disorder and conduct disorder in children and adolescents 
was performed by administering measures of impairment to children and 
ascertaining the optimal diagnostic threshold that identified impaired children 
(Lahey, Applegate, Barkley, Garfinkel, McBumett, Kerdyk et al., 1994). This 
approach is useful for demonstrating that categories relate to real-life impairment. 
Unfortunately, this research does not test the validity of the categories of disorder 
themselves.
Co-morbidity: a threat to evidence for discrete entities
A further threat to the categorical construct is high rates of co-morbidity in 
mental health problems of childhood and adolescence, which are far above 
chance levels that might be statistically expected (e.g. Caron & Rutter, 1991). 
DSM-IV includes exclusionary rules in some diagnostic categories that other 
diagnoses take precedence (for example, oppositional defiant disorder would not 
be diagnosed if a child also met criteria for conduct disorder; Reid & Wise, 
1995), but recognises that it is sometimes necessary to diagnose under more than 
one category. Co-morbidity questions the validity of categories of mental health 
problems as the overlap observed between the disorders renders the discreteness 
of them questionable.
Cole, Truglio & Peeke (1997) found that factor analyses of anxious and 
depressive symptoms in children yielded only a unitary anxiety-depressive factor 
for younger children (third grade), that suggests that separate categories for 
anxiety and depression in younger children may be of questionable validity.
Validity o f a categorical approach
The validity of a categorical construct will be addressed in this section, although 
points made here are also relevant to a later section on the alternative dimensional 
approach to psychiatric classification.
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The convergence of symptoms in different disorders has led some researchers to 
argue for continuums. Autism and Asperger’s syndrome are considered by some 
to represent two distinct syndromes on the basis that language delay is not present 
in Asperger’s syndrome, but is present in autism (they exist as two separate 
categories in DSM-IV). However, it has been argued that the two syndromes are 
in fact represent different points on the same spectrum as they differ in severity 
rather than conceptually (e.g. Wing, 1991).
The validity of a categorical approach to childhood and adolescent mental health 
problems also rests on its ability to differentiate the normal from the abnormal 
(Widiger & Clark, 2000), as is implied in the “theory” behind psychiatric 
classification (Sonuga-Barke, 1998). This begs the question, “What is normal?” 
In diagnoses of mental retardation, the cut-off point for mental retardation is 
derived from statistical properties of intelligence for the normal population. 
However, other category criteria are more arbitrary (Widiger & Clark, 2000).
Although the American Psychiatric Association periodically revise their system 
of psychiatric classification according to research, a categorical approach is 
retained. Caron & Rutter (1991) argued that research is methodologically biased 
to find in favour of categories, rather than continuums. Findings of difference 
between groups of individuals are taken to provide evidence for the categorical 
approach; however, such a result could reflect different ends of a continuum 
(Caron & Rutter, 1991).
In summary, research suggests that psychiatric classification can achieve 
acceptable levels of reliability, which makes the system a useful tool; however 
validity of categories is more questionable and may render the current system in 
need of further research to address the validity of disorder constructs.
Advantages and disadvantages of diagnosis for clients
Given concerns about reliability and validity, clinical psychologists may be 
reluctant to present psychiatric diagnoses to clients as “reality”. This issue aside,
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the effect of a diagnostic classification or label on a person is a topical debate. 
There may be potential benefits and costs in receiving a diagnosis.
Access to resources
Services are often described in terms of the population that they serve and the 
individuals who qualify for access. Psychiatric classification can provide a route 
to accessing services and receiving extra support (Cantwell & Rutter, 1994). For 
example, an individual diagnosed with “mental retardation” in DSM-IV will have 
access to special education. In clinical experience, the prospect of obtaining extra 
help is a factor that motivates parents to obtain a diagnosis for their child. 
Diagnosis may also allow access to voluntary services and support groups 
(Searight & McLaren, 1998) which may play an additional role in treatment.
The problem with using psychiatric classification to guide resource allocation is 
that this would entail making decisions mostly upon symptomatology, with only 
minor consideration of impact of the problem on a child’s development. Recently 
the Department of Health (1999; cited in Pilgrim, 2000, p.305) recommended, 
“decision making based on estimates of need, risk and vulnerability, not 
diagnosis or legal status”, so it is likely that psychiatric classification may not be 
the only factor determining access to resources. For example, psychiatric 
classification is not relevant to preventative work with children and their families 
who do not yet meet, but who are at risk in the future, for meeting diagnostic 
criteria. Resource allocation for these families may need to be decided on a 
different basis.
The effect o f a diagnostic label
A qualitative study that examined parents reactions to a diagnosis of autism found 
that diagnoses helped understanding and also helped relieve guilt that their 
child’s behaviour was their fault (Midence & O’Neill, 1999). Therefore, 
psychiatric classification may be important for parents’ and families’ - 
understanding. However, as the study sample had received a diagnosis, it is 
possible that the people in the study had actually wanted a diagnosis. This is not
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always the case and parents who do not want diagnoses may have different views, 
a question that Midence & O’Neill did not address.
Psychiatric classification may also be unhelpful for clients and their families. 
Although the DSM system allows categorisation of systemic contributions on 
axis IV (psychosocial and environmental problems), the psychiatric classification 
is still applied to the individual, and not the system within which the problem 
may have been created. Rather than being located in an individual, it has been 
suggested that mental health problems in children and adolescents arise out of a 
complex interaction between characteristics of the child, the parents, and the 
relationships between them, contextual and situational factors, including those at 
the level of the community (Carr, 1999). In this respect, it could be argued that 
psychiatric classification placed upon a child may shift responsibility wholly onto 
the child and may affect the way parents and others in the system understand the 
problem. In cases where a child has suffered abuse from a parent, it may also be 
considered unethical to attach a label of disorder to them. This could be construed 
as further mechanism to make the child feel isolated and different. Therefore, 
psychiatric diagnosis may falsely allow understanding that the problem is in one 
individual and not the system.
Cantwell & Rutter (1994; p. 17) stated that “diagnoses apply to disorders and not 
to people”; however, in the respect that psychiatric classification is applied to a 
child rather than a system, its appropriateness in terms of a global understanding 
of mental health has been questioned (Sonuga-Barke, 1998). There may be wider 
consequences of pathologising and locating a problem within an individual. 
Mental health diagnoses can be stigmatising (Pilgrim, 2000; Carr, 1999). From 
studies in cognitive psychology it is known that experience is interpreted in the 
light of how people already view the world. Therefore, once given a diagnosis, an 
individual may be perceived by others in accordance with the label.
Psychiatric classification has also been accused of biasing understanding in that it 
“medicalises” the normal, for example in the case of attention deficit disorder 
(ADHD) (Searight & McLaren, 1998).
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There may be pressure on clinical psychologists to provide a psychiatric 
diagnosis from teachers and parents (Searight & McLaren, 1998). Consideration 
of the view of clients is difficult when working with children, as there may be 
differing views within a family. There may be questions about a child’s ability to 
consent to a diagnosis. A solution might be to allow the decision to request or 
decline a psychiatric diagnosis to rest with parents; however the disadvantage of 
this is that views of children and adolescents, particularly of children are difficult 
to consider, as they may not be aware of implications. It may also allow for the 
child to be labelled with the problem, which may not be an appropriate view to 
promote.
Usefulness of psychiatric classification for clinical psychologists
The reliability and validity of psychiatric classification is somewhat separate 
from its usefulness to clinical psychologists. That is, a system might be “correct” 
in the sense that it represented a true reality, it would still not necessarily be 
relevant in the sense that it may not provide the clinical psychologist with useful 
data.
Understanding and assessment
Psychiatric classification may be useful for communication between clinical 
psychologists (Carr, 1999) in the sense that it represents a uniform language. In 
this respect it can also be useful in legal work when communicating about the 
nature of a client’s difficulties (Professional Affairs Board, 1999). Psychiatric 
classification may guide the focus of an assessment and provide a starting point 
for intervention; however, it may also shift a clinician’s focus away from other 
avenues of inquiry by pre-assigning the area of interest.
Sonuga-Barke (1998; p, 121) said of the medical model’s assumption of 
dysfunction (inherent in psychiatric classification), “Social impairment is 
automatically assumed to result from an inability to respond to a particular 
environment adaptively, rather than a lack of motivation to do so”. Thereby, the 
individual may be viewed as not being able to do anything about his or her
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disorder. This does not promote understanding of individuals’ strengths and 
coping strategies (Sonuga-Barke, 1998). Thus, by accepting psychiatric 
classification we may blind ourselves as clinicians to the individual’s strengths. 
In this respect psychiatric classification does not guide assessment of strengths, 
only areas of deficiency.
Psychiatric classification groups people on the basis of symptoms, but depending 
on the individual, there may be more important factors than symptomatology in 
understanding of the problem (Target & Fonagy, 1996). Target & Fonagy (1996) 
advocate that clinical psychologists should take a global view of the impact of 
problems on social, psychological and educational areas of development. For 
example, in clinical work with children and adolescents the quality of their 
relationships with family and friends, and whether or not they are truant from 
school, or at risk of harm to self or others may be more relevant factors than 
diagnosis.
Treatment
Psychiatric classification may not promote an appropriate model of treatment. 
According to social constructionist theory, one foundation of modem systemic 
approaches, problems are constmcted in society by the way language is used 
(Simblett, 1996). From this theoretical stance, it may be considered anti- 
therapeutic to provide a diagnosis in a language of deficit rather than strength. A 
language of deficit might inhibit clients’ abilities to see exceptions to their 
problems, which can be an important part of therapy.
Strengths and protective factors form an important part of a clinical 
psychologist’s formulation and often will form a basis for psychological 
intervention. Other than coding circumstances on axis IV (psychosocial and 
environmental problems), psychiatric classification does not provide information 
regarding complex system interactions, which would guide treatment with 
families. Psychiatric classification also does not describe risk and maintaining 
factors for the problem, which also guide treatment approaches. Consequently,
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the clinical psychologist is likely to need to use psychological theories in order to 
guide their work with relationships between individuals.
A further factor that renders psychiatric classification irrelevant for treatment is 
high levels of co-morbidity (Caron & Rutter, 1991). When an individual meets 
the criteria for two or more categories of disorder, psychiatric classification does 
not guide the clinician in selection of which treatment to use, or which disorder to 
treat first.
Due to its categorical approach, psychiatric classification only allows 
consideration of levels of a disorder above a certain threshold. As discussed, there 
is evidence that mental health problems in childhood and adolescence exist on a 
continuum. Indeed, clinical psychologists work is sometimes with families of 
children do not meet criteria for disorder and whose problems are manifest at a 
sub-psychiatric category level. Consequently, psychiatric classification is 
irrelevant for this aspect of a clinical psychologist’s work.
Relevance to research
As well as influencing clinical psychologists’ and clients’ understanding of 
mental health problems, psychiatric classification may impact upon research 
seeking to acquire understanding of mental health problems of children and 
adolescents.
Understanding
Psychiatric classification is useful in that it has allowed progress in 
epidemiological research (Regier, Kaelber, Rae, Farmer, Knauper, Kessler & 
Norquist, 1998). It also provides a basis for research into a particular disorder in 
that it enables grouping of individuals for research into risk and precipitating 
factors for the disorder (Carr, 1999). It also allows research into the course of the 
disorder over time (Carr, 1999). However, psychiatric classification may also 
mislead research endeavours. If a psychiatric classification system has poor 
reliability and validity, research on its basis will be flawed (Cantwell, 1996).
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Research may be affected by the nature of the categorical system. For example, if 
a classification system separates two disorders that may be in fact one on a 
continuum, for example, as is suggested in the case of autism and Asperger’s 
syndrome, research into the separate disorders might not be representative of the 
population as a whole. As well as similarities in individuals between categories 
that might be better researched together, there are differences between individuals 
within a category (Clark et al., 1995). When heterogeneous individuals are 
grouped as one, this may lead to loss of information about individual differences 
and may bias understanding (Mirowsky & Ross, 1989; cited in Sonuga-Barke,
1998).
Treatment
Psychiatric classification provides a basis for research into potential treatments 
for mental health problems in childhood and adolescence. As Target & Fonagy 
(1996) note, co-morbidity complicates this research. If pure disorders are 
researched, the research literature may be of limited use in selecting appropriate 
treatments for clients with co-morbidity. If co-morbidity is high, as is particularly 
the case in children and adolescents (Caron & Rutter, 1991) clinical psychologists 
will have a frequent problem of a lack of evidence-based treatment for co-morbid 
problems.
Although psychiatric classification allows grouping of individuals for the 
purposes of research, it may also hinder research, as it groups individuals on the 
basis of symptoms and not aetiology. This is a particular problem in children and 
adolescents as symptoms do not necessarily correspond to a single cause. 
Therefore, individuals who have taken part in a controlled trial to establish, or 
compare the efficaciousness of particular treatments may have differing causes of 
their problem. Consequently, a reasonably standardised treatment may either 
benefit or not benefit individuals, possibly depending on the specific risk or 
precipitating factors for the problem. In trials individuals’ differences may be 
masked by the group result, on which the efficaciousness is established 
(Mirowsky & Ross, 1989; cited in Sonuga-Barke, 1998). Despite this problem,
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there may not be a better way of conducting comparisons of treatment 
effectiveness.
This has highlighted a circular problem. Without a classification system that 
represents “reality” in the status of mental health problems in childhood and 
adolescence, there will be inherent problems in researching efficacy of treatment 
for particular disorders. However, without a way of classifying problems, 
research regarding potential treatments for groups of individuals that may be 
generalisable to other groups of individuals is problematic.
Psychiatric classification as a measure o f outcome
Should research outcome be based on whether individuals continue, or 
discontinue to meet criteria for a particular category, outcome data would mostly 
involve symptom improvement. Although symptom improvement is relevant, 
other outcome data may also be important, for example measures of family 
interaction (Target & Fonagy, 1996) and may need to be included in evaluation 
studies. If categories are unreliable, this might affect outcome research if 
measures are taken by different professionals. That is, if an individual no longer 
met diagnostic criteria after a treatment trial, if reliability is low, it would be 
difficult to ascertain whether this was due to treatment effectiveness, or to inter­
rater variability. Extra training and use of standardised assessment instruments 
may help.
Alternatives to current system of psychiatric classification
Dimensional system
A lack of absolute symptom specificity in categories of psychiatric classification 
has lead some authors to argue for a dimensional system (e.g. Widiger & Clark, 
2000). Widiger & Clark (2000) advocate a dimensional model of classification 
that represents mental health problems on dimensions of symptoms that cluster 
together. However, Widiger & Clark’s proposed model is not entirely
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dimensional in that they suggest that clusters that co-occur frequently, and for 
which a cause is found, would form the basis for a category.
Widiger & Clark’s (2000) proposal considers the broader issue of psychiatric 
diagnosis and not specifically as it relates to children. Achenbach (1991; cited by 
Carr, 1999), provided evidence for a dimensional model of children’s mental 
health problems in that analysis of behavioural reasons for referral existed as 
extremes on two dimensions — internalising or externalising behaviour problems. 
There is evidence that some disorders exist on continuums, for example, attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder, which has lead to arguments in favour of a 
dimensional approach. A dimensional system would help reduce the large 
number of categories currently present (Clark et al., 1995), depending on the 
number of dimensions used, and may better represent the data. However, other 
disorders, for example, dyslexia, might be more suited to a categorical approach 
(Carr, 1999). Therefore, research might need to continue to differentiate whether 
disorders are qualitatively or quantitatively different from normality.
An advantage to a dimensional system of classification for clients would be that 
such a model would assume quantitative and not qualitative differences from 
normality (Sonuga-Barke, 1998), which might promote a less stigmatising model 
of mental health problems. However, even with a dimensional approach, stigma 
may become attached to individuals any imposed cut-off point.
A disadvantage to dimensional systems is that they do not easily conceptualise 
rarer problems or those with only one symptom (Carr, 1999). Epidemiological 
research would be problematic as the categorical model lends itself well to group 
comparisons. Also it would be difficult to group potential research participants 
for the purposes of treatment efficacy trials if individuals were described on 
different dimensions. Sonuga-Barke (1998) stated that although the dimensional 
approach to psychiatric classification may be better grounded in the scientific 
data, it may inhibit links between research and practice.
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Psychological formulation
Psychological formulation is grounded in theories based on psychological 
research. Consequently, it allows understanding of risk and precipitating factors, 
as well as current factors that maintain the problem (Carr, 1999). It does illustrate 
potential avenues for treatment in consideration of strengths and protective 
factors. Furthermore, psychological formulation allows understanding of the 
system’s (e.g. parents’, teachers’ and friends’) role, which is particularly 
important, given that mental health problems of children often reflect problems in 
a system (Carr, 1999). Even those involved in the development of the DSM-IV 
classification system advocate that clinicians might consider exceptions to a 
diagnosis (Cantwell & Rutter, 1994). This is analogous to the therapeutic stance 
taken by narrative therapists, who focus on exceptions to the “problem story” 
(e.g. Monk, 1997), and of systemic therapists, who attend to strengths (Carr,
1999), as a therapeutic way forward. As psychological formulation considers 
many aspects of a child and their family, it is likely to be less stigmatising. 
Psychological formulation also allows continuity (Pilgrim, 2000) from the normal 
to the clinically significant degree of a problem, which is important where 
preventative work, or work at sub-threshold levels of a problem is to be 
conducted.
Unfortunately, psychological formulation is problematic in that each formulation 
is individualised and may vary between professionals for the same individual, not 
only with respect to detail, but also to theoretical orientation. Consequently, inter­
rater reliability is likely to be low. Also, without a consensus in theory and 
individual formulation, validity would be constantly questioned by clinicians of 
other theoretical orientations. The current method of psychiatric classification is 
likely to show better reliability and validity. It would also be difficult to group 
children on the basis of individual psychological formulations. Therefore, 
research may be confined to single case studies. Consequently, although there are 
inherent problems, psychiatric classification may continue to be relevant for 
research due to the need for some way of grouping individuals and due to its 
better reliability and validity than psychological formulation. This need might be 
served by a dimensional system instead.
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Conclusion
The reliability and validity of psychiatric classification are likely to be affected 
by methodological factors employed in the research. Studies that address 
questions of reliability and validity will need to be carefully examined for 
methods used.
There may be benefits in psychiatric classification for clients, such as access to 
resources and understanding.
Psychiatric classification allows a clinical psychologist to understand the group of 
symptoms presented; however diagnosis does not describe risk, precipitating, 
maintaining or ameliorating factors and therefore will not guide psychological 
understanding. The clinical psychologist needs to supplement diagnosis with 
individual formulation. Clinical psychologists should select treatment on the basis 
of evidence that demonstrates its efficaciousness; however, high levels of co­
morbidity complicates this process in children and adolescents. Where research is 
conducted on “pure” disorders, the literature will not guide treatment with the 
significant number of children who display co-morbidity.
Psychiatric classification has provided a basis for epidemiological research; 
however there are serious concerns as to whether the present categorical system 
best represents mental health problems in children and adolescents; it may be that 
some disorders would be better classified within a dimensional system. In future 
it will be necessary to balance the need for a system on which to base research 
with the need to revise classification systems in order that they best represent 
research data.
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Specialist essay
What are the implications of the Self-Regulatory Executive 
Function (S-REF) model for the practice of cognitive therapy?
Introduction
Cognitive therapy as proposed by Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery (1979) and Beck, 
Emery & Greenberg (1985) has been established as an effective treatment for 
many mental health problems, and is often the treatment of choice (Roth & 
Fonagy, 1996). The basis for cognitive therapy, the cognitive model, has largely 
remained unchanged since Beck wrote about it in the 1970s, although it has been 
adapted and elaborated upon for a variety of mental health problems, for 
example, Clark’s, (1986) model of panic disorder. Alongside this development in 
cognitive therapy, cognitive psychology has developed further understanding of 
links between cognitions and emotions, largely using experimental paradigms. A 
criticism of cognitive therapy is its failure to accommodate and adapt to findings 
from experimental cognitive psychology. Recently, new theories have been 
developed arising out of the cognitive science literature, one of which is Wells & 
Matthews’ (1994) self-regulatory executive function model (S-REF).
This essay will describe and outline limitations of the Beckian cognitive model 
and implications for therapy. Wells & Matthews’ (1994) S-REF model will be 
described and its contribution to understanding of mental health problems will be 
critically evaluated in the light of recent literature. Specific focus will be given to 
research that addresses aspects of the model that have important implications for 
clinical practice, as evaluating all of the evidence on which the model is based 
would be beyond the scope of this essay. Also, as a wide body of evidence is 
supportive of Beck’s cognitive model, this essay will not attempt to critically 
evaluate Beck’s model in detail; rather, the S-REF model will be considered in 
terms of its contributions to the practice of cognitive therapy over and above 
those of the Beckian model. Particular reference will be made to differing 
theoretical stances between the two models. Implications for therapeutic 
intervention will be considered not only in terms of theoretical coherence, and 
differences from traditional cognitive therapy, but also pragmatics, an important
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factor in the practice of clinical psychology. Examination of the S-REF model in 
terms of its contribution to understanding and therapeutic practice will be 
conducted separately.
Traditional cognitive model
Beck et al. (1979) cognitive model
Beck et al.’s (1979) cognitive model proposed that through early experience, 
schemas are formed about the self, others and the world. Schemas are thought to 
be represented as declarative statements, such as “I am unlovable”, “Others are 
untrustworthy” or “The world is a bad place”. People who are vulnerable to 
emotional problems are likely to have negative schemas. These schemas are 
thought to be dormant until a negative life event occurs that activates underlying 
schemas. Once schemas are activated, events are interpreted in the light of the 
schema. Consequently, information processing is biased through process of 
selective attention to schema-congruent information. During this negatively 
biased processing of events, the individual experiences negative automatic 
thoughts about him/herself, events and the future that then lead to negative 
emotion and influence how an individual behaves. Thoughts in emotional 
disorder are thought to be absolute and fixed. The negative automatic thoughts 
are suggested to maintain the emotional disorder.
Practice of cognitive therapy according to the cognitive model would involve 
modification of thought content at the level of negative automatic thoughts. In 
therapy the negative bias in information processing and the tendency to think in 
terms of absolutes and not degrees is corrected through the use of cognitive 
techniques and behavioural experiments. Treatment would initially target the 
negative automatic thoughts, but would also address schemas in order to prevent 
relapse.
Beck et al.’s (1979) theory is thought to be limited by its lack of description of 
the process underlying the affect of core and intermediate beliefs on processing of
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current events and is not thought to detail sufficiently the mechanism for change 
in cognitive therapy (Wells, 2000).
Self-regulatory executive function model
Description o f S-REF model
Wells & Matthews (1994) suggest that events are processed by three interacting 
cognitive levels: self-beliefs, a conscious on-line level and an automatic level. 
The self-belief level could be likened to schemas in traditional cognitive therapy 
and stores knowledge about the self and prior experience. Self-knowledge 
comprises both declarative beliefs and procedural knowledge (plans for 
processing). The automatic level conducts unconscious processing of external, 
and internal - cognitive (e.g. cognitions) or physiological state information (for 
example, heartbeat or tension in muscles). The on-line level is responsible for 
conscious processing of information received from the two other levels. It 
interprets information from the automatic level and controls action based on 
information from the self-belief level.
Wells (2000) suggests that there are different processing configurations of these 
three levels, but describes and implicates only one in emotional disorders, the S- 
REF configuration. The S-REF is thought to serve a self-regulatory function. In 
this sense, it is said to provide a homeostatic function, activated under conditions 
of adversity to return the self to a desired state. The S-REF is suggested to initiate 
when threat is detected, internally or externally at the automatic level, in order to 
reduce the discrepancy between desired and current experienced states of self. 
Consequently, in S-REF configuration, external and internal events are appraised 
and activity aimed at achieving the desired goal is executed by the on-line, 
controlled processing level, guided by information from the self-belief level to 
guide coping with the threat stimuli. On-line monitoring continues until the goal 
is reached through re-appraisal of the threat, or through use of effective coping 
strategies, when S-REF activity terminates. Other demands on attention will 
temporarily divert processing out of S-REF mode (distraction); however, S-REF 
mode will initiate again with any perceived threat.
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S-REF activity occurs in two modes (perspectives individuals take), object 
(where appraisals are taken as fact), which is the usual mode of operation, or 
meta-cognitive, in which individuals are capable of evaluating their thoughts and 
experiences (i.e. they are events and are not necessarily taken as fact). In meta- 
cognitive mode, processing capacity is directed towards detached evaluation of 
cognitive and internal events. Wells (2000) suggests that individuals normally 
fluctuate between the two modes of processing, as both can be adaptive in certain 
situations (for example, the object mode is useful to escape real threat). Mode of 
processing can influence emotion. For example, in object mode, feelings of 
anxiety are taken as representative of reality, whereas in meta-cognitive mode, 
evaluation of the reality of the threat can occur and lead to re-appraisal.
Meta-cognitive knowledge in the form of declarative beliefs and procedural 
knowledge guide processing and coping strategies. These may predispose an 
individual to use a certain coping strategy or may alert an individual to particular 
internal or external stimuli (Wells, 2000). For example, an individual may believe 
that worry is effective way of dealing with anxiety, or that they must be hyper- 
vigilant to bodily sensations or something bad will happen, plans which would be 
stored at the procedural and declarative self-belief level and would be executed 
by on-line processing.
Depending on the outcome (affected by meta-cognitive plan for processing and 
coping strategies), self-beliefs may either be maintained, or modified. For 
example, the meta-cognitive plan “I should avoid everything that makes me feel 
anxiety” would lead to the use of an avoidance coping strategy. Consequently, the 
interpretation of the anxiety-provoking stimuli as threatening is likely to be 
strengthened rather than modified, and a threat appraisal of the stimuli is likely to 
occur again in the future. Other meta-cognitions and coping strategies would be 
more likely to lead to re-appraisal of the threat value of the stimuli. The mode of 
processing of the S-REF will affect whether the threat appraisal is modified: 
object mode will lead to threat appraisal being taken as fact, which will not be 
questioned; meta-cognitive mode will lead to questioning of the threat appraisal
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and possible modification. S-REF will be re-activated in response to stimuli if 
modification at the self-belief level does not occur.
Emotional disorder is thought to occur in response to anticipated or perceived 
actual failure to meet the self-regulatory goal (Wells, 2000). This may be due to 
the fact that the goal was unrealistic (as can be the case when people use 
emotional states as a regulator of whether a goal has been met, which can cause 
problems when desired feeling states are unobtainable, or if a person has a very 
low tolerance of negative emotional states). Alternatively action taken as a coping 
mechanism to reach the desired self-state goal was ineffective (this would be due 
to the nature of self-beliefs), or negative appraisal of self-state, such that the 
discrepancy between desired and current self-state is not perceived to have 
reduced, or due to external constraints.
Emotional disorder is maintained by the fact that S-REF processing is 
perseverative as the individual will continue to monitor for personally relevant 
threat stimuli (Wells, 2000), such that the individual continues to attempt to reach 
the goal using the same processing configuration, but is not effective. Emotion 
then affects processing in S-REF by biasing the information retrieved from the 
self-belief level. S-REF affects automatic processing too -  heightens attention for 
threat-relevant stimuli. As on-line processing is limited, if maladaptive plans for 
coping are executed and perseverated, attentional capacity for modifying self­
beliefs or instigating the attentionally demanding strategy of problem-focused 
coping will be limited.
S-REF model compared with traditional cognitive model and new developments 
o f the cognitive model in terms o f their contribution to understanding emotional 
disorder
The S-REF model specifies process, and sees cognition as dynamic process with 
parts of the system having reciprocal affects on the others. This is different from 
the Beckian model, which makes cause-effect predictions about the role of 
cognitions in emotional disorder. Another main difference between the traditional 
cognitive model and S-REF model is in the role of procedural self-knowledge and
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resultant processing styles implicated in contributing to maintenance of disorder. 
The advantage over the cognitive model is that S-REF states how self-knowledge 
might influence processing routines, a link that was not made by Beck in 
discussion of how schemas or self-beliefs affect processing.
The S-REF and specific models of disorders developed on the basis of the 
Beckian model are also similar in some ways. Recent attempts to theorise specific 
models for specific disorders are based on the S-REF model, for example, in the 
recognition of the role of meta-cognitions (in GAD) (Wells, 1997) and the role of 
self-focussed processing (in social phobia) (Clark and Wells, 1995; cited in 
Wells, 1997). Recent developments in cognitive therapy also acknowledge the 
role of behavioural coping strategies in the maintenance of beliefs, which is like 
Salkovskis’s (1996) description of safety-behaviours, which are said to be coping 
strategies employed in a situation that an individual believes prevents the 
catastrophic danger appraisal in the situation from occurring, but that actually 
maintain the problem by preventing disconfirmation of the appraisal. In the S- 
REF model these are specified as part of the self-regulatory plan, one strategy to 
achieve the desired self-state would be to avoid the anxiety provoking stimulus, 
thereby preventing re-appraisal of it and change at the self-belief level.
A problem with the traditional cognitive model is that it does not explain the 
observed incongruence between clients knowing something rationally and 
knowing it emotionally. S-REF model recognises the impact of emotions on 
processing, highlighted in experimental cognitive work (reviewed by Wells & 
Matthews, 1994), which is not specified by Beck’s model. S-REF addresses this 
issue with its explanation of the role of feelings and internal events in guiding 
information processing and cognitions. For example, clients with OCD may 
check until it “feels right”.
Evaluation of evidence for S-REF model
Evidence supportive of the S-REF model that is also supportive of the cognitive 
model will not be reviewed here. Instead, evidence that is of further relevance to 
the validity of the S-REF model, or evidence that distinguishes between the
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cognitive and S-REF model will be discussed. The similarities between self­
beliefs and schemas have already been discussed; however the difference 
between the models is that S-REF specifies that self-beliefs contain procedural 
knowledge (processing plans) in addition to the declarative knowledge specified 
by the traditional cognitive model (Beck et al., 1979). Most clinically relevant is 
the proposed role of meta-cognitions and their link to processing strategies used, 
and degree of self-focus in processing in maintenance of emotional disorder.
A key distinguishing feature between the traditional cognitive model and S-REF 
is the nature of cognitions. The traditional model states that it is the thought 
content which is the causal factor in emotional disorders and predicts content 
specificity in disorders (Beck et al., 1987; cited in Wells & Butler, 1997). 
Advances of the cognitive model have recognised the role of meta-cognitions, but 
S-REF model extends this to state that meta-cognitions and resultant processing 
strategies determine emotion. This has implications for practice in whether 
cognitions or meta-cognitions should be targeted.
Cognitions versus meta-cognitions
Firstly, evidence suggests that content of cognitions distinguish between some 
different disorders. For example, in panic disorder individuals are more likely to 
misinterpret bodily sensations than clients with social phobia or controls 
(McNally & Foa, 1987; cited in Clark, 1997). Also, in health anxiety individuals 
tend to misinterpret physiological experiences as signs of illness more than 
clients with other anxiety disorders (Salkovskis, 1990; cited in Salkovskis & 
Bass, 1997). These cognitions are hypothesised to cause and maintain these 
disorders. In contrast, in OCD there is evidence that thought content does not 
differ from those without OCD (Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984; cited in Amir et 
al., 1997); however, the meta-cognition that if we think a thought, it may come 
true as an event is associated with emotional distress (Rachman, Thordarson, 
Shaffan & Woody, 1995). There is also evidence that meta-cognitive appraisal of 
obsessional thoughts predicts emotion (Purdon, 2001).
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Wells suggests that meta-cognitions and meta-cognitive plans are responsible for 
maintenance of emotional problems. Therefore, it follows that meta-cognitions 
should relate to processing style (meta-cognitive plan) and to negative emotion.
Meta-cognitions in disorders and link to emotions
S-REF model predicts that individuals will hold meta-cognitions about the 
usefulness or harm of coping strategies. Therefore, research has attempted to 
address whether individuals hold negative or positive beliefs about strategies for 
coping with thoughts.
Papagorgiou & Wells (in press; cited in Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001) found that 
people with depression held positive beliefs about rumination, although the citing 
authors do not state whether this was in comparison to controls, or another 
psychiatric sample. Also, in GAD, negative meta-cognitions about worry were 
shown to predict GAD (Nassif, 1999; cited in Wells & Carter, 2001). Wells & 
Carter (submitted; cited in Wells, 1997) found that even controlling for cognitive 
content and frequency of worries, the meta-cognitions about worry predicted the 
degree of emotional problem.
Link between thought control strategies and emotions
The S-REF model also predicts that the meta-cognitive plan will lead to 
emotional problems. Evidence from a non-clinical sample suggests that thought 
control strategies of worry and punishing oneself for thoughts is associated with 
emotional problems and that social control (asking others if  they experience 
thoughts also), distraction and re-appraisal of thoughts were not associated with 
negative emotion experienced (Wells & Davies, 1994). Papageorgiou & Wells 
(2001) found that rumination was associated with depressive thinking in students 
and that this was stable over a 6-week period. Studies have also shown that 
clinical populations use more of certain thought control strategies and that a link 
exists between some thought control strategies and emotions in clinical 
populations. For example, Warda & Bryant (1998; cited in Wells, 2000) found 
that people with acute stress disorder (ASD) following RTAs used more 
punishment and worry than victims without ASD and that use of these strategies
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were associated with emotional distress. Amir, Cashman & Foa (1997) found that 
people with OCD used more of the thought control strategies of worry, re­
appraisal, social control and particularly punishment than controls. The only 
thought control strategy on which the groups did not differ was distraction. 
Morrison & Wells’s (2000) showed that people with schizophrenia used more 
worry and punishment and less distraction than a control group (comprised of 
health service staff and students). All of these findings should be interpreted with 
caution, as controls were a non-clinical sample. It is possible that if individuals 
have more distressing thoughts, they will use strategies more often to deal with 
them. Just because a style of coping is prevalent in emotional disorders, for 
example, rumination in depression, it does not mean that it is necessarily 
implicated in causing or maintaining the emotional disorder. Findings could 
easily reflect a by-product of the nature of the disorder rather than a causal or 
maintaining factor. If an individual experiences more symptoms, it is likely that 
they will use more thought control strategies. Although, Wells & Carter (in press; 
cited in Wells 1997) did find that meta-cognitive beliefs predicted distress in 
clients with GAD, even when worry content and frequency was controlled for, 
suggesting that meta-cognitions do have a causal role.
Other evidence supportive of the proposed maintaining role of thought control 
strategies in emotional disorder comes from longitudinal studies showing the 
predictive value of coping strategies in terms of recovery. Reynolds & Wells 
(1999) who showed that compared to a non-recovered sample of people with 
PTSD or depression, at time of recovery the recovered sample used distraction 
more and worry less. Use of re-appraisal was associated with recovery. When use 
of other thought control techniques was controlled for, the use of distraction 
negatively predicted depression (i.e. indicating that distraction is a useful 
strategy). Also, punishment was positively associated, and reappraisal was 
negatively associated with degree of depression; however these findings still may 
not implicate a causal role of thought control strategy, but instead just suggest 
that a symptom of depression -  tendency to punish oneself -  is decreasing with 
the other symptoms.
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The effects of experimentally induced rumination were shown by Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1993) who found dysphoric students who had been 
instructed to ruminate were less willing to engage in activities than dysphoric 
students who had not been ruminating, even though the groups did not differ in 
terms of their perceived enjoyment of the activity. Although this did not 
explicitly test the hypotheses of the connection between thought control and 
mood, it does demonstrate the behavioural impact of ruminating and one could 
imagine that this may be mediated by its effect on mood. Deleterious effects have 
also been demonstrated following induction of worry in a non-clinical sample: 
worry increased negative thoughts (Butler, Wells & Dewick, 1995; cited in 
Wells, 2000).
Self-focus
The S-REF model also predicts that heightened self-focus of attention can be a 
causal factor in the maintenance of disorder. There is evidence that this is the 
case in social phobia (Clark, 1997). As individuals with emotional disorders are 
more attuned to various bodily symptoms and anxiety responses, this suggests a 
heightened self-focus is present in other disorders also.
Ability to think meta-cognitively
Another prediction the model makes is that individuals who are more flexible in 
their style of processing and can switch into meta-cognitive mode would be more 
likely to question their appraisals than individuals whose processing mode was 
mainly in object mode, and therefore would be less vulnerable to developing 
emotional disorder. This prediction could be tested out by examining individuals’ 
tendency to re-evaluate their thoughts. Re-appraisal thought control strategies 
seem to be negatively associated with emotional distress, evidence that may 
provide some support for this prediction.
In summary, although specific predictions can be tested out, the nature of the 
model as a dynamic interaction between three sub-systems does not allow it to be
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tested in its entirety. It would therefore be difficult to control for the effects of 
one, while assessing the causal role of another.
Implications for practice
Although the S-REF model has many implications for practice, particular focus 
will be given to main implications and those over and above the implications for 
practice of traditional cognitive therapy, and those that are in conflict with the 
traditional approach. Available evidence that supports or challenges implications 
for practice will be considered.
Wells (2000) states that therapy should modify not only declarative, but also 
procedural self-beliefs, which includes self-regulatory plans for processing. There 
are many components to this aim. It may involve modification of unrealistic 
meta-cognitive goals for desired internal states, such as ‘I must stop having 
intrusive thoughts’, which may require examination of intolerance of emotions, 
cognitions or aversive states. Procedural modifications to unhelpful attempts to 
cope, for example, worry or rumination, would also be necessary as the model 
assumes conscious control over these thoughts. Also the individuals’ processing 
style of focusing on the self needs to be changed, with the aim of reducing threat- 
monitoring, to internal and external stimuli. The procedural aspect of self- 
knowledge may be modified with the use of attentional training, which will be 
discussed below.
Declarative meta-cognitive modification
Wells (2000) states that therapeutic change occurs only when S-REF processing 
mode is activated, as this is the style of processing responsible for maintenance of 
the disorder. Therapy would aim to target the way of processing cognitions and 
experience. Firstly, individuals need to be encouraged to shift to meta-cognitive 
mode, rather than object mode, where negative appraisals regarding cognitions 
and internal experiences such as feelings can be questioned, rather than taken as 
fact. This Wells suggests should be achieved through therapist prompting 
individuals to constantly evaluate and take an outsider perspective on cognitive
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events and by individuals practising these skills in thought monitoring. 
Individuals can also be encouraged to take a detached perspective with respect to 
their thoughts and internal experiences (called “detached mindfulness”, Wells & 
Matthews, 1994), which may encourage the meta-cognitive mode of thinking.
This approach may be in contrast to more traditional cognitive therapy, which 
would principally aim to evaluate the content of thoughts, rather than meta­
cognitions or thoughts about thoughts. The idea of working therapeutically only 
when an individual is in S-REF processing configuration could be likened to the 
idea of working with ‘hot’ cognitions (cognitions that elicit emotional affect in 
session); however, in contrast to traditional cognitive therapy, work is not 
advocated when processing is out of S-REF configuration, or with ‘cold’ 
cognitions, as the model suggests challenging thoughts at this time would not 
lead to belief change. As the S-REF model does not specify other processing 
configurations, it is difficult to know why this is.
Wells (2000) predicts that changing purely verbal cognitions will have a ‘limited 
effect’ if processing styles and behaviour are not altered. However, the numerous 
outcome studies testament to the effectiveness of traditional cognitive therapy 
that does just that cannot be ignored (Roth & Fonagy, 1996). Some disorders, 
such as OCD and GAD are known to be difficult to treat and the advancement of 
knowledge about the role of meta-cognitions in maintenance of these disorders 
has enhanced the practice of therapy. However, in outcomes studies, processing 
configurations have not been explicitly addressed, as suggested in the S-REF 
model, yet therapeutic change has still occurred. There are also other disorders, 
for which the focus of therapy is likely to be exclusively on cognitions and not 
meta-cognitions or processing styles, and for which the effectiveness of 
traditional cognitive therapy has been demonstrated. It may be that processing 
routines are modified indirectly (but not an explicit target) in traditional cognitive 
therapy.
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Procedural meta-cognitive modification
The S-REF model predicts that processing plans need to be modified in order to 
move focus of processing away from the self and to optimise the processing of 
disconfirmatory evidence to aid changes in declarative self-beliefs. In order to do 
this, Wells (2000) suggests that individuals need to learn new procedural plans in 
order to move focus of processing away from the self and to increase attentional 
control. The experience of training in new procedural plans not only allow 
exposure to experience without dysfunctional coping strategies, but also free up 
processing resources for on-line processing of the disconfirmatory experience (as 
on-line capacity is limited) both of which are necessary for modification of 
declarative and procedural self-knowledge. However, any choice of techniques 
used to achieve this aim must also consider the specific processing that might be 
modified with the technique (Wells, 2000). Decrease in self-focus could be 
detrimental where an individual is avoiding the internal threat stimuli, but still 
appraises the stimuli as threatening. In this case, the strategy could serve to 
strengthen threat appraisal, as the individual is not being exposed to information 
that can modify these beliefs. Similarly relaxation has benefits of reduced 
arousal, halting of worry or rumination, and may make available more attentional 
resources for other processing (Wells, 2000), although it could also prevent 
exposure to disconfirmatory evidence and stop modification of threat appraisal 
(particularly if the meta-cognitive threat appraisal is regarding internal events 
such as physiological symptoms of anxiety). Wells also notes that relaxation can 
increase self-focus, which is thought to be unhelpful in S-REF mode.
Nevertheless, if the use of therapeutic strategies were carefully considered, a 
client would experience a new processing style at the same time as discovering 
new knowledge that disconfirms their meta-cognitions. The advantage of this 
approach is that it not only modifies declarative or ‘intellectual’ knowing, but 
also changes a clients’ ‘feeling’ that the new declarative belief is right (Wells,
2000). Therefore, through experiencing a new processing style, the emotional 
belief in the new declarative knowledge is enhanced as emotion is a product of 
the S-REF processing configuration. Such an approach is in contrast to the 
traditional cognitive therapy approach of simply targeting declarative cognitions
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and not focusing on procedural operations (style of processing). These new 
processing routines may take practice and time, just like learning of other 
procedural knowledge (Wells, 2000).
Attentional training is aimed to give clients skills to learn new processing styles 
and teaches clients to selectively attend to and divide and switch attention 
between stimuli (Wells, 2000). It is intended to be practised when the client is not 
experiencing negative emotion, thereby insuring that re-diversion of attention 
does not place the client in a position when they are avoiding exposure to 
information that would disconfirm negative appraisals. Consequently, in contrast 
to other anxiety management strategies, the intention is not to avoid distress, but 
to teach more adaptive and flexible processes of attention (Wells, 2000).
A further extension of attentional training is situational attentional re-focusing 
(Wells, 2000), which applies the principles of switching and selective attention 
training to specific situations. For example, in the case of social phobia, clients 
might practise diverting their attention externally, which would not only enhance 
flexible control of attention, but it would also allow for attention towards specific 
disconfirmatory evidence to be processed, with the aim of modifying self beliefs 
(Wells, 2000).
The benefits of therapy according to the S-REF model are documented in work 
with clients with social phobia (Wells & Papageorgiou, 2001), involving 
instructing clients to divert their attention towards an external focus, rather than 
internally focusing on the self (a process which is said to maintain the disorder). 
However, although the focus was primarily on modifying focus from self to 
external stimuli, the treatment also incorporated to a lesser degree elements of 
traditional cognitive therapy such as verbal re-attribution and therefore, the 
therapeutic outcome could have been due to these elements. Further research 
needs to involve random controlled trials of the relative benefits of therapy 
according to the traditional cognitive model versus the S-REF model, which 
would guide the clinician in selection of appropriate treatment.
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Pragmatics
In order for therapy to target meta-cognitions and processing styles as suggested 
by the S-REF model, first the therapist must conceptualise the clients’ difficulties 
within the S-REF model, as they would do within a cognitive model in traditional 
cognitive therapy. Wells (2000) calls this process meta-cognitive profiling. This 
is an area in which complexity may be a potential limitation as well as an 
advantage of the S-REF model. Unlike Beck’s model, the S-REF model is not 
linear, but is dynamic and each part of the system has effects on the other. An 
early component of cognitive therapy is socialising the client into the model, 
providing them with a clear rationale for the focus of therapy. Detailed 
understanding may be useful for clinicians and researchers; however clients may 
find the depth of information about cognition and emotion difficult to understand 
and overwhelming. Clark (2001) makes the point that people may find it difficult 
to distinguish between concepts if the terminology is too complex. If clients do 
not have a clear rationale for therapy, engagement levels are likely to be lower, 
and effectiveness may be reduced. Therefore, the therapist may find it harder to 
educate clients about the model, and the process outlined by S-REF may need to 
be simplified and tailored to the clients’ needs.
Conclusion
The S-REF model builds on advances in Beck’s cognitive model that have 
recognised the importance of meta-cognitions in the maintenance of 
psychological disorders. However, Wells & Matthews (1994) advance this further 
by stating that disorder is not only maintained by declarative meta-cognitive 
plans, but also procedural plans for focus of attention and processing style. 
Modification of procedural plans is necessary in addition to declarative belief 
change to produce recovery (Wells, 2000).
Research literature is largely supportive of the S-REF model as the future 
direction for cognitive therapy. Evidence suggests that meta-cognitions regarding 
their thoughts do differ in clinical emotional disorders, and that also clients hold 
meta-cognitive processing plans that are maladaptive, such as rumination, worry
82
Specialist essay
and punishment. Experimental manipulations have shown the deleterious effects 
of these processing styles in terms of emotional disorder, and their predictive 
value in terms of recovery. However, the S-REF model is complex, and due to 
the dynamic nature of predictions between different cognitive levels, causal 
predictions are difficult to test. Critical appraisal of the research evidence allows 
recognition that much of it is in keeping with the predictions, but does not 
provide infallible evidence of the validity of the S-REF model. Future research 
that tests the effects of induction of rumination or worry in clinical samples 
would provide firmer support for the S-REF model; however, this may be 
unethical. Instead, the research relies on such procedures in non-clinical student 
samples.
The S-REF model has been used to inform current treatments for GAD, OCD and 
social phobia; however, in future its relevance for other disorders may be 
investigated in more detail.
Future research could examine the efficacy of cognitive therapy practised 
according to the S-REF model relative to the traditional cognitive model in 
randomly controlled trails; however in the meantime, clinicians may need to 
balance the need to practice according to an evidence base with the need to 
practice according to new theoretical developments.
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The ageing process gives rise to many inevitable psychological 
and physical changes. Discuss.
Introduction
There has been a trend to view the ageing process as a process of inevitable 
decline. For example, the textbook Clinical Psychology with the Elderly defines 
ageing as,
“a progressive loss of adaptive ability” (Woods & Britton, 1985; p. 10).
However, the National Service Framework for Older Adults (Department of 
Health, 2001; p. 19) notes that,
“chronic degenerative disease, disability and ill health are not an inevitable 
consequence of ageing”.
The nature of physical and psychological change in the ageing process is a very 
large topic of research and thus this essay will only focus on those aspects that 
are likely to be most relevant to clinical psychologists’ work. Two large domains 
of clinical psychologists’ work with the elderly are in the areas of mental health, 
and the area of cognitive abilities, in particular to aid differential diagnosis of 
pathological cognitive impairment (i.e. degenerative brain disease due to 
dementia) (Woods, 1994). The ageing process has been differentiated into 
primary (normal) and secondary (pathological) ageing (Busse, 1969; cited in 
Birren & Schroots, 1996). In working with the elderly, it is important to know 
what, if any changes are inevitable, i.e. are related to primary ageing, and what, if 
any changes are secondary or pathological and might be appropriate as a target 
for intervention.
First physical changes that occur in the ageing process will be described and the 
extent to which they are observed to occur will be discussed. Sensory systems 
and the brain will be described in more detail as these changes are likely to be
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relevant to the discussion of cognitive psychological changes. The evidence 
regarding whether change in the areas of mental health and cognition is inevitable 
in the ageing process will be discussed. In the examination of whether changes in 
these areas are inevitable, factors that influence mental health and cognitive status 
in the elderly will be considered. Identification of these factors is important for 
treatment and prevention (Geerlings, Beekman, Deeg & van Tilburg, 2000). 
Ageing is a dynamic process and consequently research methodology is an 
important consideration. The limitations of different types of studies will be 
discussed.
Physical ageing
Twenty four theories of biological ageing have been documented (Morse & 
Rabinowitz, 1990). They tend to suggest that biological ageing occurs either 
through internal factors, like a biological clock, or external factors, such as 
exposure to toxins (Morse & Rabinowitz, 1990; Stuart-Hamilton, 2000). 
Biological changes in ageing include cell loss and reduced cell efficiency, and 
reduced efficiency of bodily organs, such as the heart and lungs (Stuart-Hamilton, 
2000). Changes also affect the sensory systems, for example, visual acuity 
declines (Corso, 1981; cited in Stuart-Hamilton, 2000), as do .other functions of 
the visual system (Hagegerstrom-Portnoy, Schneck & Brabyn, 1999; cited in 
Stuart-Hamilton, 2000). Hearing also declines with ageing (Bromley, 1988; cited 
in Stuart-Hamilton, 2000). Such declines to not appear to be inevitable, in that 
there is individual variability and some do not experience a decline. For example, 
although 75% of the elderly require spectacles, (Bromley, 1988; cited in Stuart- 
Hamilton, 2000), 25% do not. Nevertheless, such changes become more likely as 
people age.
Some physical illnesses are more common in later life (Stuart-Hamilton, 2000), 
for example, stroke is seen as an age-related disease (Briggs, 1993) in that 
although it is not inevitable, the incidence becomes much more prevalent in the 
elderly compared with younger adults. Age-associated biological changes can 
make elderly people more vulnerable to environmental stressors (Briggs, 1993).
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It is important to distinguish between primary, or normal ageing, and secondary, 
or pathological ageing. That is, although certain physical illnesses become more 
likely with ageing, such illnesses are not considered part of the ageing process. 
Instead, they are considered to be pathological. As the prevalence of certain 
conditions increases, to the extent that significant proportions of the population 
are affected, for example in the case of dementia, which is uncommon in people 
under 60, but is estimated to affect 20% of people over 80 (Jorm, 1990; Kay, 
1991; cited in Briggs, 1993), the distinction between normal and pathological 
ageing may be less clear (Cullum, Huppert, McGee, Dening, Ahmed, Paykel & 
Brayne, 2000). In this respect, there is sometimes blurring as to what constitutes 
normal and pathological ageing. For example, the senile plaques and 
neurofibrillary tangles found in the brain and associated with Alzheimer’s 
disease, a chronic neurodegenerative disease, are also found to a lesser extent in 
the brains of healthy elderly people (Schiebel, 1996). Consequently, the number 
of the changes when compared between healthy elderly and people with dementia 
differs along a continuum, making the distinction between normal and 
pathological ageing more complex. This issue affects ageing studies, as 
researchers are faced with the question of whether to include people with physical 
health problems or dementia, or whether to exclude them from studies.
Biological changes in the brain are likely to be of particular relevance to 
psychological changes, and thus will be described. It has been estimated that 
between five and ten percent of neuronal connections in the brain are lost in the 
ageing process (Schaie & Willis, 1991; cited in Stuart-Hamilton, 2000). This loss 
is predominantly in cortical areas, concerned with intellectual function (Stuart- 
Hamilton, 2000), and particularly the temporal lobes (Woodruff-Pak, 1997; cited 
in Stuart-Hamilton, 2000), which have long been linked with memory function 
(Scoville & Milner, 1957). Average yearly decreases in volume, measured by 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), of the cerebral hemispheres was found to be 
0.23%, whereas the temporal lobes and the amygdaloid-hippocampal complex 
(closely linked to the retention of memories) reduced in volume at higher yearly 
rates of 0.28 and 0.30% (Coffey et al., 1992; cited in Scheibel, 1996). 
Examination of mean changes might lead to the conclusion that some brain 
changes are inevitable in ageing; however, there was large inter-individual
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variation in degree of volumetric change and individual differences regarding 
when the change occurs (Scheibel, 1996). For example, changes were only 
observed in 50% of people at the age of 68.
Therefore, for a given individual, it is unclear whether certain changes will be 
inevitable by a given age; however, some physical changes occur universally 
(Morse & Rabinowitz, 1990), albeit at different rates. Further research is needed 
to examine specific factors, which may be genetic or environmental, that are 
involved in timing of changes in order to answer the question of inevitability. 
Whether physical changes translate to observable cognitive psychological 
changes in the ageing process will be considered below. Neuronal loss does not 
necessarily equate with decline in cognitive functioning (Scheibel, 1996).
Whether change during the ageing process occurs in two areas of psychological 
functioning, mental health and cognition, will now be discussed.
Psychological change: mental health
It is important to consider psychological changes and in particular change in 
mental health status in the ageing process, and how these relate to physical 
aspects of the ageing process. The National Service Framework for Older Adults 
(Department of Health, 2001; p. 19) challenges the notion that change in mental 
health status is inevitable with ageing:
“mental health problems may be perceived by older people and families, as well 
as by professionals, as an inevitable consequence of ageing, and not as health 
problems which will respond to treatment”.
The evidence for this statement will be considered, in particular in relation to 
depression, as this is one of the most prevalent mental health problems suffered 
by older adults (Blazer, 1994; cited in Geerlings et al., 2000).
Epidemiological studies that have attempted to ascertain prevalence rates of 
mental health problems in the elderly relative to younger adults can give some
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clue as to the inevitability of mental health decline in the ageing process. Initial 
inspection of the research studies would reveal a lower incidence of depression in 
the elderly relative to younger adults (Myers et al., 1984; cited in Blazer, Hughes 
& George, 1987); however this would be misleading, as the proportion of elderly 
people who report sub-clinical symptoms is much higher (15% reported 
significant dysphoria compared with 3.7% prevalence of depressive disorder) 
(Blazer & Williams, 1980; cited in Blazer et al., 1987). This could lead to the 
conclusion that a significant number of elderly develop dysphoria during the 
ageing process.
Blazer et al. (1987) reported that the 20% of their epidemiological sample of 
elderly people with dysphoria were more likely to be uneducated, unmarried and 
have a lower socio-economic status than the rest of the elderly population. This 
might suggest that dysphoria is more likely to be inevitable in the people 
demonstrating those characteristics during the ageing process. Intervention may 
aim to make such elderly peoples’ demographic characteristics more closely 
match those without dysphoria. On the other hand, the relationship may not be as 
clear; there may be another variable that makes the dysphoric elderly more likely 
to show such demographic characteristics. Such a variable may mediate both the 
dysphoria and the demographic characteristics, for example an enduring 
personality characteristic. Research to answer this question would be important if 
intervention were to be useful.
An inherent problem in attribution mental health problems to the ageing process 
from results of epidemiological surveys that compare people of different ages is 
that such studies do not highlight the change in mental health status due to the 
ageing process. Different age cohorts would have lived through different life 
experiences and thus may differ in their relative predisposition to develop mental 
health difficulties. For example, say relative incidences of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) between young adults and the elderly were compared. If a 
higher incidence of PTSD were to be found in the elderly, this could be 
attributable to many other factors other than age, a clear example of which would 
be wartime experience. This problem can be ameliorated through the use of 
longitudinal studies, which assess prevalence of the variable to be studied at
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different time points; however, such studies have high attrition rates, due, for 
example, to death or health reasons, which inevitably biases results (Hertzog, 
1996).
A longitudinal study demonstrated that higher prevalence rates of depression are 
found if frequent repeated measurements are taken and shorter episodes, that 
might be missed by studies with longer intervals between measurements, are 
included (Geerlings, Beekman, Deeg & van Tilburg, 2000). Furthermore, 
Geerlings et al. (2000) investigated the link between decline in physical health 
status (Aldwin, Spiro, Levenson & Cupertino, 2001) and depression in the ageing 
process. Geerlings et al. (2000) replicated previous findings (Geerlings et al., 
2000) and found an association between depression scores on the Centre for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) and physical health status, 
but only for a group with chronic depression, and not short episodes (defined as 
remitting within five months). This suggests that as people age, a decline in 
physical health status may predispose them to experience chronic depression; 
however, there are likely to be other factors influencing the degree of inevitability 
of short episodes of depression. The findings suggest that relevant interventions 
might target depression, physical health and a combination of the two (Gurland & 
Wilder, 1988; cited in Geerlings et al., 2000). However, Geerlings et al. (2000) 
note that due to the association between depression and physical health problems, 
concurrent diagnosis may not always be made, meaning that the individual may 
not receive the appropriate treatment.
Heidrich (1998) followed 106 women across a six-year time interval and found 
significant decline on both measures of physical health (number of health 
problems, symptom bother, difficulty with activities of daily living and subjective 
ratings of physical health). Additionally, a statistically significant increase in 
mean depression scores (measured by the CES-D), was observed. Furthermore, 
links were found between these two variables. The longitudinal design of the 
study enabled elucidation of the association between depression and physical 
health, a limitation of cross-sectional studies. Heidrich (1998) showed that 
physical health status at the beginning of the study predicted depression six years 
later; however depression at the start did not predict later physical health status.
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This indicates that adverse physical health status is a mediator of future 
psychological health measured by depression ratings. A limitation of the study 
was that participants were women only and therefore replication is needed with 
male participants. Furthermore, statistically significant results are not necessarily 
indicative of clinically significant findings. Decline in physical health status were 
noted to be small (Heidrich, 1998), as were the mean increase in depression 
scores (from 9.54 to 11.97 out of a possible total of 60). Therefore, the clinical 
significance of this increase in depression scores is questionable.
There was also an association between positive relations with others and physical 
health (Heidrich, 1998), which suggests that the decline in ability to keep up 
social relationships that may accompany mental health may be a mediator of the 
relationship between physical health and depression. This would indicate that 
intervention could not only target physical health problems, but should also aim 
to maintain peoples’ social relationships, despite any health handicaps. Further 
research would be needed to guide appropriate intervention as it is unclear 
whether this relationship is due to physical limitations, or psychological impacts 
of having health difficulties. The work of Bisconti & Bergeman (1999) helped to 
clarify this issue. They showed that perceived social control mediated the 
association between social interaction and depression in people over the age of 
65, suggesting that work may be more appropriately directed at older adults’ 
internal representations of their relationships, rather than just providing more 
opportunity for social interaction (Bisconti & Bergeman, 1999).
Therefore, research suggests that depression is not inevitable, but its development 
may be mediated by physical health problems, social relationships and perceived 
social control. This would suggest remediation, or prevention, of depression or 
dysphoria might be achieved by advances in physical health care and strategies 
designed to enhance social relationships, including psychological approaches to 
look at internal representations of relationships (Bisconti & Bergeman, 1999). 
Alternatively, it may be that peoples’ self-report of physical health (Geerlings et 
al., 2000) and internal representations of their relationships may be affected by 
depression or dysphoria, which would result in a statistical association, but not a 
causal relationship.
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Psychological change: cognition
It has been noted that neuronal connections are lost in the ageing process, 
particularly in cortical areas, which are linked with intellectual function, and 
particularly in the temporal lobes, linked with memory functions (Stuart- 
Hamilton, 2000). From this, it might be assumed that decline would be observed; 
however, this may not necessarily be the case. The evidence that addresses this 
question will be examined.
Intellectual function
Inspection of normative data for standardised tests shows that the mean test 
scores decrease with increasing age group. For example, on the Weschler Adult 
Intelligence Scale -  third edition (WAIS-III) (Weschler, 1997), reduction in mean 
score over age groups is different depending on the ability being measured. When 
intelligence is separated into fluid and crystallised intelligence (Cattell, 1971; 
cited in Briggs, 1993) fluid ability is thought to decline with age, whereas 
crystallised intelligence is thought to remain stable, and may improve with age 
(Coleman, 1996).
As part of the Berlin study on ageing, Lindenberger & Reischies (1999), people 
aged 70 to 100, grouped into age ranges of five years, were given tests of 
intellectual functioning. Correlational data showed associations between age and 
the poorer performance on five tests of reasoning, knowledge, perceptual speed, 
memory and fluency. Despite the general trend, the scatterplots of individual 
performance show large inter-individual variation in performance that was not 
related to age (Lindenberger & Reischies, 1999). Rather, the factor that accounted 
for most of the variance in intellectual performance on the tests was perceptual 
speed. This suggests that perceptual speed may be more important than age per 
se. Unfortunately, the authors do not compare mean intellectual performance 
across the age groups, so actual difference in scores is not known. It could be that 
although there was an association with age, group means did not differ.
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Given that, as discussed, sensory decline is prevalent, although not inevitable, in 
the ageing process, it is important to consider the impact of this on measurement 
of intellectual function. Inevitably, sensory difficulties will impact on ability to 
perform tests to optimum levels and it is possible that sensory variables may be a 
mediating factor in the relationship between age and intellectual functioning. 
Lindenberger & Reischies’s (1999) finding that perceptual speed explained most 
of the variance in intellectual functioning suggests that this may be the case. 
Anstey, Luszcz & Sanchez (2001) note the widely reported association between 
sensory and intellectual functioning in the elderly. They investigated this 
relationship further and found that although there was an association between 
performance on cognitive tests and factors of speed, vision and hearing acuity, 
age alone continued to predict cognitive performance when the other factors were 
controlled for. Therefore, sensory acuity may mediate some of the relationship 
between age and cognitive/intellectual performance, but does not account for all 
of the variance.
The evidence suggests that on average, older people are likely to perform worse 
than younger people on measures of intellectual function. However, there are 
large variations in individual performance at a given age. Research suggests this 
may be partly due to variation in perceptual speed and sensory function, and 
therefore may not represent actual intellectual differences between ages. 
Furthermore, although cross-sectional studies, where people of different ages are 
compared, highlight age differences, they do not enlighten the process of ageing 
as findings could reflect characteristics of the different age cohorts other than 
their chronological age. For example, differences in sociological variables, such 
as length of education, are likely to exist between the groups, could be alternative 
explanations for group differences (Woods, 1994). Consequently, although 
standardisation data (such as for the WAIS-III) are useful to compare an 
individual’s performance with age-related peers on assessment, they cannot be 
used to support the argument that age-related decline in intellectual function is 
inevitable.
As they involve investigation of a given cognitive function in the same person 
over time, longitudinal studies of cognitive function can resolve some of the
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methodological problems inherent in cross-sectional studies and therefore can be 
useful in enlightening the ageing process.
Cullum et al. (2000) reported the results of a longitudinal study investigating 
cognitive decline in elderly people over 75 using the CAMCOG. The CAMDEX, 
from which the CAMCOG is a part, is reliable and valid for use with the elderly 
(O’Connor et al., 1991; cited in Cullum et al., 2000). They also note the 
advantage of the CAMCOG over the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) 
(Folstein et al., 1975; cited in Cullum et al., 2000), in that it has less of a ceiling 
effect (Huppert et al., 1995; cited in Cullum et al., 2000). Significant global 
decline, and significant decline in the seven sub-scales was found over a mean re­
test interval of 3.9 years (range 3.4 to 5.0), from which the authors conclude that 
cognitive decline is inevitable in the ageing process. However, it should be noted 
that although decline was statistically significant, examination of the standard 
deviations of the global CAMCOG scores suggests large variation in individual 
performance at both time points, and particularly at follow-up. Furthermore, like 
other studies of ageing, a large number of people were lost to follow-up due to 
death, illness, refusal or simply not being contactable. This may bias the 
longitudinal study to find less cognitive decline than might have been found had 
for example, ill people been included in the study. A longitudinal study is time- 
consuming and may still not provide the answer to the question as to whether 
age-related decline in test performance is inevitable. A decline in test 
performance over time might reflect the fact that the material has lost its 
relevance for the individuals (Woods & Britton, 1985).
A further factor to be considered is ecological validity of measurement 
techniques. As with all psychological tests, the extent to which findings apply in 
the “real world” and clinical relevance, the extent to which findings are clinically, 
as well as statistically, important, should be considered. Woods & Britton (1985) 
also raise the point that tests are not always ecologically valid, for example the 
Block Design test of the WAIS-III. This may mean that tests are not measuring 
real-life intellectual function. Also, the testing environment is likely to be 
increasingly less familiar to increasingly older adults as time since they left
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school passes. This may lead younger adults, who are more familiar with taking 
tests, to have an advantage in an assessment (Woods & Britton, 1985).
As tests are often used to aid diagnosis of cognitive impairment, this use may bias 
the kinds of research that are conducted into the ageing process. With increasing 
attention being given into establishing tests sensitive to cognitive impairment in 
degenerative disorders for example in dementia (e.g. Fox, Warrington, Seiffer, 
Agnew & Rossor, 1998) there may be a bias towards investigation and 
publication of data that show decline in the ageing process. This may in turn 
result in less research being conducted into abilities that improve with age and 
thus might bias society’s perception of change in abilities with age towards the 
negative. Constraints that exist on measurement techniques may also bias 
research publications. It has been suggested that wisdom increases with age 
(Clayton & Birren, 1980; cited in Coleman, 1996); however, this is a harder 
concept to define (Coleman, 1996) and consequently to measure.
Memory function
As discussed with the WAIS-III, inspection of normative data for various 
memory tests including the Weschler Memory Scale -  third edition (WMS-III) 
(Weschler, 1997) and the Adult Memory and Information Processing Battery 
(AMIPB) (Coughlan & Hollows, 1985), would document lower mean 
performance on the test with increase in age. This would suggest an inevitable 
decline in memory performance, at least on the particular test and testing 
conditions. However, as discussed, such normative data are based on cross- 
sectional studies, which, as they compare people within different age groups and 
not the ageing process per se over time, do not answer the question of 
inevitability.
Nevertheless, decline in memory function is a commonly reported phenomenon 
as people age (Ryan, 1992; cited in Smith, 1996). “Age-related” differences in 
memory were found on the CANTAB (Cambridge Neuropsychological Test 
Battery) through using age as the predictor variable for variance in performance 
on memory test in the CANTAB (Rabbitt & Lowe, 2000). From this the authors
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label their findings “age-related declines”; however, this conclusion was based on 
cross-sectional findings and thus the same methodological limitations discussed, 
in terms of the applicability of findings to the ageing process, apply. Longitudinal 
research has also found statistically significant decline in memory function over 
time (Cullum et ah, 2000). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that 
education may be a protective factor in memory function as a negative 
association between education and memory decline (over a mean period of 3.9 
years) was found (Cullum et ah, 2000).
As with intellectual function, the findings of studies are related to choice of 
measurement technique. This is particularly the case with memory, as there are 
many different facets (Baddeley, 1997). Additionally, test performance inevitably 
relies on other cognitive functions, and thus when change is observed, it is 
important to know whether results are attributable to change in the function that 
was supposed to be measured, or whether results are due to some other cognitive 
function that is a pre-conditional requirement for effective performance on the 
test. An extreme example of this would be if a blind person was deemed to have 
failed on a visual memory test. Consequently theories of how memory tests are 
performed will be important to consider when attempting to explain factors 
involved in decline in memory test performance. For example, Craik (1992; cited 
in Smith, 1996) suggested that older adults are penalized more by recall tests of 
memory, as opposed to recognition tests, as the former require more processing 
resources. Therefore, memory differences observed in older people were due to 
changes in executive function, rather than memory function. Other theories that 
are based on other processing resources have also been proposed to account for 
differences in memory test performance between older and younger adults 
(Smith, 1996). For example, perceptual speed was found to account for 80% of 
the age-related variance in recall memory test performance (Salthouse, 1993; 
cited in Smith, 1996). Unlike tests of executive function, age differences in 
memory function could not be explained by fluid IQ scores, which suggests that 
fluid IQ scores do not mediate variance in memory performance (Rabbitt & 
Lowe, 2000).
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The particular selection of memory tests may be biased against elderly people. 
For example, because of the methodological problems inherent in measuring very 
remote memory (i.e. from childhood) in that every persons’ experience is 
different and such tests are difficult to standardise for this reason. Furthermore, 
any measure of childhood recall would likely be biased in favour of younger 
adults, compared with older adults, as memories would be more recent.
In summary, the evidence seems stronger for memory decline in the ageing 
process compared with the evidence for intellectual decline. Like intellectual 
function, memory function may be mediated by other cognitive abilities, which 
will be highlighted by further research. However, it is important to consider 
methodology of assessment of memory, as testing constraints dictate memory 
tests to usually be over intervals of around 30 minutes (e.g. Weschler, 1997). 
These constraints mean that less is known about change in memory performance 
on memory for personal events over longer time periods.
Methodology: normal versus pathological ageing
A final consideration in ageing cognition research is what constitutes normal 
ageing. For example, the risk of developing a progressive dementing illness is 
increased with increasing age and 20% of adults over 80 are thought to suffer 
from dementia. Whether to include this group of people in studies of normal 
ageing is an issue to be considered. Furthermore, Fox, Warrington, Seiffer, 
Agnew & Rossor (1998) showed that significant sub-clinical cognitive deficits 
could be detected on a verbal memory task in people who had not yet developed 
dementia, but who went on subsequently to develop dementia. This was a 
selected sample in that the participants were genetically vulnerable to dementia, 
and therefore results may not be generalisable to those not genetically vulnerable; 
however, it does suggest that studies of normal ageing may include those who are 
developing dementia not yet detected. This would bias results to find more 
cognitive impairment than would be expected otherwise. Indeed, research has 
suggested that increased susceptibility to dementia with age may be a 
confounding variable in the association of age with cognitive impairment. 
Lindenberger & Reischies (1999) found that associations were weaker when
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people with dementia were excluded from the analysis. Associations may further 
be weakened if those who go on to develop dementia are retrospectively 
excluded.
Given that older people are more vulnerable to physical problems, there is also 
the consideration of how physical problems might bias cognition research as it is 
also a factor in decline in cognitive function (Holland & Rabbitt, 1991; cited in 
Woods, 1994). For example, a longitudinal study showed that people with raised 
blood pressure declined more on the WAIS than those without (Wilkie & 
Eisdorfer, 1971; cited in Woods, 1994). Studies that have investigated cognitive 
function in the ageing process do not necessarily include the physical health 
status of participants. Therefore, the inclusion of those with raised blood pressure 
may bias results to find more cognitive decline than might otherwise be found 
with a healthy sample. These two examples serve to illustrate the numerous 
methodological considerations inherent in selecting a sample of people with 
whom to conduct research into the ageing process: who should be included in a 
study of normal ageing?
Conclusion
In the ageing process, physical health becomes more likely to decline; however, 
there are not inevitable changes and individuals differ. Psychological change in 
terms of mental health, specifically depression, does not appear to be inevitable, 
but rather mediated by factors of physical health, social relationships and how 
people perceive their relationships. This suggests that attention to these factors 
might increase the likelihood of elderly people developing depression or 
dysphoria in the ageing process. Studies that have investigated change in 
cognition, particularly intellectual function and memory are fraught with 
methodological problems. Cross-sectional studies are unable to answer the 
question of inevitability of change, as ageing is a dynamic process and must be 
studied as such. Large variability in performance between individuals renders the 
approach of examining group means unhelpful when answering the question of 
inevitability. Future research will highlight factors that enable the question of 
inevitability to be answered on an individual .basis. The question of which
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participants to include in studies of “normal ageing” is also important to consider 
as different practices are likely to yield different results.
Vaillant & Mukamal (2001; P. 839) note that geriatric psychiatry, “must pay as 
much attention to health as to disease”. This comment is particularly relevant, 
since the way we conceptualise ageing is likely to influence the kind of research 
conducted and whether it is deficit-, change-, or development-orientated (terms 
used in Vaillant & Mukamal, 2001; p. 839). Furthermore, the kind of research 
that is conducted, and the conclusions that are drawn are likely to contribute to 
societal views about the ageing process. For example, Hendricks (1995) noted 
that ageism can be socially constructed in the language used to describe the 
elderly and the ageing process. Therefore, it is particularly important to consider 
methodology in research conducted in the ageing process in order to ensure 
relevant research questions are answered about the ageing process, rather than 
making comparisons between the young and the old.
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Summary of clinical experience
Adult Mental Health Placement
Setting
The adult mental health placement was set within a psychology department. The 
caseload was both primary care and Community Mental Health Team. There was 
also the opportunity to undertake some work in a government setting.
Models
The models for the placement were systemic-narrative and cognitive-behavioural. 
There was also some indirect experience of psychodynamic models of working.
Range of experience
Clients’ presenting issues included anxiety and depression, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, relationship difficulties, hallucinations, suicidal ideation, aggression, 
personality disorder, cognitive difficulties.
There was experience of group work with traumatised refugees.
Conducted research project that examined client satisfaction and presented results 
to service.
Attended training on trauma debriefing and the Mental Health Act.
Regular presentation of clinical case work in group supervision setting.
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People with Learning Disabilities placement
Setting
This placement was in a community team for people with learning disability. It 
served mental health needs and provided a challenging behaviour service. There 
were opportunities to work with clients in out-patient, residential and day care 
settings.
Models
Behavioural, attachment and cognitive-behavioural models were used on this 
placement.
Range of experience
Clients’ presenting issues included challenging behaviour, autism, bereavement, 
eating disorder, self-harm, depression, personality disorder. Assessments of 
capacity and cognitive abilities were also conducted.
I co-ran a social skills group for people with a moderate learning disability.
Experience of presenting conference up-date to team members.
Visited a range of services provided for people with learning disabilities, 
including social service residential homes, NHS residential homes, day centres, 
and in-patient settings.
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Child Placement
Setting
This placement was in a variety of settings; a health centre, a GP surgery, social 
services nurseries for under fives and a Child and Family Consultation Centre 
(Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service).
Models
The models used in this placement were behavioural, narrative, and cognitive- 
behavioural. Parenting approaches were also used.
Range of experience
Presenting issues included social communication difficulties, behavioural and 
emotional difficulties, educational difficulties (learning and reading difficulties), 
post-traumatic stress disorder, sleeping, toileting and feeding difficulties, anxiety, 
depression and low self-esteem. Cognitive assessments of developmental delay 
were conducted.
Teaching experience with nursery staff (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder).
Consultation experience with nursery and staff and school teachers.
Involvement in CAMHS meetings, specialist autism diagnostic service, and 
CAMHS training (attachment; autism; Human Rights Act; racism and culture 
workshop; “Working Together” inter-agency working seminar).
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Specialist CBT Placement
Setting
This placement was mainly based in a Community Mental Health Team, but 
included some work at the Mentally Disordered Offenders service and a 
psychotherapy service.
Models
The cognitive-behavioural model was the main approach used on this placement 
(including schema-focused), but psychodynamic approaches were also used.
Range of experience
This placement involved working with clients with complex and long-term 
mental health needs. Presenting issues included self-harm, schizophrenia, alcohol, 
adjustment to illness, childhood abuse, personality disorder, anxiety, depression, 
physical health problems, manic-depression and offending behaviour 
(shoplifting). An assessment of risk for sexual offending was also conducted.
Planned, initiated a referral system for, and conducted assessments for a group for 
people with insomnia.
Attended weekly psychotherapy group supervision with psychotherapist. 
Attended personality disorder conference.
Initiated research project into insomnia in people with mental health difficulties.
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Older Adult Placement
Setting
This placement was based in a Community Mental Health Team for the Elderly. 
Work was also conducted in in-patient, day hospital, and residential settings.
Models
Cognitive-behavioural, behavioural and neuropsychological models were used in 
this placement.
Range of experience
Clients’ presenting issues included cognitive difficulties, physical health 
difficulties, bereavement, anxiety, depression, stroke, sensory impairments, 
trauma following childhood abuse, resettlement difficulties and personality 
disorder.
Designed, initiated referral system, assessed potential participants, and ran a 
group for people with memory difficulties.
Teaching experience of CBT (basic concepts and models of anxiety and 
depression) to team members. Presentation of clinical case work.
Attended training day on prevention of abuse of vulnerable adults.
Involved in organisational approaches to implement National Service Framework 
recommendations for younger adults with dementia within the service.
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Specialist Neuropsychology Placement
Setting
This placement was split between in-patient work in a private rehabilitation hospital 
and out-patient work in a NHS community hospital.
Models
The neuropsychological model was the main model used in this placement. 
Behavioural and cognitive-behavioural approaches were also used.
Range of experience
Direct experience of assessment of clients with neuropsychological difficulties 
following traumatic brain injury, stroke, or other neurological syndromes. Involved 
using a variety of neuropsychological assessment techniques. Direct experience of 
rehabilitation of neuropsychological difficulties. Direct experience of emotional 
sequelae of neuropsychological and neurological problems. Observational experience 
of assessments for suitability for the in-patient program.
Experience of supervising assistants.
Participated in, and provided a psychological perspective to case conferences, goal 
planning and clinical review of in-patients.
Visited range of residential places for people who have had a brain injury.
Summaries o f case reports
Summaries of Case Reports
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Summary of Adult Mental Health Case Report: Cognitive Therapy of 
Depression with a 30 year old woman 
Presenting problem
Yvonne presented with depression that had been present over the last four years. 
She had experienced financial difficulties in her marriage, and then had a 
miscarriage. After the miscarriage, Yvonne’s relationship with her husband 
deteriorated and ended in divorce. She held a number of extremely negative 
thoughts about herself.
Formulation
Yvonne experienced little affection in her childhood, from which she was likely 
to have developed beliefs about low-self worth. She compensated for this by 
attempting to achieve perfection. Following her miscarriage and subsequent 
breakdown of her marriage, Yvonne felt a failure. This activated latent 
assumptions that she must achieve perfection and never fail if she was to be 
worthy. Consequently, symptoms of depression developed.
Intervention
Yvonne was seen for 14 weeks for cognitive therapy. Work initially focused on 
developing techniques to evaluate depressive thoughts. Therapy then focused on 
underlying rules Yvonne had developed concerning perfectionism and self­
blame, and allowed her to develop new life rules for herself. Core beliefs about 
her low self-worth were also re-evaluated. The therapy also focused on allowing 
Yvonne to grieve for her lost child.
Outcome
Yvonne engaged well in therapy and worked hard to compile a book of self­
therapy techniques. She reported increased confidence and self-worth, and 
decreased feelings of failure and guilt. Her depression improved from the 
“severe” range of the BDI to the “mild-moderate” range.
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Summary of People with Learning Disabilities Case Report: Assessment of
Emotional and Behavioral Difficulties of a 20 Year Old Woman with a 
Moderate Learning Disability: a Behavioural and Attachment Perspective 
Presenting problem
Leena, who has a moderate learning disability, was referred for verbal and 
physical aggression and absconding from her residential home. Her placement at 
the residential home was under threat because of this behaviour, which was 
thought to be related to disagreements with her mother.
Assessment
An applied behavioural analysis framework, which views behaviour as a 
functional adaptation to, and as maintained by, the environment, was used to 
conduct a detailed assessment of the presenting problem. An attachment 
framework was incorporated into the assessment as Leena’s difficulties centered 
around her relationship (attachment) with her mother.
Formulation
Leena’s experience of rejection from her mother throughout her life had made her 
vulnerable to future experiences of rejection, both from her mother, and from 
staff and other residents at the residential home. Leena was likely to have 
internalised early rejection from her mother to result in low and unstable self­
esteem. Consequently, whenever Leena perceived she was being rejected, she 
would behave aggressively towards staff and other residents in order to release 
the aversive physiological state brought about through rejection. Leena would 
also abscond to seek out her mother when she perceived she was being rejected 
by others. Her mother positively welcomed Leena, which maintained the 
absconding.
Outcome
During the course of the assessment, Leena moved out of the service catchment 
area. She requested a referral for therapy, which was made to the psychologist in 
the area.
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Child Case Report: Assessment and Treatment of an Eight Year Old Girl 
with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Following a Car Accident: A Story of
Bravery
Presenting problem
Rachel was referred by a Child Psychiatrist for assessment and treatment of 
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder following a road accident in which 
she had been knocked down by a car. She experienced nightmares and avoided 
talking about the accident. She also tried to avoid the scene of the accident, and 
crossing roads, which were both problematic for Rachel’s mother, as both were 
encountered on Rachel’s daily walk to school.
Formulation
Rachel was from a refugee family and had witnesses her mother being racially 
abused, both verbally and physically by her neighbours. Therefore, Rachel was 
vulnerable to any further trauma. During her stay in hospital after the accident, 
Rachel believed she was going to die. Rachel avoided the trauma and therefore 
did not integrate it fully into her memory. Consequently, she experienced 
nightmares and intrusive memories of the accident, which were triggered 
particularly by crossing roads or visiting the place where the trauma occurred. 
The accident also affected Rachel’s preferred view of herself, in that she no 
longer saw herself as “brave”.
Intervention
Therapy involved playing out the trauma, to enable Rachel to integrate it into her 
memory. In-vivo exposure to crossing roads was done until Rachel’s anxiety 
ratings reduced considerably. Witnesses of God and her imaginary friend, Magic 
Mouse were called upon to witness the new brave Rachel, and a celebratory party 
of her bravery was held with Rachel and her friends.
Outcome
The frequency of Rachel’s nightmares reduced from every night to three nights a 
week. She was able to cross roads with her eyes open (thus demonstrating 
reduced avoidance) and was even able to face the accident scene by bravely 
pulling a face at it!
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Specialist CBT Case Report: Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy of Social Anxiety 
with a 28 Year Old Woman with Borderline Personality Disorder 
Presenting problem
Lindsay was referred for negative thinking patterns about herself. She was very 
self-critical and worried that others would criticise her in social situations. 
Consequently, she found it difficult to socialise, to do her job, and to do everyday 
tasks such as shopping. When she became very distressed over other’s perceived 
comments about her, she would cut herself.
Formulation
Lindsay’s mother had been very critical and humiliated her, and thus in social 
situations she expected others to be critical, or to view her negatively. 
Consequently, she viewed herself as disgusting and perceived others as critical. 
She compensated for these beliefs by attempting to be like a “chameleon”, 
blending in to avoid criticism, and avoiding intimacy because then others could 
not hurt her. Therefore, in social situations, these beliefs became activated, and 
she experienced many negative thoughts about herself. She tended to monitor 
herself excessively in social situations and consequently could not fully devote 
her attention to conversations, thus exacerbating the problem.
Intervention
Although Lindsay did not self-harm during the therapy, she expressed a desire to, 
and therefore prevention of this was addressed in therapy. Therapy aimed to deal 
with strategies to deal with Lindsay’s self-critical thoughts and predictions about 
other’s reactions to her in social situations. It also examined the utility of self­
monitoring behaviours.
Outcome
Lindsay achieved her therapy goal of going around to a friend’s house for the 
evening. She reduced self-monitoring in social situations and learnt to use 
cognitive techniques to consider all possibilities, and not to jump to negative 
conclusions regarding others’ perceptions of her in social situations.
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Older Adult Case Report: Neuropsvcholoeical Assessment of a 57 Year Old
Man Referred for Memory Complaints 
Presenting problem
Jeremiah was referred for assessment of memory and word finding difficulties. 
Jeremiah’s working conditions involved exposure to carbon monoxide; however, 
he also experienced stress at work and, previously, in his family life, and the 
referrer questioned the extent of the contribution of these factors to his memory 
complaints. His MRI scan showed damage consistent with carbon monoxide 
poisoning.
Assessment
Jeremiah was assessed on tests of general intellectual functioning, memory, 
attention and concentration, speed of processing, and naming ability. He was also 
assessed on tests of executive function, sensitive to damage in the area affected 
by carbon monoxide shown on MRI.
Formulation
Jeremiah’s test performance revealed difficulty with executive function, which 
was consistent with organic damage from carbon monoxide poisoning. His 
memory test performance was below the expected level for emotional material, 
but at the expected level for abstract material. This suggested that there was an 
emotional component to his memory difficulties. His naming ability was at the 
expected level.
Outcome
The results of the assessment were fed back to Jeremiah. In particular, the 
importance of ensuring he was no longer exposed to carbon monoxide was 
emphasised to him.
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24 October 2000
Dear
Many thanks for your most interesting presentation of your research results to our 
Department.
I'd like to say again how very important this piece of research into users' views is to 
our Clinical Governance loop and service developments. We are really grateful for 
your work!
Yours sincerely
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
PSYCHOLOGY
Service related research project
Clients’ perceptions of a psychology service
Abstract
Title: Clients’ perceptions of a psychology service
Objective: To examine client satisfaction of psychology service users. To 
compare satisfaction between clients who complete and do not complete therapy. 
To compare satisfaction between primary care and CMHT users. To assess 
generalisability of results to population of the psychology service users.
Design: Survey method, incorporating quantitative rating scales to assess 
satisfaction with various aspects of the service, and qualitative (open-ended) 
questions to enable exploration of experience of clients attending the psychology 
service.
Setting: An out-patient psychology service
Participants: 105 clients who were discharged consecutively over a three-month 
period were contacted. Response rate of 46.7% was achieved.
Main outcome measures: Satisfaction questionnaire developed by the service.
Results: A response rate of 46.7% was achieved. 80.9% of clients reported being 
satisfied overall with the service. As predicted clients who did not complete 
therapy reported significantly lower satisfaction levels on all but one of the 
ratings scales than clients who completed therapy. Contrary to predictions there 
were no significant differences in satisfaction ratings between primary care and 
CMHT clients. Client reports of their experiences of therapy were grouped into 
four categories: practicalities, therapeutic relationship, therapist action and 
outcomes. Comments were mostly positive. Clients valued the therapeutic 
relationship and outcomes of change in perspective of the problem, self- 
understanding and off-loading of the problem. Suggestions for change were
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mainly in the practicalities category and included lower waiting lists, more 
flexible session times, and additional resources.
Conclusions: High levels of satisfaction were reported. Suggestions for 
improvement of the service may guide its future development.
Introduction
There is an increasing focus on gaining users’ perspectives of services within the 
National Health Service (Department of Health, 1991; cited in Stallard, 
Department of Health, 1997, 1989 and 1999) and service users’ views of mental 
health services are considered to be increasingly important for future 
development of the NHS. Gaining psychology service users’ views is likely to be 
particularly important as clients’ views about therapy often differs from that of 
the therapist (Elliott & James, 1989).
Users’ views are commonly obtained through satisfaction surveys. Client 
satisfaction is unrelated to symptom improvement (Pekarik, 1992) and therefore 
may be useful as an additional outcome measure (Stallard, 1996), especially as it 
is thought to be related to utilisation of the service (Lebow, 1982; cited in 
Stallard, 1996).
Previous research has reported consistently high satisfaction rates (e.g.Goodwin, 
Holmes, Newnes & Waltho, 1999; Hutchings & Pope, 1998), however, 
satisfaction ratings can be subject to bias: clients who do not respond tend to be 
less satisfied (Stallard 1995; cited in Stallard, 1996) and response rates are low 
from clients who do not complete therapy (e.g. Jefferis & Porter, 1996; Hughes, 
1997). There is also a trend for clients with less severe difficulties to report 
higher levels of satisfaction (Perreault, Rogers, Leichner & Sabourin, 1996) 
Therefore, it is likely to be important to ensure that a survey sample obtain a 
sample of clients distributed across different levels of severity. This illustrates 
the importance of obtaining a representative sample of clients.
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Another problem is that satisfaction research often employs data from 
quantitative rating scales, which do not necessarily inform future service 
development as they do not elicit client’s views for improvement. Therefore 
open-ended questions should be incorporated into surveys asking users for their 
views, (Stallard, 1996).
The psychology service was interested to know clients’ satisfaction, experience 
and views and had already developed a questionnaire, which included both rating 
scales and open-ended questions, and piloted it with thirty clients. Analysis of the 
pilot results indicated ceiling levels of satisfaction with the service; however, the 
questionnaire was only administered to clients who had completed therapy and by 
only a minority of therapists in the department. Thus, the study sample was not 
representative.
The psychology service commissioned a research project to extend the use of the 
questionnaire to examine a more representative sample of clients’ views. The 
service wished to examine satisfaction between clients from the primary care and 
CMHT service to ascertain whether the previous research finding, that clients 
with more complex difficulties tended to be less satisfied, was also true for their 
service. As the pilot had only involved completers of therapy, the service also 
wished to discover whether these clients differed from non-completers of therapy 
in satisfaction. In addition, the service wished to use open-ended questionnaire 
data from a representative sample of clients to inform clinical practice and future 
service development.
The aims of the present study were:
1. To document satisfaction levels with specific aspects of the service with a wider 
and more representative sample of clients.
2. To compare satisfaction levels between clients who completed and those who did 
not complete therapy, with a prediction that non-completers would be less 
satisfied.
3. To compare satisfaction levels between primary care and CMHT clients, with a 
prediction that CMHT clients would be less satisfied.
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4. To assess generalisability of results to all clients who have used the psychology 
service.
5. To examine qualitative data provided by clients for their experiences in therapy 
and suggestions for improvement.
Method
Design
A questionnaire, cross-sectional survey design was used.
Participants
All clients who were discharged from psychology services during a three-month 
period between 17th January and 18th April, 2000, and had used either primary 
care and CMHT services at least once, were contacted, with the exception of the 
researcher’s clients (to preserve confidentiality) and six clients who attended a 
group over this period. Therapists included Clinical Psychologists, Counselling 
Psychologists and a Counsellor. A variety of therapeutic orientations were 
utilised within the department, including cognitive-behavioural, systemic- 
narrative and psychodynamic psychotherapy. 105 clients with a mean age was 37 
(SD = 11; range 18-59) were contacted.
Procedure
The questionnaire was developed by the service prior to the researcher’s 
involvement and is shown in appendix 1. The service did not wish to make any 
alterations to the questionnaire for the purpose of this research. On the 
questionnaire, clients were asked to rate (on a five-point scale) the overall 
satisfaction with the service, the extent to which their problems were solved, their 
confidence in sustaining changes made in therapy, and the extent to which their 
therapist understood the client, made themselves clear to the client and respected 
the client. Clients were also asked to describe their experience of therapy, their 
suggestions for improvements, and any other comments via open-ended
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questions. In addition clients were asked whether they would refer a friend, or 
return to the department if they needed more help (yes/no answers) and asked to 
indicate if their therapist would be able to see their completed questionnaires.
As the questionnaire had already been piloted it could not be ensured that 
participants contacted retrospectively would not already have completed the 
questionnaire. Thus, prospectively-discharged clients were contacted for the 
study. As memory deteriorates over time surveys should be conducted as soon as 
possible after an event (Baddeley, 1979). Therefore all clients received the 
questionnaire just after discharge.
To maximise generalisability of findings to the service it is considered essential 
to achieve a high response rate. Typically response rates to postal questionnaires 
are low (e.g. 50% in Hutchings & Pope, 1998) and particularly so with non­
completers of therapy (e.g. 25% in Jefferis & Porter, 1996).
Response rate is influenced by education and literacy (Baker, Pistrang & Elliot, 
1994) and degree of interest in the study (Fowler, 1993). The covering letter 
accompanying the questionnaire used basic English and did not use technical 
language, which might deter potential responders. Additionally the letter aimed to 
stress the importance of clients’ views for future development of the service, 
which aimed to increase motivation to respond. Dillman (1978) stated that 
increasing the benefiticost ratio of completing a study is key in maximising 
response rates. Therefore, the covering letter informed potential participants of 
the short time involved to complete the questionnaire, and the potential benefits, 
for themselves and other service users. To reduce the costs to potential 
participants a pre-paid addressed envelope was enclosed. The format of the 
covering letter was a similar format to that used in a similar study of service 
users’ views, which achieved a high response rate (Ryden, 1999), and contained 
headings to aid comprehension and draw attention to aspects of the study. Clients 
were contacted by post within one week of discharge with a request to participate 
(see appendix 2) and a questionnaire and pre-paid, addressed envelope enclosed.
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Reminders increase response rates (Dillman, 1978). The benefits of high response 
rates were weighed against the ethical issue of repeatedly contacting clients. Two 
mailings were considered acceptable by the researcher and the service. Mangione 
(1995) suggested that responses drop off after fourteen days, so second mailings 
(see appendix 2) of the questionnaire and pre-paid envelope were performed just 
after this time lapse at three weeks if clients had not responded to the initial 
request.
Degree of professional appearance, attractiveness and personalisation in 
correspondence have been shown to enhance response rates (Fowler, 1993). 
Therefore covering letters were personalised, on department-headed paper and 
individually signed. Dillman (1978) suggested that misplacing or forgetting about 
a questionnaire is a likely reason for non-response to mail surveys. Therefore 
questionnaires were printed on green coloured paper to increase attractiveness 
and distinctiveness.
Statistical analyses
Quantiative data from the scales were converted to numerical scores for the 
purpose of analysing the data as follows:
“Very
Dissatisfied”;
0
“Dissatisfied” 1
“Uncertain” 2
“Satisfied” 3
“Very Satisfied” 4
Ratings scales were analysed using Mann-Whitney U tests. Qualitative data were 
subject to content analysis to extract main themes.
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Results
Response rate
Of the 105 clients contacted 49 responded (response rate = 46.7%). 35 clients 
(71.4%) responded after the initial request to participate and 14 (28.6%) 
responded after a reminder.
Response characteristics
One client returned the questionnaire uncompleted, stating that they had already 
filled out an identical questionnaire. One client returned the questionnaire with 
their client number cut off the top and consequently could not be matched up with 
the demographic data. The data for this client was excluded from the analysis and 
was not included in calculation of response rate. Instead of circling the 
appropriate response on the scales, three clients treated the scales as continuous 
Likert scales and marked in between points. Such responses were scored as 0.5 
greater than the lowest of the points between which the response rested. For 
example, responses between “uncertain” and “satisfied” were coded as 2.5. Some 
clients did not complete all of the questions.
Clients varied in the amount of qualitative information provided. Seven clients 
did not respond to the open-ended questions. In response to the qualitative 
questions it was noted that clients often used the sections as if they were generic 
sections in which anything could be written. That is, an aspect of therapy one 
client may have mentioned under Q4 may have been mentioned by another client 
under Q7. For this reason all the data from the three sections were collapsed into 
a whole data set for analysis together.
Assessment o f representativeness o f the sample
Age of responders and non-responders was comparable, as was number of 
sessions attended and cancelled (shown in table 1). There was a trend for non­
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completers to have a higher DNA rate, however this was not statistically 
significant (t = 1.563; p = 0.122)
Table 1: Background data for responders and non-responders
Responders 
Mean (SD)
Non­
responders 
Mean (SD)
Age 38 (12) 35 (11)
Number of sessions attended1 7.7 (5.6) 7.4 (9.1)
Number of sessions 
cancelled2
0.8 (1.2) 0.6 (1.0)
Number of sessions did not 
attend3
0.5 (1.2) 1.0 (1.5)
Age data were unavailable for 2 clients (both non-responders).
Number of sessions attended data were unavailable for 5 clients (1 responder, 4 
non-responders.
Number of sessions cancelled and did not attend data were unavailable for 16 
clients (4 responders and 12 non-responders).
Response rate across settings was comparable, as shown in table 2.
Table 2: Percentages o f clients in different settings who responded and did not 
respond (data available for 89 clients)
Respond Did not Whole
ed respond sample
% (N) % (N) % (N)
Primary 48.5% 51.5% (34) 100% (66)
care (32)
CMHT 48.3%
(14)
51.7% (15) 100% (29)
Other 50% (2) 50% (2) 100% (4)
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Response rate across discharge status is shown in table 3. There was a tendency 
for lower response rates from clients who were seen for assessment only and 
clients who did not complete therapy. The differential response rate was 
significant for completers vs. non-completers (x2 = 3.878; p = 0.049).
Table 3: Treatment status o f responders and non-responders
Responded 
% (N)
Did not 
respond 
% (N)
Whole 
sample 
% (N)
Assessment 25% (2) 75% (6) 100%(8)
Completed 65.2% (30) 34.8% (16) 100% (46)
Did not 
complete
39.3% (11) 60.7% (17) 100% (28)
Referred on 40% (2) 60% (3) 100% (5)
Quantitative data: whole sample
The percentages of clients who rated different aspects of the service positively 
(i.e. above the “uncertain” category are detailed in table 4 below.
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Table 4: Percentages o f clients rating different aspects o f the service positively 
(i.e. above “uncertain”)
*
Percentage4 of clients rating aspect 
of therapy positively i.e. above 
“uncertain”
Ql Overall satisfaction 80.9 (very satisfied or satisfied)
Q2 Problem solved 63.0 (completely or pretty much)
Q3 Confidence in sustaining 
changes made
55.6 (totally or quite)
Q5a Therapist understood 
client
84.8 (completely or quite a lot)
Q5b Therapist clarity to client 89.4 (completely or quite a lot)
Q5c Therapist respect for client 91.5 (completely or quite a lot)
Q6a Would refer a friend to 
department
85.1 (yes)
Q6b Would come back to 
department
85.1 (yes)
Ql, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, N = 47 
Q2, 5a, N = 46 
Q3, N = 45
The distributions for data from the rating scales were negatively skewed, with a 
tendency for ratings towards the more satisfied range. Means are shown in 
addition to medians as they are more discriminating between the questionnaire 
items.
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Table 5: Mean and median satisfaction ratings given by clients
Mean (SD) Median
“range”
Overall satisfaction (Ql) 3.2 (1.0) 3.0
“satisfied”
Therapy sorted out problems
(Q2)
2.4 (1.0) 3.0 “Pretty 
much”
Confidence in sustainment of 
therapeutic changes (Q3)
2.4 (1.0) 3.0 “Quite”
Therapist understanding of 
client (Q5a)
3.2 (0.9) 3.0 “Quite a 
lot”
Therapist clarity to client (Q5b) 3.4 (0.8) 3.5 “Quite a 
lot”
Therapist respect for client 
(Q5c)
3.5 (0.7) 4.0
“Completely
>5
Table 6: Comparison o f rating scales for clients 1st vs. 2nd time responders
1st time 
responders 
(N = 35) 
Mean (SD)
2nd time 
responders 
(N = 14) 
Mean (SD)
Ql Overall satisfaction 3.3 (1.0) 2.9 (1.1)
Q2 Therapy sorted out 
problems
2.6 (0.9) 1.8 (1.1)
Q3 Confidence in sustainment 
of therapeutic changes
2.6 (1.0) 1.9 (1.0)
Q5a Therapist understanding 
of client
3.3 (0.8) 3.0 (1.3)
Q5b Therapist clarity to client 3.5 (0.6) 3.1 (1.1)
Q5c Therapist respect for client 3.5 (0.7) 3.5 (0.8)
* 1st time responders Q l, 2, 5a, 5b anc 5c N = 33, Q3 N = 32
* 2nd time responders Q2, 3 and 5a N = 13.
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Mean ratings for first time responders show a trend to be higher than second time 
responders. This difference reached statistical significance for Q2 and Q3 in that 
first time responders tended to rate degree to which therapy helped sort out their 
problems and degree of confidence in sustainment of changes as higher than 
second time responders (Q2 Z = 2.277, p = 0.023; Q3 Z = 2.184, p = 0.029).
Table 7: Comparison o f satisfaction ratings for completers vs. non-completers o f 
therapy5.
Completers 
(N = 31) 
Mean (SD)
Non­
completers 
(N = 12) 
Mean (SD)
Mann-Whitney U- 
test
Z fe)
Ql Overall 
satisfaction
3.6 (0.6) 2.1 (1.3) Z = 3.760, p <  0.001**
Q2 Problem 
solved
2.8 (0.7) 1.8 (1.1) Z = 3.043, p = 0.005**
Q3 Sustainable 
changes
2.7 (0.8) 1.8 (1.2) Z = 2.761, p = 0.010**
Q5a Therapist 
understanding
3.6 (0.5) 2.4 (1.1) Z = 3.738, p <  0.001**
Q5b Therapist 
clarity
3.6 (0.5) 2.7 (1.2) Z = 2.605, p = 0.018**
Q5c Therapist 
respect
3.7 (0.6) 3.1 (0.8) Z = 2.033, p = 0.080
T ------------------------------------------------------- 1-------------------------------------------------------------------1------------------------------------------------------------------- 1-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
One person who completed therapy and one person who dropped out did not 
complete the rating scales.
** Significant difference at 0.05 level.
On all ratings there was a tendency for completers to rate higher than non­
completers. This reached statistical significance for all comparisons except 
therapist respect for client.
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Table 8: Comparison o f primary care with CMHT clients on satisfaction ratings
Primary care 
(N = 32) 
Mean (SD)
CMHT (N = 
14)
Mean (SD)
Mann- 
Whitney U 
Z(P)
Ql Overall 
satisfaction
3.1 (1.1) 3.1 (0.8) Z = 0.572; p = 
0.572
Q2 Problem 
solved
2.4 (1.0) 2.2 (1.0) Z =  1.205; p = 
0.228
Q3 Sustainable 
changes
2.5 (1.0) 2.1 (1.0) Z =  1.725; p = 
0.115
Q5a Therapist 
understanding
3.2 (1.0) 3.2 (1.0) Z = 0.294; p = 
0.769
Q5b Therapist 
clarity
3.2 (0.9) 3.5 (0.6) Z = 0.771;p = 
0.441
Q5c Therapist 
respect
3.5 (0.7) 3.5 (0.7) Z = 0.204; p = 
0.838
Mean satisfaction overall, degree to which problem was solved, therapist 
understanding, clarity and respect are comparable between Primary care and 
CMHT clients. There was a trend for CMHT clients to rate their confidence in 
sustaining changes made in therapy lower than Primary care clients, but this did 
not reach statistical significance.
Qualitative data: whole sample
Previous studies have explicitly looked at the therapeutic process itself (as shown 
in review by Elliott & James, 1989). However, in the present study clients were 
also asked for their suggestions for improvement of the service and any other 
comments. For this reason, it was not possible to employ pre-defined categories 
solely from the literature. Instead, categories were created through both 
consideration of the literature and through gaining familiarity with the data, a 
process recommended by Day (1989).
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Responses were not necessarily confined to the pre-imposed categories on the 
questionnaire. For example clients might make suggestions for improvement in 
the “experience of therapy” section, and conversely might report their experience 
of therapy in the “suggestions for improvement” section. Therefore data from 
qualitative sections were combined for analysis.
Four main categories of aspects of therapy emerged from the data: practicalities 
of therapy, therapeutic relationship, therapist action and outcome for client. 
Clients also tended to express appreciation and made comments about other 
professionals.
Comments regarding practicalities were a mixture of appreciation of aspects of 
the service and suggestions for improvement (shown in table 9).
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Table 9: Practicalities: number o f clients who reported positive comments or 
made requests
Sub-categories Positive comment 
N =
Request 
N =
Waiting time for 
appointment
2 (appreciation of speed 
with which seen)
3 (requested shorter)
Timing of referral 
from other 
professional
3 (requested sooner)
Length of sessions 2 (requested more flexible and 
longer)
Timing of sessions 2 (appreciation of 
flexibility in session 
times)
2 (requested more flexibility)
Amount of sessions 5 (requested more, follow up 
and flexibility)
Punctuality of 
sessions
2 (appreciation of 
appointments to time)
1 (requested replacement for 
illness)
Flexibility (access to 
therapist outside 
arranged times)
1 (appreciation of access 
to therapist on phone 
outside of appointment 
times)
2 (requested ad-hoc groups 
and drop-in time)
Additional
resources
3 (requested information 
leaflet re: psychology, e-mail 
counselling, video, reading 
list)
Specialist resources 2 (requested tranquilliser 
addiction group and more 
specialists in eating disorders)
Referral on 1 (appreciation of 
therapist knowing when 
to refer on)
1 (requested help from 
psychology and not referral 
on)
Therapy physical 
environment
1 (requested less “shabby 
room”)
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Aspects of the therapeutic relationship that clients mentioned are detailed in table 
10.
Table 10: Therapeutic relationship
Sub-categories Examples Aspect
present
N =
Aspect
absent
N =
Talking “X  was good to talk to ” 11 1 (but wanted to 
talk)
Listening “Ifound X  listened to 
me”
4
Understanding “she was very good at 
understand (sic) what I  
have been through ”
12 2 (one suggested 
employment of 
people with 
mental health 
problems)
Openness:
supportive/non-
judgemental/safe
/trust
“It was a relief telling 
someone everything about 
myself and what I ’ve done 
who is prepared to listen 
and not judge you ”
10 1 (did not feel 
safe)
Respect “I  am a very private 
person and this was 
respected as well ”
1
Value “I  felt X  valued me ” 1
Interest “she was interested in 
me”
2 2 (disinterested)
Rapport “Irelated well to her” 3 1 (unable to 
build rapport)
Non-clinical style “it would be better if you 
felt like it was a one to 
one conversation rather 
than somebody receiving 
therapy ”
2 (liked
being
informal)
1 (too formal)
Generic positive 
statement about 
therapist
“was pleasant” 
“friendly ”
7
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Therapists’ actions fell into four sub-categories: professional explanation, 
normalisation, collaborative or a directive style (table 11). The data suggests that 
some clients would value a professional explanation for their problem and that 
clients prefer a collaborative style of therapy as opposed to directive style. Where 
not explicitly stated, rating of an action as helpful was inferred from the context 
in which the action was referred to. Clients who rated a particular action as 
unhelpful tended to state explicitly so, and therefore it may be assumed that those 
who did not complain about something are implicitly suggesting its usefulness.
Table 11: Therapists ’ action
Sub­
categories
Examples Rated
positively
N =
Rated
negatively
N =
Requeste 
d (did not 
receive)
N =
Professional 
explanation 
of problem
“Ifeel that it would 
help me a lot i f  next 
time we meet my 
psychologist could help 
explain to me the cause 
o f my condition in her 
professional opinion ”
2
Normalisatio
n
“made me feel normal” 2
Collaborativ 
e style: 
guided 
questions
“she allowed me to talk 
through my problems 
and discover my own 
answers ”
2
Non-
collaborative
style:
therapist-
directed
“at times I  was a little 
unclear with what I  had 
to do ”
1 (initially 
rated
negatively,
then
positively)
4
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Client reported outcomes are shown in table 12. The most frequently reported 
outcome was change in perspective, followed by self-understanding. Only three 
clients reported specific improvement in problem, yet only one client stated that 
they did not experience improvement. Ten clients reported that therapy had been 
helpful, but did not describe in what way.
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Table 12: Outcomes
Sub-categories Examples Positive
comments
N =
Negative 
comments 
N =
Requeste
d
N =
Self-
understanding/dis 
covery of problem 
and why occurred
“I don’t feel we got to the root 
of why I feel the way I do” 
“opened my eyes to a few  
things I  either didn’t realise or 
didn’t want to realise ”
6 2
Off-loading of
problem/emotional
expression
“sessions were.. .load-lifting” 
“to me Ife lt I  was going 
crying fo r an hour and that 
was it. We would speak about 
my problems but I  was coming 
out feeling no different”
5 1
Change in 
perspective (e.g. 
more able to cope, 
shift of focus, life 
goes on, 
acceptance of 
problem)
“I have my life back now” 
“the things I  was worrying 
about really didn’t matter” 
“life goes on ”
12 1
Specific
improvement in 
problem
“helped build my confidence ” 3 1 (not got)
Change of mind 
about therapy (i.e. 
sees as more 
positive)
“I  used to be the biggest 
sceptic out but I  am glad I  
tried all the help offered”
4
Generic statement 
of helpfulness
“Ifeel that the therapy I  
received has been very 
valuable and productive and 
beneficial"
10 3 (unhelpful)
Thanks/appreciati
on
“thanks fo r  your help ” 8
Self-blame for 
outcome
“I  am unable to cope at the 
level o f  therapy ”
2
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In addition, four comments were made about other professionals, one of which 
was positive, and three of which were complaints.
Discussion
Client satisfaction
80.9% of clients reported that overall they were satisfied with the service (mean 
overall satisfaction was in the “satisfied” to “very satisfied” range). 63.0% of 
clients reported that their problems had either completely or pretty much been 
resolved (mean rating was in the “uncertain” to “pretty much” range). 55.6% of 
clients were confident in sustaining changes made in therapy (mean ratings was 
in the “undecided” to “quite” range). This suggests that although the majority of 
clients were satisfied overall with the service, fewer had their problems sorted out 
and even fewer felt confident in sustaining changes, illustrating the difference 
between satisfaction and outcome (Hutchings & Pope, 1998). It also might reflect 
the effect of the time interval after which clients were asked to complete the form 
(Elliott & James, 1989): just after discharge. Ratings of confidence in sustaining 
changes might be different dependent on the clients’ experience in the time after 
discharge.
The percentage of clients who rated that the therapist understood them, made 
themselves clear and respected them was high (84.8%, 89.4% and 91.5% 
respectively), which suggests that clients generally had good therapeutic 
relationships with their therapists.
As predicted clients who did not complete therapy were significantly less 
satisfied on all but one of the ratings (therapist respect). Although data does not 
imply a causal relationship and reasons for not completing therapy can vary 
(Hughes, 1997), it is possible that clients are not completing therapy due to 
dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, despite lower overall ratings, clients who dropped 
out of therapy did still tend to report fairly high levels of satisfaction.
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Contrary to the prediction made that CMHT clients would be less satisfied than 
primary care clients, ratings by clients seen in a CMHT setting were only slightly 
lower than those seen in a primary care setting for confidence in sustaining 
changes (but not significantly so), and comparable for all other questions. 
Therefore, clients in the CMHT service were not significantly less satisfied than 
primary care clients.
Generalis ability o f the results
The response rate achieved in the study was 46.7%. Although this is higher than 
some studies the fact that over half of the sample’s views were not represented in 
the data will to some extent limit the generalisability of the findings. The trend 
for lower ratings from second-time responders compared with first-time 
responders suggests that non-responders might be even less satisfied.
A lower response rate was obtained from clients who had been referred for 
assessment only, indicating that a questionnaire about therapy may be considered 
inappropriate by these clients. A lower response rate was also obtained from 
clients who did not complete therapy, and it is possible that clients who did not 
respond might be less satisfied (Stallard, 1995; cited in Stallard, 1996), which 
may bias the results.
The response rates across primary care and CMHT clients were comparable, 
which suggests that results from the comparison between the two settings may be 
representative.
Experience o f therapy
Clients’ comments were separated into four main categories, practicalities, 
therapeutic relationship, therapists action and outcomes. Clients clearly valued 
aspects of the therapeutic relationship. There was also evidence that clients prefer 
a collaborative as opposed to directive style. The most frequently reported 
outcome was change in perspective, followed by self-understanding. Specific 
improvements were less frequently reported, and interestingly were only
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requested by one. This might suggest that clients have a realistic perspective of 
what they can achieve in therapy, i.e. they do not expect to be “cured”. Further 
analysis between satisfaction ratings and client reported experiences may further 
illuminate what clients find useful in therapy; however this was beyond the scope 
of the present study.
Critique
Biases may be present in that some clients’ views may not be represented due to 
limited vocabulary (Elliott & James, 1989). Furthermore, one cannot assume that 
because a client did not mention a particular aspect of therapy, they did not 
experience it, or did not find it useful. It is also important to note that the content 
analysis was performed by a trainee clinical psychologist, who may have 
classified the data differently both from clients or more experienced therapists.
Implications for the service
The high levels of satisfaction reported and high rate of positive experiences in 
therapy are encouraging for the service. In addition, client reported experience of 
the therapeutic relationship and outcomes were overwhelmingly positive.
Suggestions made by clients for service improvement mainly concerned 
practicalities, for example, shorter waiting times, earlier referral from other 
professionals, more sessions and more flexible times for sessions and additional 
resources. One such request, for more information about the service is being 
considered in the form of an opt-in leaflet.
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Code:
(Office use only)
/
>
User Satisfaction Survey for     Psychology Service
Our department is conducting a survey, involving all our users, in order to gather 
opinions.on our service. We value your views of our service, so  please take your time in 
filling out'this questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and information 
given by you will be strictly confidential and be used for audit and research purposes 
only. P lease try to answer all of the questions, including those on the reverse of this 
page.
Please circle on the following scales the point which you feel best describes your 
opinions.
1. Overall, how satisfied are you with the service that you received from our 
department?
7  Satisfied Uncertain Very Dissatisfied
Satisfied Dissatisfied
2. Did therapy help you to sort out your problems/symptoms; 
mpletely Uncertain Not at allI—-----------^-----------------1------------- j----------  1
Pretty Much Not Really
3. How confident do you feel in the long term with sustaining any changes that you may 
have made through therapy?
Totally Undecided Not at all
Quite Not very
4. In your own words, if you would like to, please describe your own experience of the 
therapy you received from your psychologist
5. Please circle a point on the following scales which you feel describes your view of 
whether your psychologist:
/
a) Understood you?
Completely Uncertain Not At All
f_ _ _ h -----------H------------ y-----------1
Quite a lot Not Much
b) Made herself/himself clear to you?
Completely Uncertain Not At All
I-----------------1—----------- -I--------:-------- 1---------------- 1
Quite a lot Not Much
c) Respected you?
Completely Uncertain * Not At All
I--------------------1— ------------ H -------------- — I— ------------1
Quite a lot Not Much
6. Would you:
(P lease tick a box)
a) Refer a friend to this department? Yes
b) Come back if you needed more help? Yes
7. Do you have any suggestions to enable our service to suit you better?
□  No □
□  No □
. .  ^ ; .______
If you have any other comments, please write them below.
3. Please tick the box if it would be OK if we put this survey in your file for ycu<* 
psycnoloaist to see?
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Appendix 2: Initial covering letter
Psychology Department 
ADDRESS
DATE
CLIENT ADDRESS 
Dear CLIENT NAME
Here in the department we have realised we do not really know much about 
peoples’ views of the psychology service. I understand that you recently saw a 
member of the psychology department. We would be very interested to know 
your views in order to improve the service other people experience in the future.
How?
I have enclosed a questionnaire, which will only take 10 minutes to complete, 
and a pre-paid envelope for its return.
Why you?
Everyone who has recently seen a member of the psychology department is being 
asked to complete a questionnaire.
Who will see your questionnaire?
No one outside the psychology department will see your questionnaire. The 
questionnaire will not have your name on it and will be kept separate from your 
file unless you tick the box saying you would not mind if we put the 
questionnaire in your file for your psychologist to see.
What will happen to the results?
Your opinions will help us to improve services in the future. I hope that everyone 
will respond as the service really does want to consider the views of everyone.
Will it affect my treatment?
Participation is voluntary. Your future treatment will not be affected by whether 
you choose to complete the questionnaire or not. However, we do hope that 
gaining everyone’s views of the service will enable improvement of the service 
for everyone in the future.
I hope I have answered any questions you may have, but if you would like more 
information please contact me on 01403 227000 ext. 7272.
Thanking you in advance for your time 
Yours sincerely
RESEARCHER’S NAME 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Enc: Questionnaire, pre-paid envelope
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Appendix 3: Second covering letter
Psychology Department 
ADDRESS
DATE
CLIENT ADDRESS 
Dear CLIENT NAME
I recently wrote to you inviting you to give your views of the psychology service. 
If you have already replied to this request, please ignore this letter. If not, I 
apologise for bothering you again, but wanted to let you know how important 
your views are for the future development of the service. In order to improve the 
service we would like to consider the views of everyone -  including you!
How?
I have enclosed a questionnaire, which will only take 10 minutes to complete, 
and a pre-paid envelope for its return.
Who will see your questionnaire?
No one outside the psychology department will see your questionnaire. The 
questionnaire will not have your name on it and will be kept separate from your 
file unless you tick the box saying you would not mind if we put the 
questionnaire in your file for your psychologist to see.
What will happen to the results?
Your opinions will help us to improve services in the future. I hope that everyone 
will respond as the service really does want to consider the views of everyone.
Will it affect my treatment?
Participation is voluntary. Your future treatment will not be affected by whether 
you choose to complete the questionnaire or not. However, we do hope that 
gaining everyone’s views of the service will enable improvement of the service 
for everyone in the future.
I hope I have answered any questions you may have, but if you would like more 
information please contact me on 01403 227000 ext. 7272.
Thanking you in advance for your time 
Yours sincerely
RESEARCHER’S NAME 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Enc: Questionnaire, pre-paid envelope
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What is insomnia and how do we measure it?: A review of the
literature
Introduction
It is estimated that between 15 to 20% of the population (Ford & Kamerow, 
1989) and over 75% of people with mental health problems (Morin, 1993) suffer 
from sleeping difficulties. Clinical psychologists generally receive only limited 
training in treatment of sleeping difficulties (Stores & Wiggs, 1998), despite the 
fact that sleeping difficulties are prevalent in people with mental health problems. 
Psychological therapies based on behavioural and cognitive theories have 
demonstrated efficacy (e.g. Morin, Culber & Schwartz, 1994a; Murtagh & 
Greenwood, 1995). Given that clients often prefer psychological to 
pharmacological treatments (Morin, Gaulier, Barry & Kowatch, 1992; Vincent & 
Lionberg, 2001), there may be increasing demand for clinical psychologists to 
provide these treatments. Such treatments may be particularly important in 
mental health services, as sleeping difficulties are thought to increase the risk for 
developing depression (Ford & Kamerow, 1989). In order for efficacy literature 
to be interpreted and decisions to be made regarding resource allocation and 
treatment protocols, it is important for clinical psychologists to have a knowledge 
of definitions of insomnia, as these vary in the literature.
Defining insomnia is problematic; it is difficult to know when “sleep problems” 
become clinical insomnia and are in need of treatment. The Oxford Dictionary 
(1995) defines insomnia as,
“Chronic inability to fall asleep or enjoy uninterrupted sleep”
The definition of chronicity and enjoyment is inherently subjective, which 
highlights difficulties in the definition of insomnia.
In order for a definition of insomnia to be useful for the work of a clinical 
psychologist, it needs to be clinically relevant and needs to be valid and reliably 
measured. Three main classifications have been developed and are in use: 
International Classification of Sleep Disorders (ICSD); Diagnostic and Statistical
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Manual of Mental Disorders -  fourth edition (DSM-IV) and International 
Classification of Diseases -  tenth edition (ICD-10). The diagnostic categories for 
insomnia within the two most widely cited classification systems in the literature 
(ICSD and DSM-IV) that are particularly relevant to the work of clinical 
psychologists will be described, i.e., insomnia alone, or related to a mental health 
problem. In particular, each of the main diagnostic classifications assumes 
separate categories for insomnia in people with and without mental health 
problems. This begs the question, is insomnia different when it occurs in people 
with mental health problems from those without? This is important as treatment 
recommendations differ depending on diagnosis. The validity of this distinction 
will be one of the main foci of this review. Research that has examined the 
validity of this diagnostic distinction will be critically evaluated.
Inevitably, the nature of the definition of insomnia will affect assessment 
procedures. Therefore, it is important for the clinical psychologist to know about 
different assessment tools and the problems inherent in their use. Therefore, both 
subjective and objective assessment tools for insomnia will be evaluated.
Description of classification systems
The DSM-IV and ICSD classification systems are described here. There are too 
many sub-classifications within insomnia to describe these in detail, therefore, the 
focus will be on those of particular relevance to clinical psychologists: insomnias 
alone (unrelated to physical difficulties) and insomnias related to mental health 
problems.
DSM-IV
Sleep disorders criteria in DSM-IV are broad compared with ICSD. Insomnia in 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) is classified according to 
whether it is primary, or secondary to a mental disorder or a general medical 
condition. The latter will not be described here. Criteria for primary insomnia 
state that the person must have difficulty initiating or maintaining sleep, or 
nonrestorative sleep, for at least one month. It also states that the sleep
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disturbance must cause clinically significant distress in important areas of 
functioning. The insomnia must not be related to another sleep disorder and must 
not occur exclusively within the course of another mental disorder or general 
medical condition. Criteria for insomnia related to a mental disorder are the same 
as those for primary insomnia, but state that the insomnia is related to another 
axis I or axis II disorder, and that the insomnia is sufficiently significant to 
warrant separate attention. Therefore, the distinction in DSM-IV between primary 
insomnia and insomnia related to a mental disorder implies differences in 
conceptualisation of insomnia in people with and without mental health 
difficulties.
ICSD
The ICSD (American Sleep Disorders Association, 1990, 1997) is the only one of 
the three classification systems to be developed exclusively for diagnosis of 
sleeping difficulties. Hence, its sleep disorder categories are much more specific 
than DSM-IV. Criteria are also more detailed and thus the reader is referred to the 
original texts for a complete description. It was first developed in 1990 from the 
American Classification of Sleep Disorders (ACSD), a result of a survey of 
clinicians, therefore, it is based on expert opinion. It has since been revised 
(ICSD-R, 1997). ICSD is designed to reflect the presumed pathophysiology 
behind the sleep disturbance. It includes a category of dyssomnias, within which 
sub-categories of disorders thought to be due to factors within the body (intrinsic) 
and factors outside the body (extrinsic) exist. ICSD diagnoses, thought to be due 
to intrinsic factors, of psychophysiologic (learned sleep preventing associations) 
and idiopathic insomnia (no known causes, with childhood onset) and sleep-state 
misperception (when sleep deficit is perceived, rather than actual) are likened to 
the more general DSM-IV diagnosis of primary insomnia (Sateia, Doghramji, 
Hauri & Morin, 2000). The validity of specific sub-categories, as opposed to a 
general category is debatable and has been subject to review (Reynolds, Kupfer, 
Buysse, Coble & Yeager, 1991) and will not be discussed here.
The ICSD includes a separate category from the dyssomnias for disorders of 
sleep related to medical or psychiatric conditions. In addition, unlike DSM-IV,
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which assumes all insomnias secondary to psychiatric disorder under the one 
category, ICSD contains separate sub-categories according to the specific 
psychiatric disorder; anxiety, affective disorders, psychosis and panic disorder.
In summary, both DSM-IV and ICSD specify a minimum duration of one month. 
Despite the intended objectivity, the DSM-IV classification system requires 
subjective interpretation, for example, in defining “difficulty” sleeping and 
deciding what constitutes “clinically significant distress” (in DSM-IV). ICSD is 
more objective by giving criteria related to the actual amount of sleep obtained; 
however, it does not state how this should be judged (i.e. through laboratory tests 
or self-report measures). ICSD is also more specific in that it allows for a 
“complaint of insomnia”, rather than leaving the interpretation of the sleeping 
difficulty (i.e. objective or subjective) up to the clinician. This begs the question, 
should we classify people on the basis of more objective measures, or on the 
basis of subjective complaints. This point will be examined in more detail below.
Both ISCD and DSM-IV both classify people with insomnia differently on the 
basis of whether the insomnia is thought to be related to mental health problems 
or not. The validity of this distinction will be addressed. Whether such a 
distinction is valid has not been explicitly questioned in the literature, and 
therefore this distinction seems to be accepted. Given the implications for 
different treatment (e.g. Morin, 1993), this should be subject to enquiry.
Insomnia versus insomnia related to mental health problems
Validity and clinical usefulness
Both DSM-IV and ICSD distinguish between primary insomnia versus insomnia 
related to mental health problems; however, it is not clear on what basis this 
decision was made. Establishing the validity of such a distinction is very 
important, given that diagnoses give rise to different treatment recommendations 
within the literature. For example, Morin (1993) recommends that where 
insomnia is related to mental health problems, the mental health problems should 
be the primary focus of treatment. However, if an individual receives a diagnosis
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of primary insomnia, they will receive treatment for that difficulty. Although 
DSM-IV is intended to be atheoretical (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), 
its distinction between these categories implies, and has led in clinical practice, to 
distinctions between the underlying causality. ICSD is explicit in its presumption 
of different underlying causality.
It is possible that such a distinction is valid on the basis of polysomnographic 
data; however, an evaluation of the evidence is beyond the scope of this review. 
Furthermore, in clinical practice polysomnographic data is expensive to obtain, 
and can be problematic in terms of ecological validity (see below), and therefore 
such a conceptual distinction that requires sophisticated evaluation techniques 
may not be useful in clinical practice.
In an attempt to support the distinction between diagnostic criteria for DSM-IV 
and ICSD, as part of the DSM-IV field trials, Buysse, Reynolds, Kupfer, Thorpy, 
Bixler et al. (1997) asked clinicians to make treatment recommendations after 
diagnosing clients with sleep disorders at specialist sleep centres. Treatment 
recommendations differed between insomnia diagnoses. Psychiatric interventions 
tended to be the first recommendation for insomnia related to mental health 
problems (DSM-IV) and insomnia related to mood or anxiety disorder (ICSD). 
Sleep hygiene was the first recommendation for primary insomnia (DSM-IV) and 
psychophysiological insomnia (ICSD). The authors suggest that as differences in 
treatment recommendations were found across the diagnoses, this lends support 
to the face validity of the diagnoses. However, just because clinicians have a 
conceptualisation of the cause of a disorder on the basis of its classification 
description, it does not mean that such a distinction between disorders is valid. 
Furthermore, Buysse et al. (1997) found that sleep hygiene was also a second or 
third choice of treatment for insomnia related to mental health problems, and 
psychiatric intervention was rated as a fourth treatment by non-sleep specialists 
for primary insomnia. This suggests that clinicians are confused with regard to 
aetiology and appropriateness of treatment and further refutes the authors’ claims 
that the study supports the face validity of the diagnostic distinctions.
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Further evidence that clinicians have difficulty in distinguishing between primary 
insomnia and that related to mental disorders was found by Nowell, Buysse, 
Reynolds, Hauri, Roth et al. (1997), also as part of the DSM-IV field trial. 
Clinicians were asked to provide at least one diagnosis and a second, third or 
unlimited number of rule-out diagnoses. Of 216 participants, 147 were diagnosed 
to have either primary insomnia or insomnia related to mental disorders. Of these 
147, only 11 received a diagnosis of pure primary insomnia (i.e. no additional 
diagnosis of insomnia related to mental disorders) and only 63 received a 
diagnosis of pure insomnia related to mental disorders (i.e. no additional 
diagnosis of primary insomnia). In the remaining 73 participants both diagnoses 
were applied. The results do suggest that clinicians may have difficulty in 
distinguishing between the diagnoses in individual clients, although with 
increasing numbers of rule-out diagnoses included in the statistics, the number of 
clients with both diagnoses will obviously increase. The authors do not specify 
the number of diagnoses applied to the individuals in the above cases. A limiting 
factor of this research was that it only included people from specialist sleep 
disorders centres, not mental health services, in whom the differentiation between 
primary and secondary insomnia might be even more difficult.
A useful way of determining the validity of the distinction between types of 
insomnia alone and those related to mental health problems would be to test the 
treatment response of clients in different groups (Buysse et al., 1994a). If both 
responded equally to a standard intervention for insomnia, it may be that such a 
conceptual distinction is not clinically relevant or valid. However, if, as the 
literature suggests (e.g. Morin, 1993), that clients with insomnia related to mental 
health difficulties require treatment of those mental health difficulties for 
insomnia to improve, this would lend support to the validity and clinical 
usefulness of the diagnostic distinction. Morin et al. (1994) showed that people 
with insomnia secondary to psychopathology (anxiety and affective disorders) 
demonstrated a comparable treatment response to people with 
psychophysiological (primary) insomnia to a cognitive-behavioural treatment for 
insomnia. However, participants who had sufficiently severe mental health 
problems to warrant treatment were referred elsewhere and not included in the 
study. Therefore, findings might not generalise to people with severe or enduring
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mental health problems, whose insomnia may not improve in response to the 
treatment. Future research would need to address this question. Dashevsky & 
Kramer (1998) also demonstrated significant improvements in people with 
insomnia plus psychiatric disorders following a behavioural intervention that 
specifically targeted insomnia. Unfortunately this study did not employ a control 
group of people with primary insomnias and therefore treatment response cannot 
be compared. A further problem with this study was that, like Morin et al. 
(1994b), the participants were recruited from specialist sleep disorder centres and 
not from mental health services. Therefore, preliminary evidence suggests that 
the distinction between the diagnostic categories of insomnia alone and related to 
mental health problems may be of questionable validity when judged by 
treatment outcome. Findings require further evaluation, in particular with people 
from mental health populations, who may show problems on the more severe end 
of the spectrum and therefore may respond differently from those with primary 
insomnia to treatment.
The author does not know of data pertaining to the validity of this distinction in 
ICSD. ICSD is more specific than DSM-IV in that it includes specific sub­
categories of secondary insomnia depending on the psychiatric disorder to which 
it relates. It is possible that someone with insomnia secondary to anxiety may 
need different treatment from someone with insomnia secondary to affective 
disorders. Examining treatment response across groups of individuals could test 
the validity of these sub-categories.
For distinctions in classification systems to be clinically useful, they also need to 
be reliable.
Inter-rater reliability
Inter-rater reliability was assessed as part of the field trial for DSM-IV. 
Agreement was assessed by asking two clinicians, one sleep specialist and one 
general clinician at five different sites to interview patients with sleep complaints 
together and then independently decide on a diagnosis. Inter-rater kappa co­
efficients between the two interviewers ranged from 0.28 to 0.59 across sites for a
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diagnosis of primary insomnia, and 0.34 to 0.60 for a diagnosis of insomnia 
related to another mental disorder (Buysse et al., 1994b). (Kappa coefficients of 
0.20 to 0.40 are considered “poor” and 0.41 to 0.60 are considered “moderately 
good”, Landis & Kock, 1977; cited in Buysse et al., 1994b). Therefore, it is likely 
that agreement between the two individual clinicians’ conceptualisation of the 
DSM-IV insomnia classification system varied across sites.
Buysse et al. (1994b) also found high variation in prevalence of specific 
diagnoses across the five sites. In particular, there was often diagreement over the 
diagnoses of primary insomnia versus insomnia related to another mental 
disorder. Buysse et al. (1994b) suggest that clinicians differ in their perception of 
the importance of psychiatric factors. The authors raised the possibility that this 
could be due to variation in client samples across the sites. However, further 
research that required clinicians from other sites to diagnose clients from 
videotapes of original interviews for the study found large site-related differences 
in diagnosis (Buysse et al., 1994c; cited in Buysse et al., 1994a).
Therefore, it seems that at least for DSM-IV criteria for primary insomnia and 
insomnia related to a mental disorder, inter-rater reliability and reliability in 
diagnosing across different sites is fairly low. Buysse et al. (1994b) note that the 
research did not employ structured interviewing techniques and therefore may 
have compromised the diagnostic reliability. Nevertheless, the research does 
more closely reflect clinical diagnostic practice. Poor reliability is a threat to the 
utility of this diagnostic system, as diagnosis appears to depend to a large extent 
on whom the client is referred to, and at which sleep disorders centre the client is 
seen. Given that diagnosis is expected to aid treatment decisions, such variation 
in diagnostic practice may mean that clients do not receive the most appropriate 
treatment. Unfortunately, as clients were seen in specialist sleep disorders 
centres, results cannot be generalised to population, or psychiatric samples. 
Furthermore, the population of participants for the DSM-IV field trials was 
highly educated (Buysse et al., 1994), a factor which is likely to have increased 
communication between client and interviewer and possibly have increased 
reliability, thereby decreasing the generalisability of the findings to the general 
population.
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The author does not know of reliability data for the ICSD.
Assessment of insomnia
It is important that assessment tools are both reliable and valid, and in particular, 
that they measure the client’s presenting problem. Assessment methods may also 
be used to determine outcome of an intervention and in this respect, it is also 
important that they reflect outcome that is clinically meaningful, both to the 
clinician and to the client.
Definition of insomnia varies widely within the research literature. Rather than 
being based on defined criteria, or even any standard methods, methodologies of 
eliciting sleeping difficulties from participants vary widely between research 
studies, making comparison between them difficult (Ford & Kamerow, 1989). 
This is a particular factor in epidemiological research, as estimates of prevalence 
vary widely depending on how members of a population are assessed. Even 
within formal assessment methods, variation in method of assessing for insomnia 
alone or related to mental health difficulties exists. As research discussed above 
shows, it is also difficult for clinicians to judge when insomnia is primary or 
when it is related to mental health difficulties, or indeed to decide when the 
insomnia should be subsumed under a definition of mental health difficulties. 
Such decisions will inevitably be affected by assessment methods.
Global assessment measures
Even formal assessment methods based on diagnostic categories can differ in 
their approach and therefore bias assessment results. For example, using a 
computerised telephone interview system based on DSM-IV, which incorporated 
decision making flow-charts, prevalence of insomnia that had prevailed for at 
least a month and affected daily functioning in a French population was 12.7% 
(Ohayon, 1997). Formal DSM-IV sleep disorder diagnoses were applied in 5.6% 
of the population (Ohayon, 1997). That a formal sleep disorder diagnosis was not 
applied in the other 7.4% reflects the decision-making process during the
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assessment, where even though participants experienced insomnia that affected 
their daily functioning for at least a month, they stated that this impact was small 
relative to the impact of their psychiatric symptoms. In effect, the assessment 
process implies that even if a person is experiencing symptoms of insomnia that 
impact on their daily life, if they are experiencing greater difficulties with their 
psychiatric symptoms, they will not receive a diagnosis of insomnia. This 
illustrates that interpretation of diagnostic definitions will inevitably bias 
assessment procedures.
Schramm, Hohagen, Grasshoff, Riemann, Hajak et al. (1993) investigated the 
reliability and validity of the Structured Interview for Sleep Disorders (SIS-D) 
according to DSM-111-R in 68 patients. Good reliability was demonstrated 
between two different interviewers. Validity was evaluated by blind comparison 
of clinician-generated diagnosis with polysomnographic data (only available for 
30 of the participants). Agreement existed in 27 of the 30 cases, which the 
authors suggest demonstrates good validity. An advantage of this study was that 
it included patients who had been referred to a sleep laboratory and psychiatric 
inpatients who complained of a sleep problem. The procedure differed from 
Ohayon’s (1997) methodology in that it used clinician’s judgements following 
administration of a semi-structured interview, rather than a computerised 
diagnostic decision-tree process. Although good reliability and validity were 
demonstrated with the diagnostic interview based on DSM-111-R and Ohayon’s 
computerised system has also demonstrated good reliability and validity (Ohayon 
et al., 1997; cited in Ohayon, Caulet & Lemoine, 1998), both methods use 
different decision making processes, and therefore may arrive at different 
diagnoses. Future research needs to compare diagnostic processes.
A diagnostic interview schedule has been developed that closely matches DSM- 
IV for diagnoses of insomnia. Psychometric properties are in the process of being 
collected (Harvey, 2001; personal communication).
Numerous sleep questionnaires have been employed in the assessment of people 
complaining of insomnia. A detailed evaluation is beyond the scope of this 
review; therefore, the focus will be on the most widely used of these, the
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Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) (Buysse, Reynolds, Monk, Berman & 
Kupfer, 1989). The PSQI is a self-report measure completed by clients (and their 
bed-partner if applicable). It yields an overall score on the basis of seven sub­
scales; subjective sleep quality, sleep latency, sleep duration, sleep efficiency 
(amount of sleep obtained compared with amount of time spent in bed), sleep 
disturbances, use of medication to sleep and daily functioning. Validity was 
investigated by comparing overall scores on the PSQI with final clinical 
diagnoses (based on variety of measures including semi-structured interviews, 
sleep diaries and also polysomnographic data in some cases). A cut-off score of 5 
on the questionnaire that was imposed post-hoc correctly identified 88.5% of the 
patients with sleep problems and controls (on the basis of clinical diagnosis), 
which suggests that this may be a useful global assessment tool in the assessment 
of sleep problems. The PSQI also showed good internal consistency and 
reliability (Buysse et al., 1989). Advantages of the PSQI over other 
questionnaires are its ease of administration, assessment of sleep difficulties over 
the last month (hence in accordance with diagnostic definitions), and its 
validation with a population from mental health services. On a cautionary note, as 
the cut-off score was imposed post-hoc, the validity of this cut-off score may not 
be as good in another population: the validity of the cut-off score should be 
replicated further with different samples.
It is difficult to know which is the best assessment method, one that employs a 
relatively stringent criteria, as in the case of diagnostic interviews discussed 
above or one that allows a broader definition of insomnia, for example asking 
people whether they have difficulty sleeping. Specific assessment tools that 
examine specific diagnostic criteria for insomnias have been developed.
Amount o f sleep and sleep quality
Differences in assessment have arisen due to the ambiguity in diagnostic 
classification systems regarding objective or subjective definitions. ICSD defines 
normal sleep as when sleep onset latency is greater than 20 minutes and when 
sleep duration is less than 6.5 hours (Hauri, 2000). This criteria can be assessed
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objectively or subjectively (Sateia et al., 2000). Sometimes there are 
discrepancies between the two methods.
To assess for number of hours slept and waking times, people with insomnia may 
complete a daily log after each night. In a review of the literature, Sateia et al. 
(2000) reported that such sleep diaries show modest to poor correlations with 
objective measures of sleep quantity and many studies have shown that they tend 
to over-estimate the deficit compared with objective measures (Harvey, 2001). 
Under-estimations of sleep duration have also been demonstrated with subjective 
reports (Vanable, Aikens, Tadimeti, Caruana-Montaldo & Mendelson, 2000). The 
degree of subjective misperception depends on the actual amount of sleep 
obtained: when a sufficient amount of sleep is obtained, estimates are more 
accurate (Vanable et al., 2000). Therefore, insomniacs are particularly liable to 
provide inaccurate reports. However, sleep logs do discriminate between people 
with insomnia from normal sleepers (Knab & Engel, 1988; Chambers & Kim, 
1993; cited in Sateia et al., 2000), which supports their validity and clinical 
utility. The author does not know of reliability data for sleep logs.
Objective measures of sleep include polysomnography (PSG) (electro­
encephalogram measures of sleep) or actigraphy (a watch worn on the wrist to 
detect movement). Although both aim to be objective in the assessment of actual 
sleep obtained, such measures can have problems with validity. Firstly, PSG is 
often conducted in a sleep laboratory, therefore, it may not be ecologically valid. 
The effect of being in a laboratory may either enhance sleep, through the absence 
of cues that have learned associations with difficulty in getting to sleep, or it may 
impair sleep, through the fact that the client is in an unfamiliar, non-relaxing 
environment. PSG is not recommended for routine assessment of people 
complaining of insomnia (Reite, Buysse, Reynolds & Mendelson, 1995), and may 
also be unhelpful as it may exacerbate a person’s beliefs in physical, as opposed 
to behavioural, causes (Chervin, 2000).
Actigraphy may also have inherent methodological problems as it measures the 
amount of sleep obtained by measuring wrist movement during the night; it 
assumes that if the person is not moving, they are sleeping. However, it is
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possible that people with insomnia lie very still during the night, but do not sleep 
(Sadeh, Hauri, Kripke & Lavie, 1995). This may explain the reported discrepancy 
between actigraphy and subjective measures of amount of sleep obtained by 
insomniacs. Actigraphy is not recommended for routine assessment of insomnia 
(American Sleep Disorders Association, 1995).
Given the discrepancy between methods, it is difficult to determine which method 
is most valid in assessment of insomnia. Even though polysomnography has been 
traditionally considered the “gold standard” in assessing the amount of sleep 
obtained (Sadeh et al., 1995), there are problems in that polysomnographic results 
are often inconsistent with clients’ reports. Therefore, they may neither be 
clinically useful, nor a valid measure of clients’ complaints. In evaluating 
assessment methods, it may be valuable to consider which is most meaningful for 
the person being assessed.
Another important consideration is the normal variation in amount of sleep 
needed. To illustrate this point, Sateia et al. (2000) reported that 8.5% of people 
who define themselves as good sleepers sleep for six hours or less. This suggests 
that objective assessment of amount of sleep may not be the best criterion with 
which to use to define insomnia. However, these findings should be interpreted 
with caution: considering the lack of correlation between self-report measures 
and objective measures of sleep duration, it is possible that these ‘good sleepers’ 
are underestimating the amount of sleep they obtain each night.
Impact on daily functioning
Given the problems in defining insomnia from actual or perceived amount of 
sleep obtained, it is also useful to assess the impact of the sleep problem on daily 
functioning. As with amount of sleep, this can be assessed objectively or 
subjectively. The extents to which measures are valid assessment tools depend on 
their discriminatory power between insomniacs and normal sleepers.
Objective measures of daytime sleepiness (the amount of time it takes people to 
get to sleep during daytime naps) have failed to demonstrate that insomniacs are
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no sleepier during the daytime than normal sleepers (Research cited in Edinger, 
Fins, Sullivan, Marsh, Dailey et al, 1997). However, Edinger et al. noted that 
each of these studies have involved participants who underwent laboratory PSG 
the night before, whereas studies that documented deficits were conducted on 
participants who had spent the night at home. Edinger et al. (1997) compared 
groups of insomniacs and normal sleepers, each assigned either to sleep in a 
laboratory, or to sleep at home. Results showed that insomniacs tended to be 
more alert than normal sleepers after both had spent a night sleeping in the 
laboratory. When the groups who had slept at home were compared, there was a 
trend for insomniacs to be sleepier on the objective test than normal sleepers. 
This suggests that methodology and context is a very important factor when 
assessing the impact of insomnia on daily functioning for ecological validity. 
However, group differences were small and failed to reach statistical significance. 
Therefore, this would need replication, possibly with more participants (only 8 
were in each group; it is possible that the study did not have the power to find a 
significant difference). A further limitation of the study was that insomniacs were 
mostly not clinical patients.
Contrary to the trends reported for the objective measure of sleepiness by Edinger 
et al. (1997), the authors reported that insomniacs tended to perform better on a 
test of ability to switch attention. Therefore, effects on daily functioning might be 
dependent on the measures used. Unfortunately data are not available on 
participants general ability level. It is possible that the insomniac group were on 
average of higher ability than the non-insomniac group, which could have 
produced the above findings. Roth and Ancoli-Israel (1999) cited Hauri’s (1997) 
research that did demonstrate impaired reaction times, digit span performance 
and balance in insomniacs relative to controls when the groups were well- 
matched for age, education and occupation.
The Stanford Sleepiness Scale (Hoddes, Zarcone, Smythe, Phillips & Dement, 
1973) is a self-report measure to assess daytime sleepiness. The instrument was 
validated on sleep-deprived participants (Hoddes et al., 1973), who showed 
significantly higher scores than on days when they obtained a normal amount of 
sleep. Results obtained using insomniac samples are mixed; four out of seven
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studies reported no difference in sleepiness between insomniacs and controls 
(Sateia et al., 2000). This may be explained by the fact that the original validation 
was conducted following a whole night’s sleep deprivation: milder effects, to 
which the questionnaire may be insensitive, might be expected from a reduced 
amount of sleep loss akin to that experienced in insomnia.
Other research shows that if you ask people to report subjectively their daily 
functioning, people with insomnia do report impairments. For example, Roth and 
Ancoli-Israel (1999) conducted a telephone survey of 1,000 randomly selected 
Americans, who were grouped into chronic insomnia, occasional insomnia and no 
insomnia groups. They found that people with chronic insomnia were 
significantly less likely to rate quality of life, enjoyment of relationships, 
wellness, ability to carry out tasks and ability to handle minor irritations as good 
or excellent than non-insomniacs. Chronic insomniacs were also more likely to 
report concentration and memory problems, tiredness and falling asleep whilst 
doing daily activities than people in the no insomnia group. Therefore, research 
on peoples’ subjective experience of insomnia in their daily life suggests that it 
causes a significant impact on daily functioning. This was a population study 
rather than a clinical sample, therefore results are not generalisable to a clinical 
population; however, one might predict a clinical sample to report even greater 
impact of insomnia on daily life.
In summary, studies that investigate the impact of insomnia differ in their 
definitions of insomnia, thereby making comparisons between studies difficult. It 
is possible that some measures are not sensitive enough to problems with 
everyday functioning. Given this, perhaps the most clinically relevant way of 
obtaining information is to rely on client report.
Conclusion
Two main diagnostic classifications (DSM-IV and ICSD) distinguish between 
primary insomnia and insomnia related to mental health problems. This 
distinction is questionable on the basis of research that has showed that people 
classified into the different groups demonstrate similar treatment response.
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However, much of the research is conducted on clients from sleep disorders 
centres, which may not be generalisable to clients from mental health services. 
Further research needs to be conducted, specifically to compare populations with 
primary insomnia with those recruited from mental health services, as these are 
likely to represent the more severe end of the spectrum. Similarly, other 
reliability and validity studies need to be replicated with this population.
Inevitably the definition of insomnia will influence assessment methods. There 
are often discrepancies between objective and subjective measures of both sleep 
characteristics, such as sleep-onset latency and sleep duration, and objective and 
subjective measures of impairment in daily functioning. This leaves the clinician 
wondering which is the ‘best’ method to use. Given the individual variation in 
amount of sleep required, it may be important to give greater weight to subjective 
measures, as, coming from the client themselves, they are more likely to 
represent the clients’ perception of their difficulties.
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Abstract
Recently, there has been much research into cognitive factors that may be 
maintaining insomnia. This research has outlined potential treatment strategies. 
However; there is a paucity of research into the maintenance of insomnia in 
people with co-morbid anxiety. Conflicting recommendations, which are not 
supported by research, are made in the literature regarding treatment. Therefore, 
research into the maintaining factors of insomnia in people with additional co- 
morbid anxiety was necessary. The aim of the present research was to test aspects 
of Harvey’s (2002) cognitive model of the maintenance of insomnia in terms of 
its applicability to people with co-morbid anxiety. Fourteen participants with 
anxiety plus insomnia, 22 participants with insomnia only, four participants with 
anxiety only and 22 good sleepers were recruited into the study. Between group 
comparisons were made on the following cognitive factors: cognitive arousal, 
thought content (sleep- and anxiety-related), thought control strategies and beliefs 
about sleep. Results showed that both people with anxiety plus insomnia and 
people with insomnia only had significantly higher cognitive arousal in the pre­
sleep period and significantly higher endorsement of unhelpful beliefs about sleep 
than good sleepers. They did not differ significantly from each other on these 
variables. Similarly, a significantly higher proportion of both people with anxiety 
plus insomnia and insomnia only reported thinking sleep-related and anxiety- 
related thoughts prior to sleep than good sleepers. Again, the two insomnia 
groups did not differ significantly from each other in the proportion thinking 
sleep-related or anxiety-related thoughts. Thus, on cognitive arousal, levels of 
reporting of sleep- or anxiety-related cognitions, and endorsement of unhelpful 
beliefs about sleep, the people with anxiety plus insomnia showed a similar 
cognitive profile to people with insomnia only. However, in use of thought 
control strategies, the anxiety plus insomnia group differed significantly from the 
insomnia only group. The anxiety plus insomnia group used the strategies of 
worry and punishment significantly more than the insomnia only group, who in 
turn used these strategies significantly more frequently than the good sleeper 
group. Thus, in the use of thought control strategies, the insomnia plus anxiety 
group used unhelpful strategies significantly more than the insomnia only group. 
Therefore, some treatments derived from the model might also be applicable to
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people with co-morbid anxiety. However, there may also be other factors 
involved, which therefore need attention in treatment, in people with co-morbid 
anxiety. Further research into effectiveness of treatments would provide more 
conclusive evidence regarding the maintaining factors in insomnia in people with 
anxiety.
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Introduction
Why research insomnia in people with anxiety?
Prevalence o f  insomnia
Insomnia is an important area of research as it has been estimated that between 15 
and 20 percent of the population suffer from insomnia (Ford & Kamerow, 1989). 
The percentage of people with mental health problems who experience insomnia 
is thought to be much higher, and has been estimated at 75 percent (Morin, 1993). 
Some studies have investigated the prevalence of insomnia in individual anxiety 
disorders. In a review of the research, Monti & Monti (2000) noted that between 
1.5 and 35.9 percent of people with anxiety disorders have insomnia. 
Furthermore, they noted that people with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) are 
more likely to report difficulties with initiating and maintaining sleep than people 
without an anxiety disorder. However, the review included studies that differed in 
their criteria for both insomnia and GAD, and therefore conclusions regarding the 
prevalence rate of people meeting formal criteria cannot be made. Differences in 
diagnostic criteria and assessment procedures for insomnia is a common problem 
in comparison of different studies of insomnia. Insomnia is also a common 
problem in social phobia. Stein, Croft & Walker (1993) found that 60 percent of 
people with social phobia had moderately or markedly disturbed sleep on the 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) (the PSQI differentiates insomnia with a 
90 percent sensitivity and 87 percent specificity; Buysse, Reynolds, Monk, 
Berman & Kupfer, 1989), compared with only seven percent of people without 
social phobia. Similar results have been reported for panic disorder: Stein, 
Chartier & Walker (1993) reported an insomnia prevalence rate of 68 percent (on 
the PSQI), compared with only 15 percent of people without panic disorder.
Correlates o f insomnia
Insomnia is associated with many difficulties in daily life, including 
concentration and memory problems, difficulty in carrying out daily tasks, poorer
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enjoyment of relationships and a low sense of well-being (Roth & Ancoli-Israel, 
1999). Also, in comparison with good sleepers, people with insomnia had 
significantly lower quality of life scores, measured by the SF-36 (Zammit, 
Weiner, Damato, Sillup & McMillan, 1999). Research also shows that insomnia 
increases vulnerability to mental health problems; for example, depression (Ford 
& Kamerow, 1989). Although studies have not explicitly reported the effect of 
insomnia in people with co-morbid anxiety, one might expect that insomnia 
would exacerbate any difficulties due to the anxiety, thus causing further distress.
Treatment o f insomnia in people with anxiety: gaps in literature/clinical 
practice
Despite the high prevalence of insomnia in people with anxiety disorders, and the 
reported consequences of insomnia, very little is written in the psychological 
literature about insomnia in people with co-morbid anxiety, or indeed mental 
health problems in general. In the literature available, conflicting 
recommendations are made for treatment, but these are not based on theoretical 
research or outcome studies.
Currently, medication is the most widely used treatment for insomnia (Hauri, 
1997); however, service users mostly prefer psychological therapies for insomnia 
(Morin, Gaulier, Barry & Kowatch, 1992). It would therefore be important to 
identify effective therapeutic psychological interventions for insomnia in this 
population.
Opinions regarding how insomnia should be treated psychologically in people 
with co-morbid mental health problems differ. On the one hand, there is a 
suggestion that where insomnia co-occurs with another psychiatric disorder, 
treatment of that psychiatric disorder should take place first (Morin, 1993), 
implying that this would resolve the insomnia. Monti & Monti (2000) make 
similar recommendations for the treatment of insomnia in people with GAD; 
however, they also outlined the benefits of sleep hygiene (sleep-promoting 
habits). Research evidence for these conclusions was not cited. Other authors take 
a different perspective: for example, Espie (2002) noted that, “A common
176
Major research project: introduction
misconception is that insomnia is a symptom not meriting treatment in its own 
right.. .The misconception is particularly evident in the mental health field, but is 
unsupported by the literature”. (2002; p.219). Stein et al. (1993) also 
recommended that clinicians should consider specific sleep interventions in 
people with social phobia, in addition to normal treatment. Despite the lack of 
research evidence to support either of these positions, there is anecdotal evidence 
that even when people receive treatment for a mental health problem, the 
insomnia often persists (Harvey, 2001; personal communication). This suggests 
that interventions specifically targeted at insomnia may be appropriate for this 
client group.
In the pursuit of appropriate treatment guidelines for treatment of insomnia in 
people with anxiety disorders, it is first important to consider existing 
psychological theories, research evidence, and how these both might apply to 
people with co-morbid anxiety. It should be noted that different factors have been 
implicated in the development of insomnia, including biological, behavioural and 
cognitive factors. The role of behavioural factors of poor sleeping habits in 
insomnia were first outlined by Bootzin (1972; cited in Espie, 2002); however, 
research has failed to differentiate between people with and without insomnia in 
use of unhelpful sleep behaviours (Harvey, 2000b). Increased physiological 
arousal was also implicated in insomnia (Monroe, 1967; cited in Borkovec, 1982; 
Bonnet & Arandt, 1997); however, this lost popularity following the discovery 
that cognitive arousal was more prominent and more frequently cited by people 
with insomnia as a reason for difficulty in sleeping (Gross & Borkovec, 1982). 
Therefore, concentration was turned towards cognitive theories as explanation for 
the maintenance of insomnia. These theories are reviewed below.
Cognitive theories of insomnia
Morin (1993) suggested that chronic insomnia is maintained by psychological 
factors after the original precipitant, for example, a stressful life event, has 
resolved. His theory incorporates both behavioural and cognitive factors. He 
suggested that hyperarousal, cognitive, somatic or behavioural, is key in 
insomnia. He noted the importance of behavioural factors, such as conditioning,
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for example an association between the bed and anxieties about not sleeping, in 
exacerbation of insomnia. He also implicated cognitive factors, such as worries 
about the consequences of insomnia, and somatic factors, such as bodily tension, 
in the exacerbation of insomnia, mediated by the resultant increase in attempts to 
fall asleep, which has a paradoxical effect. He also noted the role of cognitive 
arousal in the increased perception of time latency, so that the person believes 
they have been awake for longer than they really have, which is likely to further 
fuel anxiety about not sleeping. Morin also incorporates the theory of learned 
helplessness into his model: he suggests that as sleeping difficulties continue, 
perceptions of sleep become more negative, which leads in turn to more cognitive 
and emotional arousal. He also notes that behaviours to cope with reduced sleep 
can be unhelpful in the long-term, and further exacerbate the insomnia.
Harvey (2002) proposed a purer cognitive model of the maintenance of insomnia, 
developed from a synthesis of available research evidence that examined 
cognitive factors in insomnia. In individuals who have developed insomnia 
through a variety of causes, the first stage of the maintenance model suggests the 
presence of excessively negative cognitive activity regarding whether the 
individual will get enough sleep, and the consequences of this for daily 
functioning. This then leads to emotional arousal, which in turn leads to selective 
attention towards sleep-related stimuli (for example, signs of falling asleep, or 
clock watching and calculating how much sleep is yet to be gained). Furthermore, 
as the individual focuses on the threat of sleep-related stimuli (for example, 
having monitored the self for signs of tiredness and found none), the selective 
attention will lead to a distorted perception of the deficit (for example, “I am 
never going to get to sleep tonight”). This distorted cognition produces further 
autonomic and emotional arousal and has the paradoxical effect of creating a 
physiological state that is incompatible with sleep inducement, and thereby a real 
deficit in sleep (insomnia) is maintained. Other cognitive factors are suggested to 
contribute to the maintenance of insomnia. Beliefs are thought to contribute to the 
negative cognitive activity (Harvey, 2002) and may provide a schema through 
which sleep-related stimuli are perceived. For example, if a person believes 
strongly that they need eight hours of sleep in order to function well the next day,
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a glance at the clock and a mental calculation that there are only five hours left in 
which to
Figure 1: Cognitive model o f the maintenance o f insomnia (Harvey, 2002)
In bed/during the day
Excessive negatively toned 
cognitive activity
Key:
Real deficit
Beliefs
Safety behaviours
Selective attention and 
monitoring
Arousal and distress
Distorted perception of 
deficit
^  Leads to
^  Exacerbates
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gain sleep may be interpreted more catastrophically than a person who did not 
believe this as strongly. Safety behaviours designed to promote sleep are also 
thought to contribute to the problem by having a paradoxical effect (Harvey, 
2002). In particular attempting to control thoughts at night time, or performing 
other behaviours that, although the person believes them to be conducive to sleep, 
are actually counter-productive, for example drinking alcohol.
When compared, Harvey’s model outlines more specifically the processes 
involved, and in particular the interaction between the different aspects are 
specified in more detail than Morin’s model. Furthermore, Harvey’s model makes 
specific testable predictions and has been subject to some research investigation 
and testing, whereas Morin’s model has not been explicitly tested. Also, Harvey’s 
model incorporates some of the more recent developments in cognitive research, 
for example, the role of beliefs, safety behaviours and selective attention. 
Therefore, Harvey’s model will be considered in more detail here. The evidence 
for Harvey’s model as it relates to people without mental health problems will be 
considered first. Then possible relevance for people with anxiety will be 
considered in the light of the available research. As will be seen, this is difficult 
to ascertain as categorisation of research regarding whether it investigates the 
former or the latter client group is problematic due to lack of availability of data 
regarding participant samples in the study.
Evidence for Harvey’s cognitive model of insomnia
Cognitive arousal
Research supports the notion that cognitive arousal is key in insomnia. For 
example, 55 percent of people with insomnia cited cognitive arousal to be the 
main problem in their insomnia (Lichstein & Rosenthal, 1980). Furthermore, 
people with insomnia experience higher levels of cognitive activity in the pre­
sleep period than good sleepers (Nicassio, Mendlowitz, Fussell & Petras, 1985), 
and are more likely to state that they cannot sleep due to cognitive arousal than 
controls (Harvey, 2000a). Research shows that cognitive arousal is associated 
with sleep-onset latency (Nicassio et al., 1985) and experimental induction of
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high cognitive arousal prior to sleep was shown to increase sleep-onset latency in 
good sleepers (Haynes, Adams & Franzen, 1981; Gross & Borkovec, 1982).
Cognitive content and distress
Harvey’s model suggests that pre-sleep cognitive activity mainly concerns sleep 
and consequences of not having enough sleep, but also other negative topics. It 
further predicts that these cognitions should lead to distress. Studies that have 
investigated pre-sleep content (and associated distress) will be considered here. 
They are grouped into those that investigate cognitions in-vivo, i.e. whilst people 
are attempting to get to sleep, and those that ask for retrospective reports of 
cognitive content.
VanEgeren, Haynes, Franzen & Hamilton (1983) conducted a study that involved 
prompting participants with beeps to report cognitions while they were waiting to 
go to sleep in a laboratory. They found that number of pre-sleep cognitions about 
physical sensations, environmental noise, and negative cognitions about sleep 
was associated with longer sleep-onset latency, which would be supportive of 
Harvey’s model. Whether other types of cognitive content were prevalent in the 
pre-sleep period is unknown as the research employed only the three above 
categories of thought in their analysis. Affect ratings did not account for a 
significant proportion of the variance in sleep-onset latency; however, these were 
only measured on three-point scales, which might not have been sufficiently 
sensitive to variation in affect.
Wicklow & Espie (2000) also found that thoughts about sleep and its 
consequences were a predominant thought in people with insomnia (20 percent of 
total thoughts reported), and exceeded in frequency of reporting only by thoughts 
concerning rehearsing/planning/problem-solving (43 percent of total thoughts 
reported). Both of these categories, and one other category of thought regarding 
bodily sensations, were associated with objective sleep-onset latency. 
Furthermore, unpleasant emotional affect ascribed to cognitions was also 
associated with objective sleep-onset latency. Unfortunately, this research did not 
employ a control group of good sleepers, and therefore it is uncertain as to
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whether participants with insomnia experience these thoughts significantly more 
than good sleepers.
Ecological validity is a problem in in-vivo studies as the procedure of reporting 
cognitions is likely to interfere with the normal sleep process, in particular in 
VanEgeren et al.’s study which employed beeps to prompt for cognitions. 
Furthermore, the beeps were judged to have disrupted actual thought content by 
21 percent of participants (VanEgeren et al., 1983). Wicklow & Espie’s provision 
of a voice-activated tape recorder in the home to participants was likely to have 
reduced, but not eradicated the procedure’s effects on the sleep process.
Difficulties with in-vivo studies can be resolved by retrospective studies. For 
example, Fichen, Libman, Creti, Amsel, Tagalakis & Brender (1998) investigated 
thoughts experienced by good sleepers compared with poor sleepers and also 
poor sleepers who exhibited distress about a lack of sleep. They used a previously 
devised questionnaire, which examined three factors; positive thoughts, negative 
thoughts and sleep-related thoughts. A comparison of the groups revealed that 
highly distressed poor sleepers experienced significantly more negative than 
positive thoughts, whereas the reverse was true for good sleepers and poor 
sleepers with low distress. Highly distressed poor sleepers experienced 
significantly more negative thoughts than low-distress poor sleepers, who 
experienced significantly more negative thoughts than good sleepers. Therefore, 
findings are in keeping with the suggestion that people with insomnia do 
experience excessively negative cognitive activity in the pre-sleep period. 
Furthermore, the authors reported that frequency of negative cognitions was 
significantly related to frequency of sleep difficulty (in days per week) and 
frequency of distress experienced about the sleep problem. Unfortunately, the 
authors did not report frequency data for sleep-related thoughts. Also, participants 
were over the age of 55 and therefore, results might not generalise to younger 
people.
On a checklist of 29 items of possible pre-sleep thought content, people with 
insomnia reported significantly more pre-sleep thoughts about not sleeping and 
going over things that had happened that day in detail than good sleepers
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(Harvey, 2000a). Furthermore, people with insomnia reported that they spent 
longer thinking about these topics than good sleepers did. This study had the 
advantage of employing a comparison control group and therefore lends further 
support to the model’s proposition that sleep-related thoughts have a role in the 
maintenance of insomnia.
In summary, research shows that sleep-related thoughts are more prevalent in 
people with sleeping difficulties or insomnia, and that furthermore, the extent of 
this relates to sleep-onset latency. However, a potential problem with thought 
content research is that total time awake might be a confounding variable not 
accounted for by the research methodology: perhaps the longer someone is 
awake, the more likely they are to experience/report certain thoughts. A further 
limitation of the studies reported is variation in the criteria used to specify people 
with insomnia/sleeping difficulties. Two studies did not use any formal criteria 
(VanEgeren et al., 1983 and Fichten et al., 1998). The other two studies did use 
formal criteria, but different ones: Wicklow & Espie (2000) used International 
Classification of Sleep Disorders (ICSD) criteria (American Sleep Disorders 
Association, 1997) and Harvey (2000) used DSM-IV criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994).
Thought control
Harvey’s model suggests that people with insomnia adopt unhelpful strategies to 
deal with their thoughts, that actually refuel the cognitive activity and exacerbate 
the insomnia. People with insomnia were compared to those without insomnia on 
a questionnaire adapted (from the Thought Control Questionnaire; Wells & 
Davies, 1994) to examine thought control strategies in the pre-sleep period 
(Thought Control Questionnaire-Insomnia; Harvey, 2001). People with insomnia 
reported significantly higher utilisation of the thought control strategies of worry, 
reappraisal, and, when data from the previous night were enquired after, 
suppression also (Harvey, 2001). This lends support for the model that certain 
thought control strategies are used more frequently by people with insomnia. 
These strategies of worry and suppression have been reported to be unhelpful in 
other psychological disorders and are thought to fuel cognitive activity further
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(e.g. Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987; Wells & Papageorgiou, in press; 
cited in Wells & Davies, 1994), which explain the mechanism of their 
maintaining role in insomnia. Further support for this aspect of the model comes 
from evidence that instructing people with insomnia to suppress their thoughts 
actually increases sleep-onset latency (Harvey, in press a).
Using a different measure, the Structured Neutralisation Interview, Gendron, 
Blais & Morin (1999) did not find any difference between the percentage of 
people with insomnia and good sleepers who utilised thought stopping 
(suppression) as a strategy to deal with their thoughts. Nor were there any group 
differences in the percentage of people using other strategies. This finding would 
appear to contradict the above evidence. However sample sizes in this study were 
smaller than in Harvey (2001); 14 people with insomnia and 20 good sleepers, 
compared with 30 and 29 respectively. Furthermore, more detailed information 
regarding the frequency of utilisation of the different strategies was not collected 
by Gendron et al.; therefore the design may have been insensitive to group 
differences.
Beliefs
The model proposes that beliefs have a contributory role to the maintenance of 
insomnia. This is supported by the limited research available. For example, it has 
been shown that people with insomnia endorse unhelpful beliefs about sleep 
(deleterious consequences of insomnia, lack of control and unpredictability of 
sleep, expectations about sleep, and the importance of sleep-promoting practices) 
more strongly than good sleepers (Morin, Stone, Trinkle, Mercer & Remsberg, 
1993). However, it should be noted that participants were over the age of 55, and 
therefore data may not be generalisable to a younger sample. Further support for 
the role of beliefs in the maintenance of insomnia comes from a treatment study 
that found an association between reduction in strength of belief and clinical 
improvement on objective sleep measures (Edinger, Wohlgemuth, Radtke, Marsh 
& Quillian, 2001a).
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Applicability of research to people with co-morbid anxiety
Given that cognitive-behaviour therapy has been shown to be effective in people 
with insomnia (Edinger, Wohlgemuth, Radtke, & Quillian, 2001b), it is essential 
to ascertain to what extent the above cognitive model applies to people with co- 
morbid anxiety disorders to apply theory to devising a non-pharmacological 
treatment strategy in this group.
Generalisability of much of the above research to people with insomnia, with or 
without co-morbid anxiety disorders, is difficult due to variations in diagnostic 
criteria of insomnia between samples. Some studies do not use a definition of 
insomnia. Also studies often do not report whether participants were screened for 
psychiatric co-morbidity and percentages of participants who meet criteria. In 
those that do, data is sometimes not compared between those who do, and those 
who do not have co-morbid psychiatric disorders. Table 1 illustrates these 
differences between the above studies.
The limited available research that has compared people with co-morbid anxiety 
disorders with those with insomnia and good sleepers on aspects of Harvey’s 
model will now be discussed
There is evidence to suggest that Harvey’s model does apply to people with co- 
morbid GAD, as this group has been shown to have higher levels of cognitive 
activity and a higher frequency of intrusive thoughts in the pre-sleep period than 
people with insomnia without GAD (Gendron, Blais & Morin, 1998). There is 
also evidence to suggest that people with GAD and insomnia tend to use 
cognitive avoidance strategies more often than people with insomnia only or 
good sleepers (Gendron et al., 1998), suggesting that similar thought control 
strategies may be contributing to maintenance of the insomnia in this group also. 
Unfortunately, the thought avoidance questionnaire used is not referenced and 
therefore, the similarity of this scale to the TCQ-I thought suppression scale 
could not be ascertained. This research was limited to people with co-morbid 
GAD only, and may not generalise to people with other anxiety disorders. The
185
Major research project: introduction
Table 1: Use o f formal diagnostic criteria to diagnose insomnia and psychiatric
co-morbidity in studies described above
Authors Were formal criteria used for 
diagnosis of insomnia?
Were participants screened 
for psychiatric co­
morbidity?
Lichstein & 
Rosenthal (1980)
No, the authors report that 
participants “satisfied 
conservative criteria for 
insomnia”, but do not specify 
what this is
Not reported
Nicassio et al. 
(1985)
No, used >30 minute sleep-onset 
latency on every night per week 
as cut-off and added that 
participants must have 
impairment in mood and 
functioning as a result of 
sleeping difficulty (NB: similar 
to DSM-IV criteria)
Not reported
VanEgeren et al. 
(1983)
No, used >45 minute sleep-onset 
latency as cut-off
Not reported, but excluded 
participants who were 
receiving psychotherapy
Wicklow & Espie 
(2000)
Yes, ICSD Yes, and excluded from 
study
Fichten et al. 
(1998)
No, used cut-off measure on a 
questionnaire
Not reported
Harvey (2000a) Yes, DSM-IV Unclear, but reported 10% of 
sample had received previous 
psychological treatment
Harvey (2001) Yes, DSM-IV Unclear, but reported 10% of 
sample had received previous 
psychological treatment
Harvey (2002) Yes, DSM-IV Yes, using DSM-IV, 
percentages described, but 
results not compared between 
those with and without co­
morbidity
Gendron et al. 
(1999)
Yes, DSM-IV Yes, participants with GAD 
were identified and analysed 
separately.
Morin et al. (1993) No, but used cut-off criteria as 
>30 minute sleep-onset latency 
for at least three nights per week. 
Used at least one night’s 
polysomnography to verify this
Yes, using DSM-IV: 72% 
had Primary Insomnia; 28% 
had Insomnia secondary to 
medical or psychological 
disorders, but results were 
not compared between the 
two groups
Edinger et al. 
(2001)
Yes, DSM-III-R Yes, using DSM-III-R, and 
excluded from study
study did not include a group with GAD but no insomnia and therefore was not 
able to highlight cognitive factors that differ between people with GAD plus
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insomnia and people with GAD only. Such a comparison would be important to 
discover factors specific to the maintenance of insomnia in people with anxiety.
Other research suggests that there might be qualitative differences in the 
maintenance of insomnia in people with co-morbid anxiety. Twenty-six percent 
of people with panic disorder, compared with none of healthy controls, reported 
sleeping difficulties because they “could not breathe comfortably” (Stein et al.,
1993). This might suggest that night-time panic cognitions could be a maintaining 
factor in insomnia in people with co-morbid panic disorder; however, the 
research did not employ a group of people with insomnia only, and so 
comparisons could not be made. Although previous research on thought content 
in people with insomnia only did not find evidence of panic disorder cognitions, 
they were not specifically assessed for, and therefore, the possibility that they 
experience these kinds of cognitions cannot be excluded. Also, this research 
looked only at people with panic disorder, and therefore it is unknown whether 
people with other anxiety disorders experience night-time anxiety cognitions that 
interfere with sleep.
Whether people with insomnia and co-morbid anxiety disorders hold unhelpful 
beliefs about sleep that might be contributing to the maintenance of insomnia is 
unknown.
In summary, very little research has been conducted into maintaining factors of 
insomnia in people with co-morbid anxiety. Evidence from the Gendron et al.
(1998) study suggests that the increased negative cognitive arousal is present in 
both types of insomnia, but occurs to a greater extent in people with additional 
co-morbid anxiety disorder (GAD). This would suggest that the elements of 
increased cognitive arousal in Harvey’s model would also be applicable to people 
with co-morbid anxiety disorder. Evidence also suggests there may be additional 
contributory factors in the maintenance of insomnia in people with co-morbid 
anxiety. For example, Stein et al.’s (1993) report that people with co-morbid 
anxiety disorder (PD) experience night-time cognitions related to their anxiety 
disorder, suggests that other (possibly additional) maintaining factors exist in this 
population. This would suggest that Harvey’s model might need modification to
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include these possible additional factors in people with co-morbid anxiety 
disorder.
The applicability of Harvey’s model to people with co-morbid anxiety disorder is 
the subject of the present research. It should be noted that a full evaluation of the 
model is beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, aspects that have direct 
treatment implications: cognitive arousal and content, thought control strategies 
and beliefs about sleep are investigated.
Aims of present research
The aim of the present research was to consider four aspects of Harvey’s model; 
higher cognitive arousal, sleep-related thought content, use of unhelpful thought 
control strategies and endorsement of unhelpful beliefs about sleep. In particular 
to ascertain whether they are also found in people with insomnia plus co-morbid 
anxiety disorders. That is, it aimed to determine whether people with insomnia 
plus co-morbid anxiety disorders showed similarly high levels of cognitive 
arousal, sleep-related thoughts, use of unhelpful thought control strategies and 
unhelpful beliefs about sleep compared to people with insomnia only, and relative 
to good sleepers. A related aim was also to test the ability of the four aspects of 
the model to distinguish between people with insomnia plus co-morbid anxiety 
and people with anxiety only. If the model was specific to the maintenance of 
insomnia, one might expect people with insomnia plus anxiety to have higher 
night-time cognitive arousal, more sleep-related thoughts, higher use of unhelpful 
thought control strategies, and endorse more strongly unhelpful beliefs about 
sleep, compared with people with anxiety only (and no insomnia). Such a 
distinction, if  found, would lend further support to the four aspects of the model 
as being implicated in the maintenance of insomnia.
1: Cognitive arousal
Does Harvey’s (2002) suggestion that people with insomnia experience increased 
cognitive arousal at bedtime apply to people with co-morbid anxiety? If so, is this 
higher in people with co-morbid anxiety disorders than people with insomnia
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only (as would be predicted from the GAD study; Gendron et al., 1998)? Do 
people with anxiety only experience less cognitive arousal at bedtime than people 
with anxiety plus insomnia?
2: Thought content
a) Are sleep-related thoughts reported as much by people with insomnia plus co- 
morbid anxiety as people with insomnia only, and more than people with anxiety 
only or good sleepers? Are anxiety-related thoughts reported more by people with 
co-morbid anxiety than people with insomnia only?
b) Is amount of time/proportion of time taken up by sleep-related thoughts 
similar between people with insomnia, with or without co-morbid anxiety, and 
less than those with anxiety only or good sleepers. Is amount of time/proportion 
of time taken up by anxiety-related thoughts greater in people with insomnia plus 
co-morbid anxiety compared with people with insomnia only?
c) In those who do think sleep-related or anxiety related thoughts, do people with 
insomnia plus co-morbid anxiety and people with insomnia only experience these 
thoughts as more distressing at bedtime compared with people with anxiety only 
or good sleepers?
3: Thought control
Do people with insomnia plus co-morbid anxiety use the same thought control 
strategies and as frequently as people with insomnia, and more frequently than 
people with anxiety only or good sleepers?
4: Beliefs about sleep
Do people with insomnia plus anxiety hold similar levels of unhelpful beliefs 
about sleep as people with insomnia only, and at levels greater than people with 
anxiety only or good sleepers?
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Method
Measures
Background information was collected regarding gender, age, and years of 
education.
Diagnosis o f insomnia
Insomnia was diagnosed using the Interview for the Diagnosis of Insomnia (IDI; 
appendix 1), based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual- fourth edition 
(DSM-IV) criteria for insomnia (appendix 2) (American Psychiatric Association,
1994), which requires the person to experience difficulty in initiating or 
maintaining sleep, or nonrestorative sleep for at least one month. DSM-IV criteria 
were chosen over ICSD classification systems, as DSM-IV does not rely on 
polysonmnographic data for diagnosis, and thus was within the scope of this 
study. In addition, DSM-IV requires that a person experiences clinically 
significant distress in relation to their sleep complaint or impairment in 
functioning, a criterion which is likely to be a relevant inclusion to research 
attempting to address how something should be treated. A further advantage of 
using DSM-IV criteria is that it is widely used in other published studies looking 
at cognitive factors in insomnia (e.g. Harvey, 2000a), enabling comparisons with 
other literature. Research suggests that diagnostic interviews have high levels of 
inter-rater agreement (over 90%; kappa over 80%) for insomnia diagnoses and 
show good concordance with polysomnographic data (Schramm, Hohagen, 
Grasshoff, Riemann, Hajak, Weess et al., 1993). The IDI is in the process of 
being validated. Although the DSM-IV and therefore the IDI allows 
differentiation between primary insomnia, and insomnia secondary to mental 
health problems, this distinction was not made in the present research. This was 
because such a diagnostic distinction is both difficult to make (Nowell, Buysse, 
Reynolds, Hauri, Roth et al., 1997) and varies in reliability (Buysse, Reynolds, 
Hauri, Roth, Stephanski et al., 1994). Nevertheless, participants were only 
included if their sleep problem alone caused significant impairment in daily
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functioning i.e. the impairment was not explained by any other mental health 
difficulties.
Diagnosis o f anxiety
The anxiety section of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM (Spitzer, 
Williams, Gibbon & First, 1990), a structured interview for the diagnosis of 
psychiatric disorders according to DSM, was used to obtain diagnostic 
information for current (in the last month) anxiety disorders (lifetime disorders 
were not included as the research involved current status). Its modular approach 
to diagnosis of different disorders allows adaptation to include only sections of 
relevant interest (Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon & First, 1992). Research suggests 
that the SCID has fair inter-rater agreement (kappa values of between 0.5 and 
0.7) for diagnoses of panic disorder, social phobia, simple phobia and obsessive 
compulsive disorder. Inter-rater agreement was poor for agoraphobia without 
panic disorder (kappa = 0.48). Insufficient data were available for generalised 
anxiety disorder (Williams, Gibbon, First, Spitzer, Davies, Borus, et al., 1992). In 
another study of patients with symptoms of panic disorder, inter-rater agreement 
was very good (kappa = 0.87) (Williams, Spitzer & Gibbon, 1992). The research 
version of the SCID, rather than the clinician version, was chosen as it contains 
diagnostic questions for Social Phobia, Agoraphobia Without History of Panic 
Disorder, Specific Phobia and Generalized Anxiety Disorder, which are not in the 
clinician version.
Research suggests that telephone administration of the SCID may result in false 
negative diagnoses compared with in-person administration (Cacciola, Alterman, 
Rutherford, McKay & May, 1999); however this was based on a community 
sample and had low base rates of disorder in the sample. In contrast, using a 
different interview method, Rohde, Lewinsohn & Seeley (1997) reported 
excellent agreement between telephone and face-to-face DSM anxiety disorder 
diagnoses (Kappa = 0.84) and concluded “assessment of anxiety disorders is 
unaffected by interview method” (p. 1596). The consideration of a possible bias 
by method of data collection was balanced against the need to allow participants 
to participate over the telephone in order to boost recruitment. Cacciola et al.
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(1999) suggested that rapport building may improve comparability between the 
two administration conditions. Therefore, the SCID was the last measure to be 
used, to enable rapport to be established over administration of the other 
measures.
Measures o f anxiety and depression
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
(appendix 3) was used to collect descriptive information on the severity of any 
anxiety or depression. The HADS was chosen over the separate Beck Depression 
(BDI) and Anxiety (BAI) Inventories as it was shorter to complete. Also, as it 
was intended to measure symptoms only associated with mood, and not those that 
could also be due to physical problems, it was judged to be more appropriate for 
those with sleep problems, who might score high on the somatic items of the 
BDI. The HADS has acceptable reliability (Crawford, Henry, Crombie & Taylor, 
2001) and correlations with other measures of anxiety and depression were 
medium to strong (0.60-0.80) suggesting good validity (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug & 
Neckelmann, 2002).
Aim 1: Measure o f  cognitive arousal
The Sleep Disturbance Questionnaire (SDQ; Espie, Brooks & Lindsay, 1989) 
(appendix 4), developed in order to assess people with insomnia, was used to 
collect information regarding levels of cognitive arousal experienced by 
participants prior to sleep. The SDQ contains 12 items, each rated by participants 
for degree of descriptiveness of their sleep pattern on a five-point scale, ranging 
from “never true” to “very often true”. It yields three factors: “mental anxiety”, 
“sleep pattern problem”, and “physical tension”. There are no data available 
regarding reliability or internal consistency. People with insomnia rate “mental 
anxiety” items most highly (Espie et al., 1989; Harvey 2000).
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Aim 2: Measure o f thought content
Measures of thought content available in the literature were not deemed to be 
suitable for this study as they did not include anxiety-related cognitions. In-vivo 
collection of thought content (e.g. Wicklow & Espie, 2000), which may have 
highlighted anxiety-related cognitions, was considered, but the procedure itself 
may affect cognitions and was also deemed impractical given the large numbers 
needed for the study. Therefore, it was necessary to devise a new measure for the 
purpose of the study.
Thought content was measured by asking participants an open-ended question 
about the thoughts that they are having prior to going to sleep, and whilst awake 
in the night. The previous night was chosen to maximise ease and accuracy of 
recall. In order to answer the specific hypotheses about whether cognitions were 
sleep- or anxiety-related, probe questions were devised to ask specifically about 
these areas. In devising the wording of the questionnaire, DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) was consulted to obtain summaries of cognitions 
associated with the different anxiety disorders. In choosing the wording of the 
sleep-related prompt, the literature on sleep-related cognitions was considered. 
One prompt was included in the questionnaire for each anxiety disorder (panic 
disorder, agoraphobia, GAD, OCD and social phobia), plus one prompt for sleep 
related cognition. Items were shown to a specialist CBT practitioner to check 
content validity. The thought content measure is shown in appendix 5.
Literature suggests that frequency of thought occurrence differentiates between 
people with insomnia and good sleepers (Harvey, 2000). Therefore, participants 
were asked to rate the length of time spent thinking about these thoughts (as in 
Harvey, 2000), and asked to estimate total time awake. This allowed calculation 
of the proportion of time taken up by certain thoughts and thus data would not be 
confounded by increased thinking time likely to be experienced by the insomnia 
groups (Morin, 1993).
As it is thought that emotional appraisal, rather than thought content per se, is key 
in the maintenance of psychological disorders (Clark & Purdon, 1995), it was
193
Major research project: method
considered important to include a measurement of this in the present study. 
Previous research has required participants to rate their thoughts on a variety of 
descriptive scales in order to measure emotional meaning ascribed to thoughts, 
for example, controllability, discomfort, unpleasantness (Clark & Purdon, 1995). 
In measurement of the emotional meaning ascribed to thoughts in the present 
study the term “distressing” was adopted, as this is a term used by Clark & 
Purdon (1995) in their description of the kind of thoughts that maintain 
psychological disorders. It was also thought that “distress” might capture the 
emotional meaning in general, rather than specific terms. Therefore, participants 
were asked to rate each thought in terms of how distressing it was on a scale of 0 
to 100 (0 = not at all distressing, 100 = the most distressing it could be).
The thought content measure was piloted on four people (non-clinical sample) to 
ascertain its comprehensibility and usability. As a result examples were given in 
addition to some of the prompts.
Aim 3: Measure o f thought control
The Thought Control Questionnaire -  Insomnia (TCQ-I; appendix 6) was used to 
measure use of strategies to deal with thoughts experienced in the pre-sleep 
period. The TCQ-I was developed from the TCQ (Wells & Davies, 1994), which 
measures thought control strategies used in general. The TCQ requires rating of 
use of particular strategies on a four-point scale (Never, Sometimes, Often, 
Almost Always). The original TCQ was re-worded to ask about thoughts in the 
pre-sleep period, and the questionnaire was supplemented with 13 additional 
items relevant to sleep. Suppression and replacement formed one scale of 
“distraction” in the original TCQ, but were separated given recent differentiation 
between different types of thought suppression (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; 
cited in Harvey, 2001). The TCQ-I contains 43 items and yields six sub-scales; 
suppression, replacement, reappraisal, worry, punishment and social control. The 
sub-scales of suppression, worry and punishment have been shown to 
differentiate people with insomnia from good sleepers (Harvey, 2001). The 
original TCQ sub-scales showed moderately high internal consistency (Wells & 
Davies. 1994). Reliability data were not available for the TCQ-I.
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Aim 4: Measure o f beliefs about sleep
The shorter 10-item of the Dysfunctional Beliefs and Attitudes about Sleep scale 
(DBAS-10; Morin, Stone, Trinkle, Mercer & Remsberg, 1993) (appendix 7) was 
used in order to measure participants attitudes about sleep and its function. The 
DBAS-10 is a shorter version of the full, 30-item, DBAS. The 10 items were 
chosen for their sensitivity to improvement following cognitive treatment for 
insomnia (Espie et al., 2000). The DBAS-10 correlates highly with the full DBAS 
(r = 0.83; Espie, Inglis, Harvey & Tessier, 2000) and has acceptable internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.69; Espie et al., 2000). Reliability data were 
not available for the DBAS-10. Both the DBAS and the DBAS-10 have been 
shown to discriminate people with insomnia from good sleepers (Edinger & 
Wohlgemuth, 2001). Solutions to factor analysis of the DBAS have not been 
consistent across studies (Espie et al., 2000; Edinger & Wohlgemuth, 2001) and 
therefore, a mean of all 10 items was used, as in Edinger & Wohlgemuth (2001).
Participants
All participants were in the 18 to 65 age range.
Participants in both the “anxiety only” and “anxiety plus insomnia” were people 
attending a Community Mental Health Team and had one or more of the 
following anxiety disorders: obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), generalised 
anxiety disorder (GAD), social phobia, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
panic disorder with or without agoraphobia, or simple phobia. Participants with 
sleep disturbance due to nightmares occurring in the context of PTSD were 
excluded. The “anxiety plus insomnia” met DSM-IV criteria for Primary 
Insomnia in addition.
Participants in the “insomnia only” group were people who met DSM-IV criteria 
for Primary Insomnia.
Participants in the “good sleeper” group were people who defined themselves as 
sleeping “very well”, as opposed to “moderately well” or “not very well” 
(screening question on the IDI).
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Procedure
Recruitment
• “Anxiety only ” and “anxiety plus insomnia ” participants
“Anxiety only” and “anxiety plus insomnia” participants were recruited via a 
Community Mental Health Team (CMHT). CMHT team members gave clients 
who met the above criteria information packs, containing an information sheet 
(appendix 8), a consent form (appendix 9) and a freepost envelope during 
consultation sessions. Participants who opted in to the study by returning the 
consent form were then contacted by the researcher. Participants were mostly 
seen at the CMHT; however there were some exceptions to this. In order not to 
exclude participants whose work hours did not permit them to come into the 
CMHT in person, they were offered the option of answering the questions over 
the telephone and questionnaires by post.
•  “Insomnia only”participants
“Insomnia only” participants were recruited via two means. Information packs, 
containing an information sheet (appendix 10) and a consent form (appendix 11) 
were given to clients who met the criteria at a specialist diagnostic and research 
sleep service during consultations. The sleep service used ICSD criteria in their 
practice and therefore guidelines were given to include people diagnosed with 
sleep-state misperception, psychophysiological insomnia and idiopathic 
insomnia, thought to be subsumed under the DSM-IV category of Primary 
Insomnia (Reynolds, Kupfer, Buysse, Cobel & Yeager, 1991). Participants were 
also recruited via advertisements placed around the University (via departmental 
email lists, posters and a student newspaper) for people who had difficulty 
sleeping. People who replied to the advertisement were sent an information sheet 
(appendix 12) and a consent form (appendix 13).
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As an incentive to participate, participants in the above three groups were given a 
self-help booklet on sleeping difficulties (appendix 14). The booklet was 
designed on the basis of literature that reviewed treatment efficacy in insomnia 
(Morin, Culbert & Schwartz, 1994; cited in Ballantyne, 2000) and designed for 
use with clients with sleeping difficulties (Ballantyne, 2000). Participants were 
also given feedback about their responses.
•  “Good sleeper” participants
Participants for the “good sleeper” group were recruited via trainees on the 
author’s course, who were asked to pass on information about the study to anyone 
who met the criteria. People who expressed an interest in taking part were then 
sent an information sheet (appendix 15) and consent form (appendix 13). Care 
was taken not to include qualified, or trainee psychologists, as they may have 
been aware of the research aims and thus there was a potential for their responses 
to subject to demand characteristics.
Data collection
All participants completed all measures, with the exception of the good sleeper 
group, who did not complete the anxiety section of the SCID. As base rates of 
anxiety disorders in the general population are low, the extra time to complete 
this measure was considered to be unnecessary.
Power analysis
The number of participants required for the study was calculated by doing a 
power analysis using GPOWER (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992). The effect sizes were 
calculated for the TCQ-I (Harvey, 2001), the only questionnaire for which the 
necessary data was available at the time of planning the study, and the lowest 
effect size was used in the calculation. Of the three scales which showed a 
significant difference between people with insomnia and controls, the suppression 
scale in Harvey (2001) yielded the lowest effect size on t-test of 0.58, a medium 
effect size. Therefore, a medium effect size was used to calculate number of
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participants needed for ANOVA (medium effect size in ANOVA = 0.25). Power 
criteria was set at 0.80 and alpha was set at 0.05. Power analysis indicated that 
180 participants, 45 in each group, were required. A Power analysis was also 
conducted on the basis of the largest effect size in Harvey’s sample. This 
indicated that 76 participants, 19 in each group, were required.
Staff at the CMHT thought approximately two hundred of their clients met the 
research criteria. Staff at the Sleep Clinic said that 45 people did meet the 
research criteria.
Two hundred and sixty information packs were given to staff at the CMHT for 
distribution to clients meeting the criteria. Fifty packs were initially given to staff 
at the Sleep Clinic.
Ethical approval
The research was approved by East Surrey Local Ethics Research Committee and 
University of Surrey ethics committee (appendices 16 and 17 respectively).
Data analysis
Data were analysed using the statistical package SPSS -  version 10. Between- 
groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was planned to investigate differences 
between groups on the TCQ-I1, SDQ and DBAS-10. ANOVA assumes that data 
are normally distributed and variances between the groups are equal (Coolican, 
1990). Therefore, prior to analysis, histograms were performed on variables to 
check for normal distribution and the assumption of equal variances was checked. 
Where assumptions were not met, variables were either transformed in order to 
meet assumptions, or if this was not possible, were analysed using Kruskall- 
Wallis, the non-parametric equivalent of ANOVA.
1 ANOVA is a parametric test and thus should only be used on data that is at least at the interval 
level of measurement (Coolican, 1990). It could be argued that frequency data on TCQ-I and the 
degree of truth statements on the SDQ are nominal data, and as such should be analysed by non- 
parametric tests; however, previous research has analysed the TCQ-I with parametric statistics 
(Harvey, 2001).
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Thought content questionnaire was analysed by first grouping thoughts into three 
categories: sleep-related, anxiety-related, and other. For definitions, see appendix 
18. A second rater (a Clinical Psychologist) rated the transcripts blind to 
participant category. Any thoughts that were difficult to classify were discussed 
between raters. Percentage of participants in each group thinking sleep-related 
thoughts was subject to a Chi-Square test, as was percentage thinking anxiety- 
related thoughts. Between-groups ANOVA was planned to investigate 
differences between groups on amount of time spent thinking different categories 
of thoughts, and mean proportion of total time awake spent thinking different 
categories of thoughts. Mean distress ratings were calculated for each participant 
for both sleep-related and anxiety related thoughts and were subject to a between- 
groups ANOVA. Only those participants who thought sleep-related thoughts (or 
anxiety-related thoughts respectively) were included in this type of analysis.
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Results
Participants
In total 62 participants were recruited into the study.
Of 88 information packs given to the CMHT group, 20 opted into the study, 
giving a response rate of 22.7%. Two participants did not attend their 
appointments and thus were lost from the study, leaving 18 CMHT participants. 
Fourteen met DSM-IV criteria for insomnia. Four did not meet the criteria for 
insomnia. It should be noted that those who did not meet the criteria for insomnia 
did experience some kind of sleeping difficulty, but typically did not meet criteria 
B, that the sleeping difficulty causes significant distress or impairment in 
functioning.
Although 45 people had been identified at the sleep clinic, only six packs were 
given out. This was due to the fact that once staff at the sleep clinic had examined 
their prospective participants’ details more closely, they noted that most of the 45 
identified were judged to have mental health problems, which was an exclusion 
criteria for the insomnia only group. Of the six packs given out to people at the 
sleep clinic, four responded, thus giving a response rate of 67%. All four met the 
criteria for insomnia. Thirty-nine participants responded to the advertisements 
around the University for people who experienced sleeping difficulties. Of these, 
17 did not opt into the study, three were excluded due to failure to meet 
diagnostic criteria, one was excluded due to being over the age limit, leaving 18. 
In total there were 22 participants in the insomnia group.
Twenty-nine people responded to the request for people who slept very well. Of 
these three did not opt into the study, and four were excluded because they did 
not meet criteria (they slept only “moderately well”, instead of “very well”). 
Therefore, 22 people who described themselves as sleeping “very well” were 
recruited into the good sleeper group.
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Data screening
Variables were screened for whether they were normally distributed and equal 
variances between the groups. Where data did not meet these criteria, they were 
either transformed where possible (as in the case of TCQ Worry and TCQ 
Punishment scores), or subject to non-parametric statistical tests (in the case of 
thought content variables).
Validation of eroup status
Of the fourteen people in the CMHT group with insomnia, 13 met formal criteria 
for an anxiety disorder, and one did not. Of the four in the CMHT group without 
insomnia, all of them also met criteria for an anxiety disorder.
Of the planned insomnia group (recruited via the sleep clinic and University), 
eight also met formal diagnostic criteria for an anxiety disorder. Numbers in each 
group who met diagnostic criteria are shown in table 2.
Because some of the participants recruited via the sleep clinic or University also 
met anxiety disorder criteria, the groups were not as they had originally been 
defined. Therefore, the analysis was conducted in two separate ways. Firstly, the 
groups were analysed as originally planned, comparing CMHT participants with 
and without insomnia, those recruited via the sleep clinic or University (referred 
to as Other Insomnia), and good sleepers. This comparison would test the 
hypotheses in relation to applicability of the model of insomnia in relation to 
different participant groups. Secondly, the participants were re-grouped according 
to whether they had an anxiety disorder or not and whether they had insomnia or 
not, and compared with good sleepers. This comparison allowed a theoretical test 
of the hypothesis regarding applicability of the model to participants with co- 
morbid anxiety disorders.
Although descriptive statistics are shown for the CMHT No Insomnia group 
(anxiety only group), it was excluded from the statistical analyses due to small 
numbers.
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Table 2: Numbers in each group (and percentages o f total in group) who met
DSM anxiety disorder diagnostic criteria
CMHT Sleep clinic and 
university -  
insomnia (n = 22)
Insomnia (n = 14) No insomnia (n = 
4)
Panic
disorder
6 (42.9%) 1 (25.0%) 2(9.1%)
Agora­
phobia
7 (50%) 0 (0%) 2 (9.1%)
Social
phobia
4 (28.6%) 0 (0%) 3 (13.6%)
Specific
phobia
2 (14.3%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%)
OCD 6 (42.9%) 2 (50%) 1 (4.5%)
PTSD1 3 (21.4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
GAD2 6 (42.9%) 0 (0%) 5 (22.7%)
No anxiety 
disorder
1 (7.1%) 0 (0%) 14 (63.6%)
1 Data missing for two CMHT participants anc two insomnia only participants due to
discontinuation of SCID interview
2 Data missing for one CMHT participant and one insomnia only participant due to 
discontinuation of SCID interview
Analysis 1 : Comparison between groups based on source of recruitment and 
presence of insomnia
Background characteristics of the sample
Gender distribution, mean ages, HAD anxiety and depression scores of the 
groups are shown in table 3. CMHT participants had a higher mean age than the 
Other Insomnia and Good Sleeper groups, but group differences were not 
significant: F (2, 54) = 2.914, p = 0.063.
Participants recruited via the sleep clinic or University, and Good Sleepers tended 
to have more Years Education than the people in the CMHT groups. This was 
significant: Chi-Square = 27.780; df = 2; p < 0.00052.
HADS Anxiety scores tended to be the highest in the CMHT Insomnia group, 
followed by the Other Insomnia and CMHT no Insomnia group, followed by the
2 Although there was a difference between years in education between the groups, no research has 
found a link between years of education and insomnia.
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Good Sleepers. The group difference was significant: Chi-Square = 34.495; d f= 
2; p < 0.0005.
HADS Depression scores tended to be highest in the CMHT Insomnia group, 
followed by the CMHT no Insomnia group, followed by the Other Insomnia 
group, then the Good Sleepers. This difference was significant: Chi-Square = 
32.890; df=  2; p < 0.0005.
The difference between the CMHT Insomnia and the Other Insomnia group was 
larger on HADS Depression scores than on HADS Anxiety scores.
Table 3: Gender distribution, and mean ages, years o f education, HAD anxiety
and depression scores o f groups
CMHT Sleep clinic and 
University -  
insomnia 
(n = 22)
Good sleepers 
(n = 22)Insomnia 
(n = 14)
No insomnia 
(n = 4)
Gender: M : 
F
5 :9 3 : 1 11 : 11 9 : 13
Age
Mean (SD)
42.8 (12.9) 44.5 (11.2) 33.1 (10.7) 34.2 (13.7)
Years 
Education 
Mean (SD)
11.1(1.1) 12.0 (1.8) 17.2 (3.5) 16.7 (2.4)
HAD
Anxiety
score
Mean (SD)
14.0 (3.3) 9.0 (3.4) 9.4 (3.5) 5.2 (1.8)
HAD
Depression
score
Mean (SD)
11.2(4.0) 7.0 (2.7) 5.7 (3.1) 2.2 (1.9)
Aim 1: Cognitive arousal
Means and standard deviations for the groups on the three factors of the SDQ are 
shown in table 4.
The CMHT Insomnia group had the highest mean Mental Anxiety, followed by 
the Other Insomnia group, followed by the CMHT no Insomnia group, followed
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by the good sleepers. ANOVA revealed a significant group difference for Mental 
Anxiety, F(2, 55) = 49.707, p < 0.0005.
Table 4: Means and standard deviations o f SDQ factors by group
CMHT Other
insomnia (n = 
22)
Mean (SD)
Good sleeper 
(n = 22) 
Mean (SD)
Insomnia 
(n = 14) 
Mean (SD)
No insomnia 
(n = 4)
Mean (SD)
SDQ
Mental
Anxiety
23.6 (3.4) 19.0 (2.4) 22.5 (4.7) 12.1 (3.6)
SDQ
Sleep
pattern
problem
10.6 (2.7) 8.0 (1.4) 10.0 (2.4) 5.5 (1.8)
SDQ
Physical
Tension
11.7(2.3) 8.0 (1.4) 9.8 (2.3) 5.4 (1.1)
Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant differences between the CMHT 
Insomnia group and the Good Sleepers (p < 0.0005) and between the Other 
Insomnia group and the Good Sleepers (p < 0.0005). There were no significant 
differences between the CMHT insomnia group and the Other Insomnia group (p 
= 0.737).
The CMHT Insomnia group also had the highest mean Sleep Pattern Problem, 
followed closely by the Other Insomnia group, then the CMHT no Insomnia 
group, then the Good Sleepers. Group differences were significant: F (2,55) = 
29.304, p < 0.0005. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant differences between 
the CMHT Insomnia group and the Good Sleepers (p < 0.0005), and between the 
Other Insomnia group and the Good Sleepers (p < 0.0005), but differences 
between the CMHT Insomnia and Other Insomnia groups were not significant (p 
= 0.779).
The CMHT Insomnia group had the highest mean Physical Tension score, 
followed by the Other Insomnia group, then the CMHT no Insomnia group, then 
the Good Sleepers. There was a significant group difference: Chi-Square =
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37.831; df = 2; p < 0.0005. Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests, with correction for 
multiple comparisons (p < 0.017) were performed. There were significant 
differences between the CMHT Insomnia group and Good Sleepers (Z = 5.005; p 
< 0.0005), and between the Other Insomnia group and Good Sleepers (Z = 5.124; 
p < 0.0005), but the difference between the CMHT Insomnia and Other Insomnia 
groups did not reach the level required for significance (Z = 2.313; p = 0.021).
Aim 2: Thought content
A second rater rated fifty-six of the sixty-two transcripts. Agreement was 78.3% 
for sleep-related thoughts, 70.1% for anxiety-related thoughts, and 69.1% for 
other thoughts.
Sleep-related thoughts
Thought content data are shown in table 5. Time spent thinking about thoughts 
was analysed in two ways: firstly, as other researchers have done, by taking total 
amount of time spent thinking about a thought (e.g. Harvey, 2000), and secondly, 
by taking proportion of total time awake spent thinking about a thought, as it has 
been suggested that total time spent may be confounded by amount of total time 
awake (e.g. Morin, 1993).
The highest percentage of participants thinking sleep-related thoughts was in the 
CMHT Insomnia and the Other Insomnia group, followed by the CMHT no 
Insomnia group, then the Good Sleeper group. Group differences were 
significant: x2 = 17.818; df = 2; p < 0.0005. Paired chi-square tests revealed that 
group differences existed between the CMHT Insomnia and the Good Sleeper 
groups (x2 = 9.972; df = 1; p = 0.002), and between the Other Insomnia and Good 
Sleeper groups (x2 = 13.538; df = 1; p < 0.0005). There was no significant 
difference between the CMHT Insomnia and Other Insomnia groups (%2 = 0.003; 
d f = l ; p  = 0.956).
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Mean total time spent thinking about sleep-related thoughts was highest in the 
CMHT Insomnia group, followed by the Other Insomnia group, then the CMHT 
no Insomnia group, then the Good Sleeper group. Group differences were 
significant: Chi-Square = 21.393; df = 2; p < 0.0005. Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U 
Table 5: Percentage thinking sleep-related thoughts and time spent thinking
sleep-related thoughts by group o f participant
CMHT Other 
insomnia 
(n = 22)
Good 
sleeper 
(n = 22)
Insomnia 
(n = 13)
No
insomnia 
(n = 4)
Percentage in 
group reporting 
sleep-related 
thoughts (n)
85.7% (n=  12) 75% (n = 3) 86.4% (n = 
19)
31.8% (n = 
7)
Time (in 
minutes) spent 
thinking sleep- 
related thoughts 
Mean (SD)
27.1 (24.1) 13.9 (27.4) 15.6(22.3) 1.4 (3.2)
Percentage of 
total time awake 
spent thinking 
sleep-related 
thoughts 
Mean (SD)
1.2 (1.1) 3.5 (3.7) 8.2 (23.6) 6.6 (21.4)
Mean distress 
rating for sleep- 
related thoughts 
/100
Mean (SD)
51.8(25.5) 
(N = 12)
30.6 (22.4) 
(N = 3)
47.5 (28.1) 
(N = 19)
16.9(15.9) 
(N = 7)
tests corrected for multiple comparisons revealed significant differences between 
the CMHT Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p < 0.0005), and between the 
Other Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p < 0.0005). The difference 
between the CMHT Insomnia and Other Insomnia groups did not reach the level 
required for statistical significance (p = 0.890).
When taken as a percentage of total time awake, time spent thinking about sleep- 
related thoughts was highest in the Other Insomnia group, followed by the Good 
Sleepers, followed by the CMHT no Insomnia group. The CMHT Insomnia
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group spent the least percentage of time awake thinking sleep-related thoughts. 
Group differences were not significant: Chi-Square = 4.643; df = 2; p = 0.098.
Mean distress ratings for sleep-related thoughts was highest in the CMHT 
Insomnia group, followed closely by the Other Insomnia group, then the CMHT 
no Insomnia group, then the Good Sleepers. Group differences were significant: 
F (2, 35) = 4.628, p = 0.160. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant differences 
between the CMHT Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p = 0.019), and 
between the Other Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p = 0.028). There 
were no significant differences between the two insomnia groups (p = 0.895).
Anxiety-related thoughts
Table 6: Percentage thinking anxiety-related thoughts and time spent thinking
anxiety-related thoughts by group o f participant
CMHT Other 
insomnia 
(n = 22)
Good sleeper 
(n = 22)Insomnia 
(n = 13)
No
insomnia 
(n = 4)
Percentage in 
group reporting 
anxiety-related 
thoughts (n)
78.6% (11) 50% (2) 86.4% (19) 31.8% (7)
Time (in minutes) 
spent thinking 
anxiety-related 
thoughts 
Mean (SD)
55.2 (52.2) 8.8 (14.4) 29.4 (35.0) 3.1 (6.9)
Percentage of time 
of total time 
awake spent 
thinking anxiety- 
related thoughts 
Mean (SD)
38.0 (29.0) 6.9 (8.3) 27.9 (27.8) 13.6 (23.4)
Mean distress 
rating for anxiety- 
related thoughts / 
100
Mean (SD)
67.7(25.1) 
(N = 11)
30.0 (14.1) 
(N = 2)
45.2 (22.6) 
(N = 19)
33.9(23.1) 
(N = 7)
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Percentage of people reporting anxiety-related thoughts was highest in the Other 
Insomnia group, followed closely by the Insomnia group. A lower percentage of 
people in the CMHT no Insomnia group reported thinking anxiety-related 
thoughts than the other two insomnia groups. The Good Sleeper group had the 
lowest percentage of people reporting anxiety-related thoughts. The differences in 
percentages reporting anxiety-related thoughts across the groups was significant: 
%2 = 15.914; df = 2; p < 0.0005. Paired chi-square tests revealed that group 
differences existed between the CMHT Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups 
(%2 = 7.481; df = 1; p = 0.006), and between the Other Insomnia and Good 
Sleeper groups (%2 = 13.538; df = 1; p < 0.0005). There was no significant 
difference between the CMHT Insomnia and Other Insomnia groups (% = 0.374; 
d f = l ; p  = 0.541).
Time spent thinking anxiety-related thoughts was highest in the CMHT Insomnia 
group, followed by the Other Insomnia group, followed by the CMHT no 
Insomnia group, then the Good Sleepers. Group differences were significant: Chi- 
Square = 19.437; df = 2; p < 0.0005. Post-hoc comparisons with significance 
level adjusted for multiple comparisons (p < 0.017) revealed significant 
differences between the CMHT Insomnia and Good Sleeper groups, Z = 3.730, p 
< 0.0005, and between the Other Insomnia and Good Sleeper groups, Z = 3.740, 
p < 0.0005. There were no significant differences between the CMHT Insomnia 
and Other Insomnia groups, Z = 1.317, p = 0.188.
Percentage of time spent thinking anxiety-related thoughts was highest in the 
CMHT Insomnia group, followed by the Other Insomnia group, followed by the 
Good Sleepers, then the CMHT no Insomnia group. Group differences were 
significant: Chi-Square = 9.724; df = 2; p = 0.008. Post-hoc comparisons with 
significance level adjusted for multiple comparisons (p < 0.017) revealed 
significant differences between the CMHT Insomnia and Good Sleeper groups, Z 
= 2.656, p = 0.008, and between the Other Insomnia and Good Sleeper groups, Z 
= 2.612, p = 0.009. There were no significant differences between the CMHT 
Insomnia and Other Insomnia groups, Z = 1.001, p = 0.317.
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Mean distress rating for anxiety-related thoughts was highest in the CMHT 
Insomnia group, followed by the Other Insomnia group, followed by the Good 
Sleepers, then the Anxiety only group. Group differences were significant: F (2, 
34) = 5.206, p = 0.011. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant differences 
between the CMHT Insomnia and the Other Insomnia group (p = 0.041), and 
between the CMHT Insomnia and the Good Sleeper group (p = 0.014). There 
were no significant differences between the Other Insomnia and the Good Sleeper 
groups (p = 0.522).
Aim 3: Thought control
Means and standard deviations for the groups on the six sub-scales of the TCQ-I 
are shown in table 7.
Table 7: Means and standard deviations for the groups on the TCQ-I sub-scales
CMHT Other 
insomnia (n 
= 22)
Mean (SD)
Good sleeper 
(n = 22) 
Mean (SD)
Insomnia 
(n = 14) 
Mean (SD)
No insomnia 
(n -  4)
Mean (SD)
Worry (Max. 
score = 28)
16.1 (3.4)1 12.0 (1.7)2 12.5 (3.4) 9.3 (2.1)
Punishment 
(Max. score = 
24)
12.4 (3.9) 8.3 (2.6) 9.6 (3.0) 7.6 (1.8)
Social (Max. 
score = 28)
13.1 (4.2) 17.3 (3.4) 15.1 (4.7) 17.4 (2.8)
Suppression 
(Max. score = 
20)
11.4(2.5) 12.5 (3.3) 12.0 (2.5) 11.3(2.4)
Replacement 
(Max. score = 
36)
19.4 (3.4) 19.8 (4.6) 20.0 (4.8)'i 18.0(3.8)“
Reappraisal 
(Max. score = 
36)
19.1 (3.3) 19.3 (1.0) 20.6 (4.3) 19.1 (4.2)
Based o n n=  13
2 Based on n = 3
3 Based onn = 21
4 Based onn = 21
Mean Worry score was highest in the CMHT Insomnia group, followed by the 
Other Insomnia group and the CMHT no Insomnia group, followed by the Good
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Sleeper group. ANOVA revealed a significant group difference, F (2, 54) = 
24.557; p < 0.0005. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant differences between 
the CMHT Insomnia group and the Other Insomnia group (p = 0.006), between 
the CMHT Insomnia group and the Good Sleeper group (p < 0.0005), and 
between the Other Insomnia group and the Good Sleeper group (p < 0.0005).
Mean Punishment score was highest in the CMHT Insomnia group, followed by 
the Other Insomnia group, followed by the CMHT no Insomnia group, followed 
by the Good Sleeper group. ANOVA revealed a significant group difference, F 
(2, 55) = 12.382, p < 0.0005. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed significant differences 
between the CMHT Insomnia and the Other Insomnia groups (p = 0.024), 
between the CMHT Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p < 0.0005), and 
between the Other Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p = 0.035).
Mean score for the Social scale of the TCQ-I was highest for the CMHT no 
Insomnia group and the Good Sleeper group. It was slightly lower for the Other 
Insomnia group and lowest for the CMHT Insomnia group. ANOVA revealed a 
significant group difference, F (2, 55) = 5.176, p = 0.009. Post-hoc Tukey tests 
revealed significant differences between the CMHT Insomnia and the Good 
Sleeper groups (p = 0.007). There were no significant differences between the 
Other Insomnia group and either the Good Sleeper group (p = 0.148) or the 
CMHT Insomnia group (p = 0.303).
Mean scores for Suppression, Replacement and Reappraisal scales were 
comparable across the groups. ANOVA did not reveal any significant group 
differences for any of these three scales: F (2, 55) = 0.563, p = 0.573); F (2, 53) = 
1.274, p = 0.288; F (2, 55) = 0.969, p = 0.386 respectively.
Aim 4: Beliefs about sleep
Mean and standard deviations for the groups on the mean DBAS-10 score are 
shown in table 8.
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The CMHT Insomnia group had the highest mean score on the DBAS, followed 
closely by the Other Insomnia group, followed by the CMHT no Insomnia group, 
then the Good Sleeper group. ANOVA revealed a significant group difference, F 
(2, 54) = 19.208, p < 0.0005. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant 
differences between the CMHT Insomnia group and the Good Sleeper group (p < 
0.0005), and between the Other Insomnia group and the Good Sleeper group (p < 
0.0005). There was no significant difference between the CMHT Insomnia group 
and the Other Insomnia group (p = 0.965).
Table 8: Mean and standard deviation fo r  the groups on the mean DBAS-10
score
CMHT Other 
insomnia 
(n = 22)
Good sleeper 
(n = 22)Insomnia 
(n = 13)
No insomnia 
(n = 4)
DBAS
Mean
(SD)
65.8 (17.5) 51.4 (8.5) 64.6 (11.1) 41.2(14.6)
Analysis 2: Comparison between groups based on presence of anxiety 
disorder and presence of insomnia
Table 9: Numbers in each group (and percentages o f  total in group) who met
DSM anxiety disorder diagnostic criteria
Anxiety plus Insomnia 
(n = 21)
Anxiety only 
(n = 4)
Panic disorder 8 (38.1%) 1 (25%)
Agoraphobia 9 (42.9%) 0 (0%)
Social phobia 7 (33.3%) 0 (0%)
Specific phobia 2 (9.5%) 1 (25%)
OCD 7 (33.3%) 2 (50%)
PTSD1 3 (14.3%) 0 (0%)
GAD2 11 (52.4%) 0 (0%)
Data are unavailable for four participants in the anxiety plus insomnia group, who discontinued 
the interview
2 Data are unavailable for one participant in the anxiety plus insomnia group, who discontinued 
the interview
Groups were not significantly different in age. There was a tendency for the 
insomnia only and the Good Sleeper groups to have higher mean years spent in
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education than the anxiety groups. The difference between the groups was 
statistically significant: Chi Square = 11.999; df = 2; p = 0.002.
Mean HAD Anxiety score tended to be higher in the Anxiety plus Insomnia 
group, followed by the Anxiety only and Insomnia only groups. The Good 
Sleeper group had the lowest mean HADS Anxiety score. Group differences were 
significant: Chi-Square = 7.009; df = 2; p = 0.30. HADS Depression scores did 
not differ significantly across groups; Chi-Square = 4.184; df = 2; p = 0.123.
Table 10: Gender distribution, and mean ages, years o f education, HAD anxiety 
and depression scores o f groups__________________________________ ________________
Anxiety plus 
Insomnia 
(n = 21)
Anxiety only 
(n = 4)
Insomnia 
only 
(n = 15)
Good Sleeper 
(n = 22)
Gender: M : 
F
9 : 12 3 : 1 7 :8 9 : 13
Age
Mean (SD)
39.2 (12.7) 44.5 (11.2) 33.5 (11.4) 34.2 (13.7)
Years 
Education 
Mean (SD)
13.1 (3.5) 12.0 (1.8) 17.3 (3.7) 16.7 (2.4)
HAD
Anxiety
score
Mean (SD)
12.6 (3.7) 9.0 (3.4) 9.2 (3.8) 5.2 (1.8)
HAD
Depression
score
Mean (SD)
9.1 (4.8) 7.0 (2.7) 6.1 (3.2) 2.2 (1.9)
Aim 1: Cognitive arousal
Means and standard deviations for the groups on the three factors of the SDQ are 
shown in table 11.
Mean Mental Anxiety was highest in the Anxiety plus Insomnia group, followed 
by the Insomnia only group, followed by the Anxiety only group, followed by the 
Good Sleeper group. This group difference was significant, F (2, 55) = 55.645, p 
< 0.0005. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant group differences between the 
Good Sleeper group and both the Anxiety plus Insomnia (p < 0.0005) and 
Insomnia only group (p < 0.0005). The difference between the Anxiety plus
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Insomnia group and the Insomnia only group did not reach the level of statistical 
significance (p = 0.080).
Table 11: Means and standard deviations o f SDQ factors by group
Anxiety plus 
Insomnia 
(n = 21) 
Mean (SD)
Anxiety only 
(n = 4)
Mean (SD)
Insomnia only 
(n = 15)
Mean (SD)
Good Sleeper 
(n = 22)
Mean (SD)
SDQ
Mental
Anxiety
24.1 (3.6) 19.0 (2.4) 21.3 (4.6) 12.1 (3.6)
SDQ
Sleep
pattern
problem
11.0(2.5) 8.0 (1.4) 9.3 (2.1) 5.5 (1.8)
SDQ
Physical
Tension
11.0(2.7) 8.0 (1.4) 9.8 (1.9) 5.4(1.1)
The SDQ factors of Sleep Pattern Problem followed the same pattern. The group 
difference was also significant: F (2, 55) = 34.157, p < 0.001. Post-hoc testing 
revealed significant differences between the Good Sleeper group and both the 
Anxiety plus Insomnia (p < 0.0005) and Insomnia only (p < 0.0005) groups. The 
difference between the Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Insomnia only groups did 
not reach statistical significance (p = 0.067).
The Anxiety plus Insomnia group also had the highest mean score on the Physical 
Tension factor, followed by the Insomnia only, then the Anxiety only, then the 
Good Sleeper groups. The group difference was significant: Chi-Square = 36.138; 
df = 2: p < 0.0005. Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U Tests corrected for multiple 
comparisons (critial p < 0.017) revealed significant differences between the 
Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p < 0.0005), between the 
Insomnia only and the Good Sleeper groups (p < 0.0005), but not between the 
Anxiety plus Insomnia and Insomnia only groups (p = 0.108).
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These findings replicate the results of comparisons in analysis 1. Therefore, 
results did not differ, regardless of whether participants with insomnia were 
grouped based on source of recruitment or presence of anxiety disorder.
Aim 2: Thought content
Sleep-related thoughts
Table 12: Percentage thinking sleep-related thoughts and time spent thinking
sleep-related thoughts by group o f participant
Anxiety plus 
Insomnia 
(n = 21)
Anxiety 
only 
(n = 4)
Insomnia 
only 
(n = 15)
Good sleeper 
(n = 22)
Percentage in 
group
reporting sleep- 
related 
thoughts (n)
90.5% (n = 
19)
75.0% (n = 
3)
80.0% (n = 
12)
31.8% (n = 7)
Time (in 
minutes) spent 
thinking sleep- 
related 
thoughts 
Mean (SD)
25.7 (23.2) 13.9 (27.4) 12.7 (22.3) 1.4 (3.2)
Percentage of 
time of total 
time awake 
spent thinking 
sleep-related 
thoughts 
Mean (SD)
1.2 (1.0) 3.5 (3.7) 10.9 (27.7) 6.6 (21.4)
Mean distress 
rating for 
sleep-related 
thoughts /100  
Mean (SD)
57.7 (25.5) 
(N = 19)
30.6 (22.4) 
(N = 3)
35.6 (23.7) 
(N = 12)
16.9 (15.9) 
(N = 7)
The highest percentage of participants thinking sleep-related thoughts was in the 
Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Insomnia only group, followed by the Anxiety 
only group, then the Good Sleeper group. Group differences were significant: %2 
= 18.242; df = 2; p < 0.0005. Paired chi-square tests revealed that group 
differences existed between the Insomnia plus Anxiety and the Good Sleeper
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groups (x2 = 15.465; df = 1; p < 0 .0005), and between the Insomnia only and
Good Sleeper groups (x2 = 8.288; df = 1; p = 0.004). There was no significant
• • 2difference between the Anxiety plus Insomnia and Insomnia only groups (x =
0.803; d f = l ; p  = 0.370).
Mean total time spent thinking about sleep-related thoughts was highest in the 
Anxiety plus Insomnia group, followed by the Anxiety only group, then the 
Insomnia only group, then the Good Sleeper group. Group differences were 
significant: Chi-Square = 23.426; df = 2; p < 0.0005. Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U 
tests corrected for multiple comparisons revealed significant differences between 
the Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p < 0.0005), and 
between the Insomnia only and the Good Sleeper groups (p = 0.004). The 
difference between the anxiety plus insomnia and insomnia only groups did not 
reach the level required for statistical significance (p = 0.026).
When taken as a percentage of total time awake, time spent thinking about sleep- 
related thoughts was highest in the Insomnia only group, followed by the Good 
Sleepers, followed by the Anxiety only group. The Anxiety plus Insomnia group 
spent the least percentage of time awake thinking sleep-related thoughts. Group 
differences were not significant: Chi-Square = 4.581; df = 2; p = 0.101.
Mean distress rating for sleep-related thoughts was highest in the Anxiety plus 
Insomnia group, followed by the Insomnia only group, then the Anxiety only 
group, followed by the Good Sleeper group. Group differences were significant: 
F (2, 35) = 8.592, p = 0.001. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant differences 
between the Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p = 0.001), and 
between the Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Insomnia only group (p = 0.039). 
There were no significant differences between the Insomnia only and the Good 
Sleeper groups (p = 0.234).
These results replicate those in analysis 1. Therefore, results did not differ 
whether participants with insomnia were grouped on the basis of source of 
recruitment, or on the basis of presence of DSM anxiety disorder diagnosis.
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Anxiety-related thoughts
Table 13: Percentage thinking anxiety-related thoughts and time spent thinking
anxiety-related thoughts by group o f participant
Anxiety plus 
Insomnia 
(n = 21)
Anxiety 
only 
(n = 4)
Insomnia 
only 
(n = 15)
Good sleeper 
(n = 22)
Percentage in 
group reporting 
anxiety-related 
thoughts (n)
85.7% (18) 50% (2) 80.0%
(12)
31.8% (7)
Time (in minutes) 
spent thinking 
anxiety-related 
thoughts 
Mean (SD)
49.9 (48.4) 8.8 (14.4) 27.5
(35.7)
3.1 (6.9)
Percentage of time 
of total time 
awake spent 
thinking anxiety- 
related thoughts 
Mean (SD)
34.1 (26.5) 6.9 (8.3) 29.5
(30.9)
13.6 (23.4)
Mean distress 
rating for anxiety- 
related thoughts / 
100
Mean (SD)
63.9 (20.5) 
(N= 18)
30.0 (14.1) 
(N = 2)
37.8
(25.0)
(N = 12)
33.9(23.1) 
(N = 7)
The percentage of participants reporting anxiety-related thoughts was highest in 
the Anxiety plus Insomnia group, followed closely by the Insomnia only group, 
then the Anxiety only group, then the Good Sleeper group. Group differences 
were significant: %2 = 15.813;df=2;p< 0.0005. Paired chi-square tests revealed 
that group differences existed between the Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Good 
Sleeper groups (%2 = 12.824; df = 1; p < 0.0005), and between the Insomnia only 
and Good Sleeper groups (%2 = 8.288; df = 1; p = 0.004). There was no 
significant difference between the Anxiety plus Insomnia and Insomnia only 
groups (x2 = 0.206; df = 1; p = 0.650).
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Time spent thinking anxiety-related thoughts was highest in the Anxiety plus 
Insomnia group, followed by the Insomnia only group, then the Anxiety only 
group, then the Good Sleeper group. Group differences were significant; Chi- 
Square = 19.981; df = 2, p < 0.0005. Post-hoc tests corrected for multiple 
comparisons (p < 0.017) revealed significant differences between the Anxiety 
plus Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups; Z = 4.196, p < 0.0005, and between 
the Insomnia only and the Good Sleeper groups; Z = 3.174, p = 0.002. There 
were no significant differences between the two Insomnia groups; Z = 1.409, p = 
0.159.
Percentage of total time awake spent thinking anxiety-related thoughts was also 
highest in the Anxiety plus Insomnia group, followed by the Insomnia only 
group, then the Good Sleeper, then the Anxiety groups. Group differences were 
significant; Chi-Square = 9.425, p = 0.009. Post-hoc tests corrected for multiple 
comparisons revealed a significant difference between the Anxiety plus Insomnia 
and the Good Sleeper group, Z = 2.830, p = 0.005; however, the difference 
between the Insomnia only and the Good Sleepers did not quite reach the level of 
statistical significance, Z = 2.385, p = 0.017. Differences between the two 
Insomnia groups were not significant, Z = 0.557, p = 0.578.
Mean distress ratings for anxiety-related thoughts were highest in the Anxiety 
plus Insomnia group, followed by the Insomnia only group, followed by the Good 
Sleepers, then the Anxiety only group. Group differences were significant: F (2, 
34) = 7.017, p = 0.003. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant differences 
between the Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Insomnia only groups (p = 0.010), 
and between the Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Good Sleeper groups (p = 0.014). 
There were no significant differences between the Insomnia only and the Good 
Sleeper groups (p = 0.929).
Results replicated those described in analysis 1, with the exception of distress 
ratings, which were significantly higher in the Anxiety plus Insomnia group than 
the Insomnia only group (the CMHT Insomnia and Other Insomnia groups did
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not differ from each other on distress ratings concerning anxiety-related 
thoughts).
Aim 3: Thought control
Means and standard deviations for the groups on the six sub-scales of the TCQ-I 
are shown in table 14.
Table 14: Means and standard deviations fo r  the groups on the TCQ-I sub-scales
Anxiety plus 
Insomnia 
(n = 21) 
Mean (SD)
Anxiety 
only 
(n = 4) 
Mean (SD)
Insomnia 
only 
(n = 15) 
Mean (SD)
Good Sleeper 
(n = 22)
Mean (SD)
Worry (Max. 
score = 28)
14.6 (4.3)1 12.0 (1.7)* 12.9 (2.7) 9.3 (2.1)
Punishment 
(Max. score = 
24)
11.4 (3.6) 8.3 (2.6) 9.7 (3.5) 7.6 (1.8)
Social (Max. 
score = 28)
13.9 (4.9) 17.3 (3.4) 14.9 (4.2) 17.4(2.8)
Suppression 
(Max. score = 
20)
11.8(2.6) 12.5 (3.3) 11.7(2.5) 11.3 (2.4)
Replacement 
(Max. score = 
36)
19.7 (3.5) 19.8 (4.6) 19.9 (5.3)3 18.0 (3.8)4
Reappraisal 
(Max. score = 
36)
19.6 (4.0) 19.3 (1.0) 20.7 (3.9) 19.1 (4.2)
Based on n = 20
2 Based on n = 3
3 Based on n = 14
4 Based onn = 21
Mean Worry scale scores were highest for the Anxiety plus Insomnia group, 
followed by the Insomnia only group, then the Anxiety only group, then the Good 
Sleeper group. Group differences were significant, F (2, 54) = 17.429, p < 
0.0005. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed significant differences between the 
Anxiety plus Insomnia group and the Good Sleeper group (p < 0.0005), and 
between the Insomnia only group and the Good Sleeper group (p = 0.001).
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Differences between the Anxiety plus insomnia and Insomnia only group were 
not significant (p = 0.440).
Mean Punishment scale scores were highest for the Anxiety plus Insomnia group, 
followed by the Insomnia only group, then the Anxiety only group, then the Good 
Sleeper group. Group differences were significant, F (2, 55) = 9.840, p < 0.0005. 
Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed a significant difference between the Anxiety plus 
Insomnia group and the Good Sleeper group (p < 0.0005). Differences were not 
significant between the Insomnia only and the Good Sleeper groups (p = 0.082) 
nor between the Insomnia only and Anxiety plus Insomnia groups (p = 0.170).
Mean Social scale scores were highest for the Good Sleeper and the Anxiety only 
group, then slightly lower for the Insomnia only group, then slightly lower still 
for the Anxiety plus insomnia group. Group differences were significant: Chi- 
Square = 7.096; df = 2; p = 0.029. Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests, corrected for 
multiple comparisons, revealed a significant difference between the Good Sleeper 
and the Anxiety plus Insomnia group (p = 0.014). The difference between the 
Insomnia only and the Good Sleeper group did not reach the level of statistical 
significance (p = 0.058). The difference between the Insomnia only and the 
Anxiety plus Insomnia was not significant (p = 0.450).
Mean scores on the Suppression, Replacement and Reappraisal scales were 
comparable across groups and not significantly different: F (2, 55) = 0.235, p = 
0.791; F (2, 53) = 1.196, p = 0.310; F (2, 55) = 0.673, p = 0.515 respectively.
Compared with analysis 1, analysis 2 yielded different results for the Worry and 
Punishment sub-scales. When participants were grouped on the basis of source of 
recruitment, participants with Insomnia recruited from the CMHT used Worry 
and Punishment significantly more than participants with Insomnia recruited via 
the Sleep Clinic and University. However, when grouped on the basis of presence 
of anxiety disorder, the Anxiety plus Insomnia group did not differ significantly 
on use of either Worry or Punishment from the Insomnia only group. In addition, 
when grouped on the basis of presence of anxiety disorder, the Insomnia only 
group were no different from Good Sleepers in use of Punishment; however,
219
Major research project: results
when the groups had been based on source of recruitment, the Other Insomnia 
group used Punishment significantly more than Good Sleepers.
Group comparisons for the other TCQ-I sub-scales of Social Control, 
Suppression, Replacement and Reappraisal yielded the same results as analysis 1.
Aim 4: Beliefs about sleep
Mean and standard deviations for the groups on the mean DBAS-10 score are 
shown in table 15.
Table 15: Mean and standard deviation fo r  the groups on the mean DBAS-10 
score
Anxiety plus 
Insomnia 
(n = 20)
Anxiety only 
(n = 4)
Insomnia only 
(n = 15)
Good Sleeper 
(n = 22)
DBAS
Mean
(SD)
67.9 (14.2) 51.4 (8.5) 61.2(12.2) 41.2(14.6)
Mean score on the DBAS was highest in the Anxiety plus Insomnia group, 
followed by the Insomnia only group, followed by the Anxiety only group. The 
Good Sleeper group had the lowest mean DBAS score. Group differences were 
significant, F (2, 54) = 20.860, p < 0.0005. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed 
significant group differences between the Anxiety plus Insomnia and the Good 
Sleeper groups (p < 0.0005), and between the Insomnia only and Good Sleeper 
groups (p < 0.0005). There were no significant differences between the Anxiety 
plus Insomnia and Insomnia only groups (p = 0.341).
The results replicated those in analysis 1. Therefore, regardless of whether 
participants with insomnia were grouped on the basis of source of recruitment, or 
presence of anxiety disorder, they were still not significantly different from each 
other, and were still significantly different from Good Sleepers in ratings of 
unhelpful beliefs about sleep.
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Discussion
Main findings
This study aimed to test out Harvey’s (2002) model of the maintenance of 
insomnia in a population of people with co-morbid anxiety disorders. In 
particular, its aims were to investigate the degree of applicability of the model to 
people with co-morbid anxiety compared to those with insomnia only. The study 
also aimed to test the relevance of the model to people with insomnia plus co- 
morbid anxiety by comparing this group to those with anxiety only. 
Unfortunately, insufficient numbers of people with anxiety only were recruited; 
therefore, the second aim of the study could not be fulfilled by making statistical 
comparisons.
With respect to the main aim of the study, the results were supportive of Harvey’s 
model. They suggest that most aspects of the model apply equally to those with 
insomnia and co-morbid anxiety or those from a CMHT, when compared with 
those with insomnia only, or those recruited from usual sources in the literature 
(i.e. a Sleep Clinic or a University). Specifically, regardless of the presence of 
anxiety, people with insomnia have higher cognitive arousal and higher 
endorsement of unhelpful beliefs about sleep than good sleepers. This replicates 
previous research findings from studies of people with insomnia only (Lichstein 
& Rosenthal, 1980; Nicassio et al., 1985; Harvey, 2001; Morin et al., 1993). 
Harvey’s model’s prediction that people with insomnia think more about sleep at 
bedtime was also supported. This replicates previous findings concerning people 
with insomnia only (Wicklow & Espie, 2000; VanEgeren et al., 1983) and 
extends them to find that sleep-related thought content is also a feature of 
insomnia in people with co-morbid anxiety disorders. The present research also 
found anxiety-related thoughts at bedtime to be a feature of insomnia, regardless 
of the presence of anxiety. This raises the possibility that anxiety-related thought 
content might be implicated in the maintenance of insomnia in addition to sleep- 
related thoughts, which is a new finding.
221
Major research project: discussion
The research also supported the aspect of Harvey’s model concerning the use of 
unhelpful thought control strategies in people with insomnia, and furthermore 
demonstrated that frequency of use is even higher in people attending a CMHT 
than people with insomnia recruited from other sources. That people with 
insomnia use worry as a strategy to deal with unwanted thoughts more frequently 
than good sleepers is consistent with previous research outlining the prominence 
of worry in insomnia (e.g. Harvey, 2001; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & 
DePree, 1983). That people with insomnia use punishment as another strategy is 
also consistent with other studies that have demonstrated the role of putting 
pressure on the self to sleep in insomnia (Ansfield, Wegner & Bower, 1996) and 
the association of punishment and self-blame with poor sleep (Harvey, 2001; 
Gregory and Eley, in preparation). Thus, the present study suggests that use of 
worry and punishment may be particularly prominent factors in the maintenance 
of insomnia in people from a CMHT. Alternatively, the higher use of punishment 
could be due to the fact that the people with insomnia from the CMHT had higher 
depression levels than people with insomnia from the Sleep Clinic or University, 
as the tendency to be self-critical (i.e. punishing of the self) is a common feature 
of depression. Therefore, punishment is not necessarily maintaining the insomnia 
in this population. In order to address this the study could be replicated using 
groups matched for levels of depression.
The study also extended previous research to demonstrate that although not a 
feature of insomnia only (Harvey, 2001) people with insomnia from the CMHT 
tended to use the thought control strategy of sharing thoughts with others sleepers 
(measured on the Social Control sub-scale of the TCQ-I) less frequently than 
good sleepers. Low utilisation of this strategy could be contributing to the 
maintenance of high cognitive arousal and insomnia by two mechanisms. Firstly, 
the role of reduced emotional processing has been implicated in insomnia (Farrell 
& Harvey, 2001). Therefore, discussing thoughts with others may help to reduce 
cognitive arousal at night and thereby be a preventative factor in insomnia. 
Secondly, discussion of thoughts with others may allow an alternative perspective 
on the thought, thereby facilitating dealing with the thought in a helpful way.
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Contrary to predictions, the use of the unhelpful thought control strategy of 
thought suppression did not differ between the groups. It is unclear as to why this 
was. Although this may be due to lower group numbers in the study relative to 
previous research (e.g. Harvey, 2001), there was not even a trend towards higher 
use of suppression in the insomnia groups.
Implications of findings for treatment
The present results suggest that interventions based on the model of insomnia for 
primary insomnia may also be appropriate for people with insomnia and co- 
morbid anxiety disorders. Interventions designed to address high cognitive 
arousal at bedtime in poor sleepers, such as the Pennebaker writing technique, 
which is thought to be effective by aiding people to process and deal with 
problematic thoughts prior to going to bed (Farrell & Harvey, 2001), may also be 
suitable for people with co-morbid anxiety disorders. Similarly, cognitive- 
behavioural treatment focusing on unhelpful beliefs about sleep (Edinger et al., 
2001a) is also likely to benefit people with insomnia plus co-morbid anxiety. 
Furthermore, the high levels of physical tension found in people with insomnia 
plus anxiety at bedtime might suggest that interventions used to reduce this, such 
as relaxation, might be appropriate.
When considering the type of cognitive content to address in treatment, the 
present results suggest that both sleep- and anxiety-related thoughts might need to 
be addressed in both people with insomnia only and people with insomnia plus 
anxiety. The high co-morbidity between the two disorders lends further support to 
the use of a treatment approach that addresses both types of cognitions.
This research suggests that for people from a CMHT with insomnia, a special 
focus on use of unhelpful thought control strategies might be needed. For 
example, treatment for worry, analogous to that for GAD, may be appropriate. In 
addressing the tendency to punish oneself, paradoxical experiments might be 
helpful in illustrating the role of performance anxiety in insomnia. Cognitive- 
behavioural intervention addressing the tendency to be self-critical may also be 
appropriate.
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Future research could address the use of the above recommended components in 
cognitive-behavioural treatment in order to establish their effectiveness and 
furthermore, would have implications for whether they hold key maintaining 
roles in insomnia.
Implications of findings for diagnosis
That the anxiety plus insomnia and insomnia only groups were similar on several 
of the measures in this study may question the usefulness of the diagnostic 
distinction between primary insomnia and that due to a mental health problem, 
such as anxiety. Indeed, the tendency to worry is a shared factor between 
insomnia and GAD/anxiety.
It is of relevance to note that of the participants recruited via the sleep clinic or 
University, eight (36%) met the criteria for DSM-IV anxiety disorder, and 5 
(23%) met criteria for GAD. Therefore, a high degree of co-morbidity was found 
between insomnia and GAD in the present sample. Given the implicated role of 
high cognitive arousal and the strategy of worry to deal with this in the 
maintenance of insomnia, this finding is not surprising. There may be a high 
degree of overlap between GAD and insomnia: it may be that they share 
maintaining factors, for example, the perceived usefulness of worry. Previous 
research has demonstrated this as a strategy to deal with high cognitive arousal in 
people with insomnia (Harvey, in press b). This parallels findings in the GAD 
literature (Wells, 1997).
Implications for future research
People with insomnia tend to employ certain thought control strategies, such as 
worry, and, in the case of those with co-morbid anxiety, increased use of 
punishment, and decreased use of discussing thoughts with others. These findings 
are likely to be reflective of meta-cognitive beliefs regarding the appraisal of 
thoughts and how they should be dealt with (Wells, 1997). Indeed, the higher 
distress ratings associated with sleep- and anxiety-related thoughts in people with
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co-morbid anxiety could be reflective of meta-cognitive appraisals regarding the 
nature of their pre-sleep thoughts. These beliefs could be the subject of future 
research.
This research was an assessment of the cognitive factors thought to be involved 
in the maintenance of insomnia. However, it should be noted that the group 
differences observed could be a result of, rather than a maintaining factor in 
insomnia. Further research could address this issue in treatment studies in order 
to further elucidate the key maintaining factors in insomnia. The role of different 
thought control strategies could also be addressed in thought control manipulation 
experiments, for example in people with anxiety without insomnia.
An aspect of the model that was not tested in the present research was the 
predicted tendency of people with insomnia to selectively attend to and monitor 
sleep-related stimuli (Harvey, 2001). This could be a subject of further research 
within a population of people with anxiety in order to determine whether this has 
a possible maintaining role.
Strengths and limitations of the study
Participant recruitment
The research was limited by the low numbers in the anxiety only group, which 
prohibited inclusion of the group in statistical comparisons. Ideally, with 
sufficient group numbers, data would have been analysed using a 2 X 2 factorial 
ANOVA, which would have allowed exploration of main and interaction effects 
of insomnia and anxiety on the key cognitive variables. That there were more 
people with insomnia than without in the anxiety sample is discrepant with the 
proportions that would be expected in an actual anxiety sample based on previous 
research; for example, 60% prevalence of insomnia in a sample of people with 
social phobia (Stein et al., 1993), 68% prevalence of insomnia in a sample of 
people with panic disorder (Stein et al., 1993). There are several possible 
explanations for the low prevalence of participants without insomnia in the 
present sample. One reason could be that the two studies cited reported data for
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participants with only the specified anxiety disorder, whereas co-morbid other 
psychiatric diagnoses were not an exclusion criteria for the present research. 
Therefore, prevalence of insomnia in the present sample may have been higher 
than reported in the research. Alternatively, the low numbers of participants 
without insomnia from the CMHT may be explained by the recruitment 
procedure. People with sleeping difficulties had an increased incentive to take 
part in the form of the booklet outlining strategies to improve sleep and the 
promise of feedback. This may have led to a differentially higher response from 
participants with sleeping difficulties.
Further research could address these issues. Firstly, the prevalence of insomnia in 
people who attend CMHTs, who are likely to have co-morbid psychiatric 
diagnoses, could be assessed in a separate study. Secondly, in the present study, 
clinicians were simply asked to give out information packs to anyone with 
anxiety, and not asked to assess for whether people had insomnia or not. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether there was a response bias. Clinician assessment 
of insomnia would allow such a calculation to be made. Thirdly, the possible bias 
in recruitment could possibly be remedied by providing an incentive for the 
anxiety only group to participate, such as a handout on anxiety.
There were also lower numbers than had been expected in the other groups, 
which reduced the power of the study to find significant differences. In particular, 
that significant differences on the use of some thought control strategies, and not 
any other of the cognitive variables, between the insomnia plus anxiety and the 
insomnia only groups could reflect that there was insufficient power in this study 
to find a difference. Therefore, the study needs replication, or extension, with 
sufficient numbers of participants to properly investigate whether people with 
insomnia plus co-morbid anxiety disorders display similar, or different, levels of 
cognitive arousal and reporting of sleep- or anxiety-related thoughts to people 
with insomnia only.
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Generalisability offindings
It should also be noted that the response rate in the CMHT was 22.7%. Data 
regarding non-responders were not collected, and therefore the degree of 
generalisability is uncertain. In the present study, clinicians were not asked to 
provide descriptive data on participants given information packs due to 
constraints on their time; however, such data would have highlighted possible 
biases in recruitment. It should also be noted that the advertisements around the 
University would have been accessible to a large number of people although only 
a small proportion of people responded. Therefore, this sample is highly self­
selected, and their results may not be generalisable to a larger sample of people 
with insomnia.
It should be noted that CMHT participants were all receiving some kind of 
treatment for their problems, which may have biased their responses on the 
dependent variables. For example, one participant reported that she had received 
cognitive-behaviour therapy and therefore did not worry so much about her 
thoughts. Therefore, the generalisability of this research to people with untreated 
anxiety disorders is unclear. Future research could replicate this research in an 
equally severe, but untreated population; for example admissions to CMHTs, 
where higher levels of cognitive arousal and more utilisation of unhelpful thought 
control strategies (e.g. worry and punishment) might be expected.
Critique o f assessment procedures
A strength of this study was that formal DSM diagnostic procedures were used to 
classify the sample according to presence of insomnia and anxiety disorders. The 
extent of generalisability of previous research on insomnia to people with co- 
morbid anxiety disorders/those attending CMHTs was unclear as studies either 
did not include a formal diagnostic procedure as part of the study, did not report 
the data, or did not compare populations. The detailed description of participants, 
and comparisons made in the present study, aids clarification of the features of 
insomnia in people both with and without co-morbid anxiety disorders.
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A limitation of this study was that alternative causes or maintaining factors for 
insomnia were not definitively identified. Polysomnography was only performed 
in four participants recruited from the sleep clinic. The IDI included probe 
questions for sleep apnoea and other explanations for insomnia; however, more 
detailed investigation to exclude these possibilities was beyond the scope of the 
study.
Previous research has used a variety of methods for collecting data regarding 
thought content, including both in-vivo and retrospective report. That participants 
were required in the present study to report retrospectively may have biased the 
results. It is well known that beliefs can bias information processing in a variety 
of mental health problems. Thus participants with insomnia might be more likely 
to remember negative cognitions than those who were satisfied with their sleep. 
This process is implied by Harvey (2002) in discussion of the tendency of people 
with insomnia to focus on lack of sleep during the daytime; therefore, congruent 
information may be more readily recalled by this group. The present study 
attempted to increase accuracy by collecting data from the previous night, which 
was likely to have aided recall and accuracy compared to asking about cognitions 
at night-time in general. However, using only one night as the period of 
measurement potentially made the research biased by specific events the day 
before, and may not have been representative of a typical night. A further 
possible bias of the results was that, participants were required to make time 
estimates, both in terms of total time awake, and time spent thinking each thought 
listed. Participants reported that they found the former difficult, and the latter 
particularly difficult. Previous research has demonstrated a tendency for people 
with insomnia to over-estimate time (Tang & Harvey, 2001). Therefore, the 
accuracy of the time estimates is likely to be questionable. Using in-vivo data 
collection methods might increase reliability, but such methods are less 
ecologically valid as they are likely to interfere with cognition content. A further 
complication, applicable to all methods of assessing thought content, is individual 
variability in accessibility of cognitions; clinicians may spend some time in 
therapy using a variety of techniques (e.g. Beck, 1995) to access clients’ 
cognitions, but research design requires that participants have easy access to
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cognitions. Further research could examine the effects on sleep of instructing 
participants to think particular types of cognitions in the pre-sleep period.
A limitation of the study was that the thought content questionnaire was a new 
measure and therefore its psychometric properties are unknown. In particular, 
reliability of the participants’ reports over time was not investigated. This could 
be the subject of future research using a repeated-measures design.
A further limitation of the thought content questionnaire was that only anxiety- 
related cognitions were probed for. Due to the nature of difficulties of people 
attending a CMHT, participants were likely to have other, unrecorded DSM 
diagnoses, including, for example, personality disorders, eating disorders, or 
depression. Thus, the thought content measure may have been insensitive to 
measurement of other night-time cognitions related to other psychiatric 
diagnoses, that may have contributory maintaining roles, such as depressive 
cognitions regarding sadness and loss. Future research could replicate the present 
methodology to people with other psychiatric diagnoses, for example, depression, 
to investigate the extent to which Harvey’s model of insomnia is applicable in 
other groups, and the extent to which other psychiatric-related cognitions are 
implicated in the maintenance of insomnia in other groups.
A limitation of previous research (e.g. Harvey, 2000) that has examined thought 
content is that studies have not accounted for total time awake. This is important, 
as the longer someone has to think, the more likely a given thought is to come 
into mind (Morin, 1993). A strength of the present study was that it examined 
presence of thoughts, time thinking about the thoughts, and proportion of time 
spent thinking particular categories of thoughts; however this highlighted 
discrepancies in results depending on method of analysis. Time spent thinking 
sleep-related thoughts were highest in the anxiety plus insomnia group; however, 
when calculated as proportion of total thinking time, the anxiety plus insomnia 
group spent the least proportion thinking sleep-related thoughts of all of the 
groups. This discrepancy between the results might be due to a suggested 
phenomenon of inaccuracy in time-estimation when people are highly cognitively 
aroused (Morin, 1993). Alternatively, the discrepancy could suggest that when
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time is controlled for, there really are no differences in time spent thinking sleep- 
related thoughts. In this case, sleep-related thoughts might be as a result of, rather 
than a maintaining factor in, insomnia (Freedman & Sattler, 1982; Morin, 1993). 
Further research needs to develop accurate and reliable methods of measuring 
time if this is to be investigated in future studies.
Conclusions
This research has investigated cognitive factors that may maintain insomnia in 
people with co-morbid anxiety disorders. Cognitive arousal and beliefs about 
sleep are at similar levels in people with insomnia, both with and without co- 
morbid anxiety relative to good sleepers. This suggests that they may be involved 
in the maintenance of insomnia in both groups. Similarly, the content of thoughts 
appears to be both sleep- and anxiety-related in both people with and without co- 
morbid anxiety disorders, which suggests that both types of thought content may 
have a maintaining role in insomnia. The use of worry and punishment strategies 
were more prominent in people with insomnia plus co-morbid anxiety, compared 
to those with insomnia only. This suggests that use of these strategies may be 
particularly relevant to the maintenance of insomnia in this population through 
tendency to view worry and self-criticism as helpful strategies to deal with 
thoughts, thereby increasing threat interpretations of thoughts and thus increasing 
arousal, making sleep less likely. Additionally, people with insomnia plus anxiety 
had a reduced tendency to discuss their thoughts with others. This could result in 
lack of emotional processing or external input on thoughts, which could maintain 
appraisals about thoughts as threatening and increase cognitive arousal, thereby 
maintaining the insomnia. As the group differences between use of punishment 
and discussion of thoughts with others have not been demonstrated in previous 
research, these should be replicated in further research.
Overall these findings suggest that people with anxiety plus insomnia may benefit 
from similar treatment to people with insomnia only. Treatment might 
specifically target reduction of mental activity at bedtime, and modification of 
unhelpful beliefs about sleep. Attention needs to be given to the possible role of 
anxiety-related thoughts in insomnia, and conversely, the role of sleep-related
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thoughts in people with anxiety plus insomnia, in addition to the thoughts 
associated with their diagnosis. Special attention might need to be given to 
reducing the use of unhelpful thought control strategies such as worry, 
punishment, and keeping the thought to oneself in people with co-morbid anxiety 
disorders. Further research employing manipulation of thought control strategies, 
or response to treatment studies, on the basis of the above recommendations, 
would clarify the question regarding the possibility that the cognitive factors 
identified are a mere result of insomnia, as opposed to key maintaining factors.
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1Interview for the Diagnosis of Insomnia (IDD
Demographics
Name:
Age:
Phone:
Sex:
Address:
Occupation:
Education:
Cluster A - The predominant complaint is difficulty initiating or maintaining sleep, or nonrestorative sleep, for at least 1 month.
1. Would you say you sleep very well, moderately well or not very well? (interviewer to circle one)
I f  answered "sleep very well" patient does not meet criteria fo r  insomnia (may need to go to Cluster C & D  
when using for research purposes). i f
2. Which aspects of your sleep do you have difficulty with? (interviewer to circle answer)
(SHOW Card B)
Falling asleep | /
Staying asleep 
Waking up too early
Waking up in the morning and feeling like the sleep you have had was not restorative
If patient responded "yes ” to more than one item ask You have said that you have problems with <list . 
them>. Which of these do you regard as the biggest problem?
Which do you regard as the second biggest problem? Etc.
Put a number from 1 to 4 next to circled items to indicate the biggest problem (1) to the least biggest 
problem (4)
Frequency. Please indicate on the following scale how many nights/days a week you <have trouble falling 
asleep, staying asleep, waking up too early, waking up in the morning and feeling like the sleep you have 
had was not restorative>7 (write a, b, c, d, or e next to the relevant area of difficulty above) (SHOW  
CARD A)
a. never or less than once per month
b. less than once per week (score 1)
c. on 1 night a week (score 2)
d. on 2 nights a week (score 2)
e. on 3 nights a week (score 3) - cutoff
f. on 4 nights a week (score 3)
g. on 5 nights a week (score 3)
h. on 6 nights a week (score 4)
i. on every night or almost every night (score 4)
Total across each area o f difficulty Score 2 = ______
Severity. I f  difficulty falling asleep... When you are having trouble getting to sleep, how long does it take 
you to fall asleep? (SHOW Card C)
a. less than 10 minutes
b. 15-20 minutes (score 1)
c. 20-25 minutes (Score 1)
d. 25-30 minutes (score 1)
e. 30-60 minutes (score 2) - cutoff
f. 60-90 minutes (score 3)
g more than 90 minutes (score 4)
If difficulty staying asleep.. . When you are having difficulty staying asleep, how much time are you awake 
during the night? (SHOW Card C)
a. less than 10 minutes
b. 15-20 minutes (score 1)
c. 20-25 minutes (Score 1)
d. 25-30 minutes (score 1)
e. 30-60 minutes (score 2) - cutoff
a. 60-90 minutes (score 3)
b. more than 90 minutes (score 4) Score 4 = ________
I f  difficulty waking too early... When you are experiencing difficulties with waking too early, how much 
earlier do you wake in the morning compared to your ‘ideal’ waking time? (SHOW Card C)
a. less than 10 minutes
b. 15-20 minutes (score 1)
c. 20-25 minutes (Score 1)
d. 25-30 minutes (score 1)
e. 30-60 minutes (score 2) - cutoff
f. 60-90 minutes (score 3)
g. more than 90 minutes (score 4) Score 5 = _______
3. How long ago did you first start having problems sleeping? _
To meet criteria for Cluster A the patient must have slept "moderately well" or "not at all w ell"for more than one 
month. For the frequency and severity criteria there are two pathways (1) the frequency must be at least 3 nights/week 
or (2) the frequency must be at least 1 night per week but the severity must be 60 minutes or more.
Cluster A MET: Yes No Subtotal^
3
Cluster B - The sleep disturbance (or associated daytime fatigue) causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
1) Have your sleeping difficulties caused you to feel distressed, upset or bothered ? YES NO
I f  yes, please indicate on the following scale How many days a week do your sleeping difficulties cause 
you to feel upset or bothered? (circle one) (SHOW CARD A)
a. never or less than once per month (score 0)
b. less than once per week (score 1)
c. on 1-2 nights per week (score 2)
d. on 3-5 nights per week (score 3)
e. every night or almost every night (score 4)
Could you give me an example of a time you felt upset or bothered?_______ ;__________ ______________
2) Have your sleeping difficulties kept you from socialising or talking with people? YES NO
I f  yes, please indicate on the following scale How many days a week have your sleeping difficulties kept 
you from socialising or talking with people? (circle one)
a. never or less than once per month (score 0)
b. less than once per week (score 1)
c. on 1-2 nights per week (score 2)
d. on 3-5 nights per week (score 3)
e. every night or almost every night (score 4)
Could you give me an example of a time you were kept from socialising or talking with people?________
3) Have your sleeping difficulties kept you from completing your normal work? YES NO
I f  yes, please indicate on the following scale How many days a week have your sleeping difficulties kept 
you from completing your normal work? (circle one)
a. never or less than once per month (score 0)
b. less than once per week (score 1)
c. on 1-2 nights per week (score 2)
d. on 3-5 nights per week (score 3)
e. every night or almost every night (score 4)
Could you give me an example of a time you were kept from completing your normal work?___________
4) Have your sleeping difficulties kept you from doing other tilings you need to do? YES NO
I f  yes, please indicate on the following scale How many days a week have your sleeping difficulties kept 
you from doing other things you need to do? (circle one)
a. never or less than once per month (score 0)
b. less than once per week (score 1)
c. on 1-2 nights per week (score 2)
d. on 3-5 nights per week (score 3)
e. every night or almost every night (score 4)
Could you give me an example of a time you were kept from doing other things?_____________________
If any o f the above cluster B items are answered "yes ”, Cluster B is met Cluster B MET: Yes No.
Subtotal =
4
Cluster C - The sleep disturbance does not occur exclusively during the course of narcolepsy, breathing-related sleep disorder, 
circadian rhythm sleep disorder, or a  parasomnia.
I am now going to read out a list o f things that you or your bed partner may have noticed during die night 
I would like you to let me know which o f these you have noticed and to estimate in a typical week how 
many nights you experience these symptoms? Have you or your partner noticed..........
a. snoring YES NO How many nights/wk?
b. pauses in your breathing at night YES NO How many nights/wk?
c. shortness of breath during the night YES NO How many nights/wk?
d. choking at night YES NO How many nights/wk?
e. morning headaches YES NO How many nights/wk?
f. difficulty getting breath or 
breathlessness on waking YES NO How many nights/wk?
(if “yes " was answered to one o f  questions a to f  consider diagnosis o f sleep apnea)
g. sleep attacks YES NO How many nights/wk?
(when standingup. when doing physical exercise: Reite et al., 1997)
h. cataplexy YES NO How many nights/wk?_______
(sudden and complete loss ofmuscleJone - sometimes ju st in face, neck, and limbs in response to 
sudden emotional stimuli such as laughter, anger, surprise; Reite et al, 1997)
(if “ye s” was answered to one ofquestions g  to h consider diagnosis of narcolepsy)
i. nightmares YES NO How many nights/wk?_______
(must provoke intense fear and anxiety, must be repeated awakenings)
j. sleep paralysis YES NO How many nights/wk?_______
(waking from sleep and unable to move or speak)
k. night terrors YES NO How many nights/wk?
1. sleepwalking/talking YES NO How many nights/wk? _
(repeated episodes o f walking about during sleep - the person has a blank, staring face and is unresponsive)
m. bruxism YES NO How many nights/wk?_______
(repetitive teeth grinding during sleep)
il Periodic limb movements o f sleep YES NO
(uncomfortable sensations in the legs while trying to get to sleep)
(if “yes " was answered to one o f  questions i to m consider diagnosis ofparasomnia)
o. Does your j ob involve rotating shift work or night shift work OR has your job ever involved 
rotating shift work or night shift work. YES NO
(Do not get sleepy until well past the normal sleep onset time. Complaints o f inability to get to sleep until 
the early hours o f the morning but little difficulty sleeping once asleep. I f  they are able to not get up until 
they have had a normal amount o f  sleep they have no impairment)
If  yes, record details___________________ _____________________________________________
(if “yes " was answered to question n consider diagnosis o f  circadian rhythm disorder)
If the reported insomnia cannot be explained by sleep apnea, narcolepsy, parasomnias or a circadian rhythm 
disorder, Cluster C is met Cluster C MET: Yes No
Cluster D -  The disturbance does not occur exclusively during the course of another mental disorder (e.g., major depressive 
disorder, generalised anxiety disorder, a delirium) -  included ax of all DSM-IV disorders for which insomnia is a symptom.
Ask the SCID screening questions listed below. I f  the patient answers yes then complete appropriate 
section o f the SCID.
1. Have you ever had a period when you were feeling depressed or down 
most of the day nearly every day. Or a time when you lost interest or pleasure 
in things you usually enjoyed? (Major depressive disorder) YES
2. For the past couple o f years, have you been bothered by depressed mood most of the 
day, more days than not? (Dysthymic disorder) YES
3. In the last 6-months, have you been particularly nervous or anxious?
(Generalised anxiety disorder) YES
4. Sometimes things happen to people that are extremely upsetting - things like being 
in a life threatening situation like a major disaster, veiy serious accident or fire; being 
physically assaulted or raped; seeing another person killed or dead, or badly hurt, or 
hearing about something horrible that has happened to someone you are close to. At 
any time during your life, have any of these kinds o f things happened to you? YES
I f  any events listed: Sometimes these things keep coming back in nightmares, flashbacks, 
or thoughts that you can’t get rid of. Has that ever happened to you? YES
If no: What about being very upset when you were in a situation that reminded you of 
one of these terrible things7(Posttraumatic and Acute stress disorder) YES
6. Has there been any time in your life when you had five or more drinks (beer, 
wine, or liquor) on one occasion? YES
Have you ever used street drugs? YES
Have you ever become “hooked” on a prescribed medication or taken a lot more of it than 
you were supposed to? YES
(Substance abuse disorder, Substance-induced disorder, Alcohol withdrawal, Caffeine withdrawal, 
Amphetamine withdrawal, Cocaine withdrawal, Nicotine withdrawal, Opioid withdrawal, sedative, 
hypnotic, or anxiolytic withdrawal)
7. Have you ever experienced a disturbance of consciousness, a time when your ability to focus, 
sustain or shift your attention has been impaired? YES NO
(Delirium)
If the reported insomnia cannot be explained by another mental disorder, Cluster D is met
Cluster D MET: Yes No .
Cluster E - The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance
Just before developing your problems with sleeping were you taking any drugs,
caffeine, diet pills or medicines? YES NO
Describe______________________________________________
In the last month have you been taking any drugs, caffeine, diet pills or medicines? YES NO 
Describe_______________________________________
How much coffee and tea do you drink a day?_______ cups of coffee ________ cups o f tea
What time of the day do you drink your last cup of tea or coffee?_______________________ .
How much alcohol do you drink a day?________
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
What time of the day do you drink your last glass of alcohol?_____________________________ _
If the reported insomnia cannot be explained by the direct physiological effects o f  a substance, ClusterE is met
Cluster E MET: Yes No
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Appendix 2: DSM-IV criteria for insomnia
A. The predominant complaint is difficulty initiating or maintaining sleep, or 
nonrestorative sleep, for at least 1 month.
B. The sleep disturbance (or associated daytime fatigue) causes clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important 
areas of functioning.
C. The sleep disturbance does not occur exclusively during the course of 
Narcolepsy, Breathing-Related Sleep Disorder, Circadian Rhythm Sleep 
Disorder, or a Parasomnia.
D. The disturbance does not occur exclusively during the course of another 
mental disorder (e.g., Major Depressive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder, a delirium).
E. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance 
(e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition.
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Appendix 3 :  Hospital Anxiety „  jg
Qate:
  ,/lay an important part in moot illnesses. If your doctor knows about these feelings he will be able
helpyoumore.. • * •
This questionnaire is designed to help your doctor to know how you feel. Read each item and place a firm tick in the. box opposite tl 
reply which ccmos closest to how you have been feeling in the past week.
Don’t take too long over your replies: your immediate reaction to each item will probably be more accurate than a  long thought-out- 
response.
Tick atity one box m each section.
I fee l te n se  or 'wound up’:
. Most of the t im e ....................................
A lot of the tim e..................  :-------
Time to'time, O ccasion a lly ................
Not at a l l  ........ '...............................
I feel a s  If I am slo w ed  down:
Nearly all the t im e ......................................
-Very o fte n ..................   .......;....
S o m etim es ...............................
Not at a l l ............................... ..................... .
arar
I still enj’oy  the th in gs I u sed  to enjoy:
Definitely a s  m u c h  :...................
Not quite so  much ......* .......................
Only a little ............................................
Hardly at a l l ....................... :--------------
I g e t a  sort o f frightened feeling a s  if 
som eth ing  awful is  about to h a p p e n : .
' Very definitely and quite badly  —
Y es, but not too badly ..................
A little, but it doesn’t worry m e ..........
Not at a l l   .......................  :-
I get a  sort o f frightened feeling like 
'butterflies’ in th e  stom ach:
Not at a l l .................... ..........................
O ccasionally  ...............................
Quite o fte n  ..........................................
Very often  ....................... ....................
f have lost interest in m y appearance:
Definitely :  ...... ........................
1 don’t take so much care a s  I should.. 
I may not take quite as much care ..... 
I take just a s  much care a s  e v e r ........
I can laugh and s e e  the funny s id e  of 
th ings: ' -  '
As much a s  I always could  ...........
Not quite so  much n o w ...................—
Definilely not so  much n o w ................
Not at a l l ....................... :......... ...............
I feel r e stle ss  as If I have, to  b e  on  th e  
m ove:
Very much indeed ............. ..................
Quite a  l o t ...............................................
Not very m u c h   ...............................
Not at a l l ......................... ..;v.......... ........ * • 1/ : : 4___
Worrying thoughts g o  through my 
mind: ______
A great deal of the t im e ....................
A lot of the t im e ...................................
From time to time but not too often
Only occasion ally ...................... .......
I feel cheerful:
Not at a l t  ...'............ :..................
No! o fte n ......................... ................
S o m etim es ......................
Most of the lime  .......................
I can  sit at e a se  and feel relaxed:
D efin itely .  .....................
U su a lly   ................................
. Not often  ............. .......... ...........
Not nr an
•
' - " A
V . * !
£
I look forward with enjoym ent to  thing s :
. As much as ever I d id ..............................
Rather less than I used to .*.....................
Definitely le ss  than 1 used t o  .
Hardly at all ........... ................... ..........
1
-------
I get sudden fee lin gs of panic:
Very often indeed ....:;.............
Quite o ften ......................... ;......
Not very o fte n ............................
Not at a l l   .........................
I can enjoy a good  book or radio or TV 
programme:
O fte n   ....... ......................................
Sometimes  .................... ...............
Not often
I. • 1i ^JUrf.C'.H'VS
r a L ' - l
M R
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Appendix 4: Sleep Disturbance Questionnaire
• SDQ
‘. O  ' ' v !
• Please circle the appropriate number* 
statements are for your typical sleep pattern.
Never
True
1. I can’t get into a 
comfortable position in bed 1
Seldom Sometimes Often
True true true
Very ofte 
true
2. My mind keeps turning 
things over 1
3. I can’t get my sleep 
pattern into a proper routine 1
4. I get too “worked up” at 
not sleeping 1
5. I find it hard to physically 
“let go” and relax my body 1
6. My thinking takes a long 
time to “unwind” 1
7. I don’t feel tired enough
at bedtime 1
8. I try too hard to get to sleep 1
9. My body is full of tension 1
10. I am unable to empty my 
mind 1
11. I spend time reading/ 
watching TV in bed when I 
should be sleeping 1
12.1 worry that I won’t cope tomorrow 
if  I don’t sleep well 1
13.1 have got into bad sleeping 
habits ■ 1
14. It’s just because I am getting 
older 1
Which one of the above statements is most relevant to you? 249
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Appendix 5: Thought content measure
Thought Content Questions
“I would like you to think about when you were lying in bed last night and I would like to 
ask you some questions about the kinds of thoughts that were going through your mind.”
"When you  were lying in bed  last night, what d id  you  think about? ”
Prompt with specific questions
"Now I ’ll run through a list o f  thoughts som e peop le have to see whether these were thoughts that 
you  were thinking about last night... ”
(If yes, prompt with, “Could you tell me more about that?”) NB: BE SURE TO PROMPT 
WHEN ANSWERS ARE VAGUE OR CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED -  “COULD YOU TELL ME 
MORE ABOUT THAT?”
(If person is unclear, can prompt with examples in brackets)
(Sleep)
“When you were lying in bed last night, did you find yourself thinking about the amount of 
sleep you would have, or how tired you would feel the next day?”
(Anxiety)
“When you were lying in bed last night, did you find yourself thinking about the possibility 
that something awful might happen to you, or that you might lose control, or have a panic 
attack?”
“When you were lying in bed last night, did you find yourself thinking about what would 
happen if you go out?” (for example, that you might go out and then become very anxious)
“When you were lying in bed last night, did you find yourself thinking about anxieties and 
worries?”
“When you were lying in bed last night, did you find yourself thinking about whether you 
have done things that you should have done and what might happen if you had not done 
them?” (for example, checking that the door is locked, or washing your hands?)
“When you were lying in bed last night, did you find yourself thinking about social 
situations and other people’s reactions or judgements about you?”
Then, go back over each thought and ask...
“For how long, roughly, were you awake last night?”
“When you thought about ...X ..., how distressing did you find that on a scale of 0 to 100, 
with 0 being not at all distressing, and 100 being the most distressing?”
“When you thought about ...X ..., how long would you estimate you were thinking about 
that for whilst in bed last night?”
(NB: I f  times do not add up, prom pt fo r  thoughts in spare time)
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Appendix 6: Thought Control Questionnaire -  Insomnia
Thought Control Questionnaire -  Insomnia
Many people find that as they are trying to get to sleep at night thoughts relating 
to the day they have just had or thoughts about tomorrow come to mind. Other 
times thoughts relating to ongoing problems or stressors at work or in your home 
life come to mind. Sometimes these thoughts make it hard to fall asleep.
How often does thinking too much keep you awake?
0 1
Never
10
Every night
Below are a number of things that people do to control these thoughts. Please 
read each statement carefully and indicate how often you use each technique to 
control the thoughts that run through your mind as you are trying to get to sleep at 
night by circling the appropriate number. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Do not spend too much time thinking about each one.
When thoughts running through my mind keep me awake at night....
Never Sometimes Often Almost always
1. I tell myself not to think about them now
2. I try to push the thoughts out of my head
3. I count sheep
4. I call to mind positive images instead
5. If the thoughts relate to a problem I make a decision 
about it in order to solve the problem
6. I try to block them out by reading a book, 
watching TV or listening to the radio
7. I ruminate about them
8. I decide to put them “on hold” until the morning
9. I get out of bed and write about them
10.1 let my mind go blank
11.1 tell myself not to be so stupid
12.1 focus on the thought
13.1 replace the thought with a more trivial bad thought
14.1 don’t talk about the thought to anyone
15.1 punish myself for thinking the thought
16.1 dwell on other worries
17.1 keep the thought to myself
18.1 think about something else instead
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Never Sometimes Often Alm ost always
19.1 challenge the thoughts validity
20 .1 get angry at myself for having the thought
21.1 avoid discussing the thought
22 .1 shout at myself for having the thought
23 .1 analyse the thought rationally
24 .1 slap or pinch myself to stop the thought
25 .1 think pleasant thoughts instead
26.1 find out how my friends deal with these thoughts
27 .1 worry about more minor things instead
28 .1 do something that I enjoy
29.1 try to reinterpret the thought
30.1 occupy myself with work instead
31.1 think more about the more minor problems I have
32.1 try a different way of thinking about it
33.1 think about past worries instead
34.1 ask my friends if  they have similar thoughts
35.1 focus on different negative thoughts
36 .1 question the reasons for having the thought
37.1 tell myself that something bad will happen if I think 
the thought
38.1 talk to a friend about the thought
39 .1 keep myself busy
4 0 .1 prefer to think things through than distract from 
them
41.1 seek reassurance from others (eg. my bed partner or
a friend on the following day) 1
42 .1 say “stop” to myself 1
43 .1 do something physical to block them
(eg. turn over, get out of bed) 1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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Appendix 7: Dysfunctional Beliefs About Sleep -  ten item questionnaire
DBAS
Please indicate to what extent you personally agree or disagree with each of the statements listed 
below. There is no right or wrong answer. For each statement, place a mark ( / )  along the line 
whenever your personal rating falls. Try to use the whole scale, rather than placing your marks at 
one end of the line.
1. I need 8 hours of sleep to feel refreshed and function well during the day.
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
2. When I don’t get a proper amount of sleep on a given night, I need to catch up on 
the next day by napping or on the next night by sleeping longer.
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
3. I am concerned that chronic insomnia may have serious consequences for my physical health. 
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
4. When I have trouble getting to sleep, I should stay in bed and try harder.
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
5. I am worried that I may lose control over my abilities to sleep.
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
6. After a poor night’s sleep, I know that it will interfere with my daily activities on the next day. 
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
7. When I feel irritable, depressed, or anxious during the day, it is mostly because I did not sleep 
well the night before.
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
8. When I sleep poorly on one night, I know it will disturb my sleep schedule for the whole 
week.
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
9. When I feel tired, have no energy, or just seem not to function well during the day, it is 
generally because I did not sleep well the night before.
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
10.1 get overwhelmed by my thoughts at night and often feel I have no control over my racing 
mind.
Strongly disagree -----------------------------------------------------------------  Strongly agree
Strongly agree
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Appendix 8: Information sheet for CMHT participants
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DrMetkaShawe-TaylorBSc MSc PhD CPsychol 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist
Surrey O ak lands
NHS Trust
»nfp™atipn.sh^Sj^ .mearch Dorking Community Mental Health Team
Clarendon House Mental Health Resource Centre 
Why Is this research Important? 28 West Street
We spend 1/3 of our lives sleeping yet we understand so litfle about sleep and about how to Dorking
correct sleep problems. Sleeping difficulties can cause people a lot of distress. Research * Surrey 
suggests that people who attend a Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) often experience RH4 1
difficulties in sleeping. However, most of die research into sleeping problems has n°t j e \- 01306  502400 
included people who also have other difficulties. This study aims to find out about factors that FaX; 01306  502608 
are maintaining sleeping difficulties in people who attend a CMHT. It is hoped that once 
these factors are identified, we will know more about how to best help sleeping problems in 
people who attend CMHTs.
Do I need to have sleep problems in order to participate?
No! It does not matter whether you have sleep problems or not We hope to be able to 
compare responses from people who have difficulty sleeping with those who do not This will 
hopefully let us know more about how to help people with sleeping problems.
What does taking part involve?
It is very easy and should take no more than one hour of your time. If you take part you will 
first need to sign a consent form (enclosed), fill out your contact details and post this back in 
die freepost envelope provided (no stamp needed). Then a researcher, Rachel Blake, will 
contact you to arrange for you to answer some questions about your sleep. This interview will 
take place at Clarendon House, or over die telephone if  you prefer. You will then be given 
some questionnaires to complete and return. You can either complete these at Clarendon 
House, or take them home and return them by post. If you choose to return them by post die 
researcher will give you a stamped addressed envelope.
Do I have to take part?
No! It is entirely up to you whether or not you decide to take part in this research. You do not 
have to give any reasons for not taking part. Even if  you do decide you want to take part, and 
then later change your mind, you can tell the researcher that you no longer want to take part 
You do not have to give a reason. If you decide not to take part, either now or later, die 
standard of care you receive at the community mental health team will not be affected. The 
research will not be mentioned to you by your clinician during your consultations.
What will be the benefits of taking part?
If you take part in this research, afterwards you will be given a booklet telling you about 
strategies to improve your sleep. You will also have the opportunity to meet with/speak to the 
researcher over the telephone to discuss your answers to the questions. If you decide to take 
up this opportunity, you will be given feedback about potentially helpful and unhelpful 
strategies in getting to sleep. This research will hopefully lead to greater understanding of 
sleeping difficulties, and how to treat them.
Who will see the questionnaires?
Your answers will be kept confidential. Only the researchers will see the questionnaires or 
answers you give in response to questions about your sleep. If you take part in the study, you 
will be assigned a number. Questionnaires will only have this number on them and not your 
name. Only numbers, and not names, will be stored on a computer. The contact details you 
provide on the consent form will be kept confidential and will be destroyed after you have 
talked to die researcher about your sleep.
Thank you for taking time to read this information and consider your decision. If you would 
like to speak to someone about this, or would like any more information, please contact 
Rachel Blake, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, at Department of Psychology, University of 
Sui^ | 5 uildford, GU2 7XH.
_   T rnct U n arln n a rto rc  D aH an rlc  H m ico C n n lc rlnn  Roar! C a to rh a m  S n rro v  CR3 SYA
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Appendix 9: Consent form for CMHT participants
Consent form; sleep research
I (name)____________ _______________________________________
have read and understood the information given to me about the above research. I 
understand that taking part in the study will involve completing some questionnaires and 
answering some questions about my sleep. I understand that the researcher will contact 
me to arrange a convenient time to answer the questions about my sleep.
I understand that whether I decide to take part or not, my care in the Community Mental 
Health Team will not be affected and this research will not be mentioned by my clinician 
during my consultations.
I understand that my answers will be kept confidential and when entered onto the 
computer, will be identifiable by a number only. I understand that the contact details I 
provide will be destroyed after I have spoken with the researcher about my sleep.
I agree to take part in this project and know that I can withdraw at any time without 
needing to give any reason for doing so.
Signed:__________________________________Date:____________________
If you would like to contact the researchers, please write to Rachel Blake at Department 
of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH.
In order that the researcher can contact me to arrange a convenient time to ask me 
some questions about my sleep, please (tick/complete as appropriate)
Telephone me______________________ My number is____________________
The best time(s)/day(s) to call me are____________________________________
OR
Contact me by post____________ My address is__________________________
Please note, the researcher will arrange with you a convenient time to meet at Clarendon 
House to ask you some questions about your sleep.
If you would prefer to answer these questions over the telephone, please tick here__
Please now post this form in the stamped addressed envelope enclosed. You will be
contacted shortly by Rachel Blake to arrange to ask you some questions about your
sleep.
Thank you very much for taking part.
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Appendix 10: Information sheet for participants recruited via the sleep clinic
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UniS
Information sheet; Sleep research 
Why is this research important?
We spend 1/3 of our lives sleeping yet we understand so little 
about sleep and about how to correct sleep problems. Sleeping 
difficulties can cause people a lot of distress. Researchers are 
currently developing a new theory about insomnia; however, it is 
not clear whether the theory is relevant for different types of 
sleeping difficulties. This study aims to fund out about factors that 
are maintaining different types of sleeping problems. It is hoped 
that once these factors are identified, we will know more about 
how to best help people with different types of sleeping 
difficulties.
Why me?
Your clinician has been asked to give this information to people who have insomnia We hope to ask 
people with different kinds of insomnia some questions about their sleep and compare their answers 
with those from people who sleep well. This should highlight new ways to treat insomnia By 
comparing answers from people with different types of insomnia, we should find out whether new 
treatments are likely to be helpful to everyone, or just people with certain kinds of insomnia The more 
people who agree to take part, die more representative the research will be of people with different 
types of sleeping difficulties.
What does taking part involve?
Taking part is very easy and should take no more than one hour of your time. If you decide to take part 
you will first need to sign a consent form (enclosed), fill out your contact details and post fins back in 
the freepost envelope provided. Then a researcher, Rachel Blake, will contact you to arrange for you to 
answer some questions about your sleep over die telephone. After this, you will be sent some 
questionnaires to complete and return in a stamped addressed envelope.
Do I have to take part?
No! It is entirely u p  to vou whether or not you decide to take part in this research. You do not have to 
give any reasons for not taking part Even if  you do decide you want to take part, and then later change 
your mind, you can tell die researcher that you no longer want to take part You do not have to give a 
reason. If you decide not to take part, either now or later, the standard of care you receive at the Sleep 
Laboratory will not be affected. The research will not be mentioned to you by your clinician during 
your consultations.
What will be the benefits of taking part?
If you take part in this research, afterwards you will be given a booklet telling you about strategies to 
improve your sleep. If you wish, the researcher can discuss with you the new theory about sleeping 
difficulties that is being developed. You will also have the opportunity speak to the researcher over the 
telephone to discuss your answers to the questions. If you decide to take up tins opportunity, you will 
be given feedback about potentially helpfhl and unhelpful strategies in getting to sleep. This research 
will hopefully lead to greater understanding of sleeping difficulties, and how to treat diem.
Who will see the questionnaires?
Your answers will be kept confidential. Only die researchers will see the questionnaires or answers you 
give in response to questions about your sleep. If you take part in the study, you will be assigned a 
number. Questionnaires will only be labelled with this number, and not your name. Only numbers, and 
not names, will be stored on a computer. The contact details you provide on the consent form will be 
kept confidential and will be destroyed after you have talked to the researcher about your sleep.
Thank yon for taking time to read this information and consider your decision. If you would like to 
speak to someone about this, or would like any more information, please contact Rachel Blake, Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist, at Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH, 
telephone 01483 259441.
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800
Facsimile
+44(0)1483 300803
School of
Human
Sciences
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Appendix 11: Consent form for participants recruited via the sleep clinic
Consent form: sleep research
I (name)___________________________________________________
have read and understood the information given to me about the above research 
and have had the opportunity to contact the researcher to ask any questions I may 
have. I understand that taking part in the study will involve completing some 
questionnaires and answering some questions about my sleep. I understand that 
the researcher will contact me to arrange a convenient time to answer the 
questions about my sleep.
I understand that whether I decide to take part or not, my care at the Sleep 
Laboratory will not be affected and this research will not be mentioned by my 
clinician during my consultations.
I agree to the researcher contacting my general practitioner about my 
participation in the study in confidence.
I understand that my answers will be kept confidential and when entered onto the 
computer, will be identifiable by a number only. I understand that the contact 
details I provide will be destroyed after I have spoken with the researcher about 
my sleep.
I agree to take part in this project and know that I can withdraw at any time 
without needing to give any reason for doing so.
Signed:_________________________________ Date:____________________
If you would like to contact the researchers, please write to Rachel Blake at 
Department of Psychology (PsychD Clinical Psychology), University of Surrey, 
Guildford GU2 7XH, or call 01483 259441.
In order that the researcher can contact me to arrange a convenient time to 
ask me some questions about my sleep, please
Telephone me. My number is________________________________________
The best time(s)/day(s) to call me are__________________________________
Please now post this form in the freepost envelope enclosed. You will be
telephoned shortly by Rachel Blake to arrange with you a convenient time to ask
you some questions about your sleep.
Thank you very much for taking part.
Major research project: appendices
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UniS
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800 
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
School of
Human
SciencesInformation sheet; Sleep research 
Why is this research important?
We spend 1/3 of our lives sleeping yet we understand so little 
about sleep and about how to correct sleep problems. Sleeping 
difficulties can cause people a lot of distress. Researchers are 
currently developing a new theory about insomnia; however, it is 
not clear whether the theory is relevant for different types of 
sleeping difficulties. This study aims to find out about factors that 
are maintaining different types of sleeping problems. It is hoped 
that once these factors are identified, we will know more about 
how to best help people with different types of sleeping 
difficulties.
Why me?
You have responded to an advertisement for people who have difficulty sleeping. We hope to ask 
people with different kinds of insomnia some questions about their sleep and compare their answers 
with those from people who sleep well. This should highlight new ways to treat insomnia. By 
comparing answers from people with different types of insomnia, we should find out whether new 
treatments are likely to be helpful to everyone, or just people with certain kinds of insomnia. The more 
peoplewhoagreetO-takepart,-themorerepresentativetheresearchwillbeofpeq)lewithdifferent 
[ types of sleeping difficulties.
[ What does taking part involve?
Taking part is very easy and will take a maximum of one hour of your time. If you decide to take part 
you will first need to sign a consent form (enclosed), fill out your contact details and post this back in 
I the freepost envelope provided. Then a researcher, Rachel Blake, will contact you to arrange for you to 
answer some questions about your sleep over the telephone, or in person, whichever you prefer. After 
this, you will be given some questionnaires to complete and return in a stamped addressed envelope.
Do I have to take part?
No! It is entirely up to vou whether or not you decide to take part in this research. You do not have to 
give any reasons for not taking part. Even if you do decide you want to take part, arid then later change 
your mind, you can tell the researcher that you no longer want to take part. You do not have to give a 
reason.
What will be the benefits of taking part?
If you take part in this research, afterwards you will be given a booklet telling you about strategies to 
I improve your sleep. The researcher will also give individual feedback about potentially helpful and 
unhelpful strategies in getting to sleep on the basis of your answers, which should be helpful in learning 
how to improve your sleep. This research will hopefully lead to greater understanding of sleeping 
difficulties, and how to treat them.
Who will see the questionnaires?
jYour answers will be kept confidential. Only the researchers will see the questionnaires or answers you 
pve in response to questions about your sleep. If you take part in the study, you will be assigned a 
lumber. Questionnaires will only be labelled with this number, and not your name. Only numbers, and 
lot names, will be stored on a computer. The contact details you provide on the consent form will be 
cept confidential and will be destroyed after you have talked to the researcher about your sleep.
Thank you for taking time to read this information and consider your decision. If you would like to 
speak to someone about this, or would like any more information, please contact Rachel Blake, Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist, at Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH, 
slephone 01483 259441.
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Appendix 13: Consent form for participants recruited via the University (and 
good sleepers)
Consent form: sleep research
I (name)___________________________________________________
have read and understood the information given to me about the above research 
and have had the opportunity to contact the researcher to ask any questions I may 
have. I understand that taking part in the study will involve completing some 
questionnaires and answering some questions about my sleep. I understand that 
the researcher will contact me to arrange a convenient time to answer the 
questions about my sleep.
I understand that it is up to me whether I decide to take part or not.
I understand that my answers will be kept confidential and when entered onto the 
computer, will be identifiable by a number only. I understand that the contact 
details I provide will be destroyed after I have spoken with the researcher about 
my sleep.
I agree to take part in this project and know that I can withdraw at any time 
without needing to give any reason for doing so.
Signed:_________________________________ Date:____________________
If you would like to contact the researchers, please write to Rachel Blake at 
Department of Psychology (PsychD Clinical Psychology), University of Surrey, 
Guildford GU2 7XH, or call 01483 259441.
In order that the researcher can contact me to arrange a convenient time to 
ask me some questions about my sleep, please (please tick)
Telephone m e________ My number is________________________________
The best time(s)/day(s) to call me are_________________________________
OR email me__________My email address is___________________________
Please now post this form in the freepost envelope enclosed. You will be
telephoned shortly by Rachel Blake to arrange with you a convenient time to ask
you some questions about your sleep.
Thank you very much for taking part.
Major research project: appendices 
Appendix 14: Self-help booklet given to participants
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In 
most cases you 
will not see immediate 
im
provem
ents in 
your sleep 
but, so 
♦ 
Food 
and 
drink 
can 
be 
very 
im
portant to 
our sleep. Many 
of us are 
in 
the 
long 
as 
you 
stick 
with 
your 
program
m
e, you 
are 
likely 
to 
notice 
gradual 
habit of drinking 
a 
hot drink 
before 
going 
to 
bed. If you 
wish 
to 
keep 
doing
improvement over several weeks. 
this, try 
a 
small warm 
milky 
drink 
as 
this 
promotes 
sleep. Do 
not 
drink
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1. Introduction
You 
may 
not feel motivated 
or able 
to 
read 
all through 
this 
booklet. In 
this 
A 
good 
night’s sleep 
is important to 
all of us as sleep 
helps to 
replenish 
our 
case you 
could 
work 
through 
these 
strategies together with 
your key 
worker,
energy 
levels and 
restore 
pur bodies. If you 
are 
reading 
this booklet you 
are 
therapist, or doctor. They 
can 
give 
you 
further advice 
and 
encouragem
ent to
probably 
having 
frustrating 
problems with 
your sleep 
and 
may 
have 
done 
so 
stick 
with 
it. 
\
do 
not sleep 
well, your bedroom 
and 
bed 
may 
have 
become 
strongly 
(and 
unhelpfully) associated 
with 
being 
awake 
for long 
periods of time. Stimulus 
Control is a 
strategy 
which 
aims to 
make 
the 
connection 
between 
your bed
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2.3 
Sleep 
Restriction 
If your 
sleep 
has 
not greatly 
im
proved, you 
might need 
to 
go 
for 
another
week 
using 
the 
same 
sleep 
restriction 
time. Eg. After 
a 
week 
Mary 
is 
still
If you 
find 
that after using 
Stimulus 
Control 
for several weeks your sleep 
has 
having 
problems 
dropping 
off to 
sleep 
and 
her 
sleep 
is 
still broken. She
not improved 
that much, then 
Sleep 
Restriction 
is the 
next useful strategy 
to 
decides to 
stick 
with 
her 5 
hours restriction 
for another week.
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UniS
University School of
of Surrey Human
Information sheet: Sleep research
Why is this research important?
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800
We spend 1/3 of our lives sleeping yet we understand so little Facsimile
about sleep and about how to correct sleep problems. Sleeping +44 (°)1483 300803
difficulties can cause people a lot of distress. Researchers are
currently developing a new theory about insomnia; however, it is
not clear whether the theory is relevant for different types of
sleeping difficulties. This study aims to find out about factors that
are maintaining different types of sleeping problems. It is hoped
that once these factors are identified, we will know more about
how to best help people with different types of sleeping
difficulties.
You have responded to an request for people who sleep well. We hope to ask people with different 
kinds of insomnia some questions about their sleep and compare their answers with those from people 
who sleep well. This should highlight new ways to treat insomnia. By comparing answers from people 
with different types of insomnia, we should find out whether new treatments are likely to be helpful to 
everyone, or just people with certain kinds of insomnia. The more people who agree to take part, the 
more representative the research will be of people with different types of sleeping difficulties.
What does taking part involve?
Taking part is very easy and will take a maximum of half an hour of your time. If you decide to take 
part you will first need to sign a consent form (enclosed), fill out your contact details and post this back 
in the freepost envelope provided. Then a researcher, Rachel Blake, will contact you to arrange for you 
to answer some questions about your sleep over the telephone, or in person, whichever you prefer. 
After this, you will be given some questionnaires to complete and return in a stamped addressed 
envelope.
Do I have to take part?
No! It is entirely u p  to you whether or not you decide to take part in this research. You do not have to 
give any reasons for not taking part. Even if you do decide you want to take part, and then later change 
your mind, you can tell the researcher that you no longer want to take part. You do not have to give a 
reason.
What will be the benefits of taking part?
If you take part in this research, the researcher can give individual feedback about your answers, if you 
would like. It is particularly important that we include people who do not have difficulty sleeping in the 
research, in order that we can understand more about helpful strategies in getting to sleep. As a person 
who sleeps well, by taking part you will be helping the researchers gain a greater understanding of how 
people are able to gain a good nights sleep. This will guide treatment of people who have difficulty 
sleeping.
Who will see the questionnaires?
Your answers will be kept confidential. Only the researchers will see the questionnaires or answers you 
give in response to questions about your sleep. If you take part in the study, you will be assigned a 
number. Questionnaires will only be labelled with this number, and not your name. Only numbers, and 
not names, will be stored on a computer. The contact details you provide on the consent form will be 
kept confidential and will be destroyed after you have talked to the researcher about your sleep.
Thank you for taking time to read this information and consider your decision. If you would like to 
speak to someone about this, or would like any more information, please contact Rachel Blake, Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist, at Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH, 
telephone 01483 259441.
Why me?
Major research project: appendices
Appendix 16: Ethics approval granted from East Surrey Local Ethics Research 
Committee
SH/AJR
Date: 27th November 2001. 
To: Rachel Blake,
Dear Ms Blake,
RE: COFNITIVE FACTORS MAINTAINING INSOMNIA IN PEOPLE WITH ANXIETY
WHO ATTEND A CMHT 
REF: 19RBIA(333) - to be quoted on all future correspondence p lease
Thank you for your letter dated 15th October 2001 in response to our letter of 
concerns dated 27th September 2001. The East Surrey Local Research Ethics 
Committee discussed these issues at its meeting on Friday, 23rd November 2001 
and I am pleased to inform you that approval has been granted to commence this 
study.
In future, the Committee would like to follow up all new trials. Therefore, w e would 
be grateful if you could send us an update after a period of a year from the 
commencement of the study with the following details:-
1. Is the research still continuing?
2. If it is, which stage has it reached:-
2.1. Data being collected
2.2. Data being analysed
2.3. Research being written up
2.4. Research published.
N.B. If you are sending any Protocol Amendments to  us, p lease  ensure that 
you highlight the areas o f change.
Thank you for your trouble.
merely,
EAST SURREY LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
Santham s, 
W est Park Hospital, 
Horton Lane, 
Epsom , Surrey, 
KT19 8PB.
I rris,
Manager - ESLREC
tv5&
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Appendix 17: Ethics approval granted from University of Surrey ethics 
committee
29 January 2002
Ms Rachel Blake
Dear Ms Blake
University vf 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800
Facsimile
+44(0)1483 683811
Cognitive factors maintaining insomnia 
(ACE/2001/85/Psvchl
I am writing to inform you that the Advisory Committee on Ethics has considered the 
above protocol (and the subsequent information supplied) and has approved it on the 
understanding that the Ethical Guidelines for Teaching and Research are observed and 
the following condition is met:-
• That the Information Sheet for Volunteers (last paragraph) also includes your 
direct telephone number at the University (not a private number), should the 
Volunteers wish to contact you for more information.
For your information, and future reference, the Guidelines can be downloaded from 
the Committee’s website at http://www.surrev.ac.uk./Surrev/ACE/.
This letter of approval relates only to the study specified in your research protocol 
(ACE/2001/85/Psych). The Committee should be notified of any changes to the 
proposal, any adverse reactions, and if the study is terminated earlier than expected, 
with reasons.
I should be grateful if you would confirm in writing your acceptance oi me conamun 
above, forwarding the amended document for the Committee’s records.
Date of approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 29 January 2002
' Date of expiry o f approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 28 January 2007
Please inform me when the research has been completed.
Yours sincerely
Catherine Ashbee (Mrs)
Secretary, University Advisory Committee on Ethics
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Appendix 18:Definitions for thought content analysis
Thought content definitions
Sleep-related thoughts
Any thought expressed relating to the amount of sleep, quality of sleep, getting to 
sleep or waking up, daytime consequences of sleep (e.g. tiredness), thoughts 
about sleep in the future, monitoring for signs of being tired or strategies to 
improve sleep.
Anxiety-related thoughts
Any thought that relates to the possibility of having a panic attack or losing 
control, thoughts of checking things, thoughts of how others might perceive the 
self in social situations, meta-cognitions about thoughts, threat-related thoughts.
Other thoughts
Any sadness-related thoughts, or anger-related thoughts, or thoughts that do not 
fit into the above categories, e.g. looking forward to events, problem-solving 
going over what has happened in the day, neutral thoughts.
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